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ABSTRACT 
 
Derived from the Latin corrodere, meaning to ‘gnaw to pieces’, corrosion as a 
transformative physical process is nature at its most sublime, engendering 
fear and power, producing the obscure and reducing form to the darkness 
‘beneath all beauty as promise of its ultimate annihilation’ (Beckley, 2001: p. 
72). The thesis considers corrosion as subtraction, erasure and negation in 
relation to the painting process. Through experimentation with the ruination of 
both content and painting’s plastic, material properties the thesis reflects upon 
how the disruption or destruction of image and surface might relate to the un-
representable. 
 
Within the history of twentieth century art negation has been cited as the 
defining spirit of the Modernism (TJ Clark: 1986). Jean François Lyotard 
suggests that it is the sublime that has provoked this destructive, nihilistic 
tendency and given Modern and postmodern art its ‘impetus and axioms’ 
(Lyotard: 1979). As the 2010 Tate research project, The Sublime Object 
attests, the sublime is once again ‘now’. Painting was conspicuous in its 
absence from the project, perhaps because as Simon Morley states ‘most 
sublime artworks these days tend to be installations. It is certainly getting 
harder for painting, the traditional vessel for evoking visual sublimity, to elicit 
such effects’ (2010, p. 74). This thesis will examine Morley’s position by 
considering how the composition of the un-presentable may be alluded to 
through de-composition and corrosion in painting. An expressionist enquiry 
into the tension between figure and ground the thesis investigates a 
relationship between mark, surface and the sublime.1 
 
Notoriously difficult to capture, the sublime is intrinsically contradictory, 
making an effective, overarching theory on the subject all but impossible to 
sustain (Forsey: 2007). Highlighting some of the problems surrounding the 
theory of the sublime James Elkins, in his essay ‘Against the Sublime’ (2009), 
suggests that the term has been mistaken for a trans-historical category and 
that it has been used and abused to smuggle religious content into 
contemporary critical writing. Further more, he describes the post-Kantian 
postmodern sublime as so intricate and linguistically complex as to render it 
effectively redundant without substantial qualification. Elkins has called for a 
moratorium on the term sublime and a redress of language in favor of new, 
direct terms (2009). This project asks if painting can facilitate this redress and 
provide these terms. 
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A note on thesis structure: 
 
Central to this research is a perceived tension between forms of discourse 
and language. This is reflected in the thesis structure. Experimentation with a 
negative, abject language of painting is the prism through which a new 
theoretical perspective on the sublime and its discourse is viewed. Material 
language determines a re-reading of a historical narrative. Studio practice is 
the compass with which the library is navigated. Painting leads the 
investigation. For this reason a portfolio of studio research is presented first 
as foreground to the theoretical inquiry. 
 
The structure of the written document, necessarily, presents chapters that 
establish the theoretical and critical perspective before those which deal with 
studio research. Consequently, it will be noted that there is a deliberate shift in 
tone and timbre between chapters that consider theory and those that look at 
painting as material language. 
 
All portfolio images copyright of the author. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Entering that gabled-ended Spouter Inn, you found yourself in a wide, low, 
straggling entry with old-fashioned wainscots, reminding one of the bulwarks 
of some condemned old craft. On one side hung a very large oil painting so 
thoroughly besmoked, and every way defaced, that in the unequal crosslights 
by which you viewed it, it was only by diligent study and a series of 
systematic visits to it, and careful inquiry of the neighbors, that you could any 
way arrive at an understanding of its purpose. Such unaccountable masses of 
shades and shadows, that at first you almost thought some ambitious young 
artist, in the time of the New England hags, had endeavored to delineate 
chaos bewitched. But by dint of much and earnest contemplation, and oft 
repeated ponderings, and especially by throwing open the little window 
towards the back of the entry, you at last come to the conclusion that such 
and idea, however wild, might not be altogether unwarranted. 
 
[!] A boggy, soggy, squitchy picture truly, enough to drive a nervous man 
distracted. Yet there was a sort of indefinite, half-attained, unimaginable 
sublimity about it that fairly froze you to it, till you involuntarily took an oath 
with yourself to find out what that marvelous painting meant. 
      Henry Melville, Moby-Dick or, The Whale1 
 
Published in 1851, Melville’s description of his narrator Ishmael’s encounter 
with this obscure, unsettling painting — a painting that eventually reveals itself 
as a depiction of terror and the ‘leviathan’ — is noteworthy as an account of 
an ‘unimaginable sublimity’ manifest in painting of a particular materiality. 
Widely regarded in terms of the grand Romantic literary tradition, Melville’s 
account of the painting at the whaling inn presents that which exceeds 
cognition and ultimately language itself not in the context of the elevation or 
elation historically associated with the shock and awe of theologically charged 
nature, but instead in terms prescient of a very modern sense of the sublime, 
where the inconceivable is bound not to the towering mountain range or 
infinite heavens but rather to a secularized notion of spirit, to the base, the un-
representable, to the inexpressible — to presentation itself. Representation 
gives way to abstraction, content to form, figure to ground. Sublime 
experience is not contained by readable, associative signs, symbols or 
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narrative motifs — by description or literature — rather the sublime is 
operative, it is presence. It is the direct, physical immediacy of the painting 
itself. Melville invokes a sublimity that turns on the negative, on ‘shades’, 
‘shadows’ and on ‘chaos’. The abyss or the infinite void is embodied in the 
‘half-attained’. Melville grasps the sublime against the grain, against the 
prevailing traits of affirmation and progress as modeled by Edmund Burke in 
his influential 1757 treatise A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of Our 
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful. Though demonstrably and directly 
indebted to Burke’s categorization of the concept, Melville invokes, via the 
medium of painting, an essentially pessimistic sublime where nature is 
indifferent, arbitrary, base and malign.2 It offers no redemption or divine 
reassurance. The luminous Romantic landscape of William Wordsworth and 
Casper David Friedrich gives way to darkness — to a defiled and desecrated 
material surface — besmoked, defaced, boggy, squitchy. Rather than that of 
Edmund Burke, such language is perhaps more redolent of the anti-
hierarchical, anti-institutional writing of the twentieth century dissident 
surrealist George Bataille. It is an abject sublime that holds Ishmael in 
peculiar thrall. 
 
Prologue 
 
It is summer 2010, Camberwell College of Art. The day before the MA Fine 
Art final show is due to be installed. The studios, normally flooded with natural 
light from the floor-to-ceiling cast iron windows and gallery-white — but for the 
stains and viscera of a year’s worth of art student trial and error — are instead 
silent, dim and devastated. The walls are blackened with soot and dust that 
water runs through, forming a kind of tar that now streams ceiling-to-floor in 
places. The stench of smoke thickens the air turning it acrid. Every surface 
has been charred and chewed. The windows are shattered and the iron 
frames have buckled. Ceiling plaster, broken glass and the remains of studio 
furniture have formed a landscape of demolition. Fine art materials have been 
reduced to indefinable matter. Cellulose paper and sunlight have been the 
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catalyst for auto-combustion that has caused a fire to all but entirely destroy 
the facility.  
 
Amongst the wreckage of my workspace I am confronted by the remains of 
the body of painting I have developed over the course of my study. The fire 
has been fierce but inconsistent. Whilst nothing has entirely escaped its reach 
or the insidious effects of smoke and water, some work has fared better than 
others. My largest painting (180 x 120cm, oil on wood panel), yet to be titled, 
is still mounted to the wall. Nevertheless, the support has been badly 
disfigured and the original representational image all but entirely de-figured. 
Pictorial content has been reduced to such a degree that it is now not unlike 
the unfathomable abject abstraction that Melville’s narrator contemplates at 
The Spouter Inn. Like Ishmael, I too am fairly frozen to an unrecognizable, if 
not now incomprehensible painting. My initial emotionally charged response to 
a work that had taken a substantial amount of time to complete, now so 
drastically distorted, is slowly replaced by a kind of hypnotic apprehension in 
the face of that which has transgressed my limits as a painter. ‘Squitchy’ and 
‘besmoked’, my ambitions towards figuration have been ‘in every way 
defaced’. This process of de-composition, arbitrary and ambivalent, has left 
little but a bottomless black monochrome — a particular empty, far from 
nothing.  
 
Where previously as a figurative painter my work courted representational 
image to allude to or infer an oblique conception of narrative, the physicality of 
the corrupted surface now insists upon the primacy of material experience 
alone. Such experience feels direct and unmediated, corporeal rather than 
cognitive. There is a revelatory force in the here-ness, in the now-ness of the 
confrontation with the plastic reality of the defaced painting before me. The 
spirit invoked from such revelation has little to do with the divine, rather it 
equates to the spirit of painting — painting as feeling — spirit derived less 
from rapture and more from rupture, less from God, more from the unknown 
which George Bataille suggests ‘overturns everything within us like a violent 
wind’.3 A certain self-awareness is triggered in this temporal irruption where 
past and future splinter. It is a self-awareness that conflates the position of 
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author, whose aims and objectives have been distorted and transgressed by a 
process of degradation, with that of the spectator, whose reception of the 
work is now necessarily subjective. Like a Van Der Graaf generator, a kind of 
metaphysical static crackles from the material surface, holding opposing 
states at tension, oscillating between limit and that which is beyond, between 
past and future — between the anxiety that comes from what’s been lost and 
the dizzying sensation of delight at possibility, at a fleeting glimpse of new 
means and methods, of a language in painting defined by negation and base 
materiality. It is a sublime of the formless that holds me rigid to the remnants 
of my fire-damaged painting. 
 
Oil paint has separated from binders, medium from varnish, forming passages 
where a resin — a kind of ‘a nameless yeast’, to employ Melville’s phrase — 
coagulates between pocked and mottled pigment. Elsewhere the surface has 
bubbled and cracked, leaving a brittle flaking, sooty crust. Color has been 
polluted leaving ‘unaccountable shades and shadows’ in ash grey and char-
black. Other areas, where flames have been most direct are singed and 
scorched. Here wood, warped and bowing, is fully exposed beneath the 
destabilized sediment of paint layers and gesso primer. A previously 
meticulous and unified surface, with depth and form derived from technique 
and control, has been reduced to the indefinite by accident, chance and by 
absence. Figuration moves away from the literal and the literary towards an 
alternative conception — towards alterity, determined not by representation 
but by presentation or the impossibility of it. Here the operative methods are 
found to be corruption and decay. These destructive forces, these forces of 
privation subsequently proved the catalyst for a tectonic shift in my approach 
to painting and the figure/ground relationship.  
 
This re-orientation within my practice was not merely a turning out of the 
figurative in favor of pure abstraction. Rather it signaled a re-evaluation of 
figuration in abstract terms, whereby the exteriority of representation gives 
way to the interiority of expression. As such it is a shift from construction of 
image to the image of de-construction, from control to catastrophe, the optic 
to the haptic, from the intuitive to the subjective. Subsequently my concerns 
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have developed from how paint reads to how paint speaks or moves, both as 
plastic material but also in terms of affect. Simply put, I am interested with 
painting as a felt experience. In this sense the privileged position previously 
occupied by composition, association and narrative is superseded by a 
downward facing notion of materiality. As both critical, self-reflexive strategy 
and studio method, negation presented the means to integrate abstraction 
into coherent form. Through gesture and the material qualities of paint my 
practice has gravitated towards a relationship between expression and the un-
presentable. Fundamentally irreconcilable, the ground between concept and 
its articulation is unstable; it is the decaying, brittle veneer of a scorched oil 
painting, splintered, sticky and cracked. The ambiguous and contested 
territory between subject and object is the corroded surface.   
 
Chaos Delineated: Theory, Terms and Territory 
 
Derived from the Latin corrodere, meaning to ‘gnaw to pieces’, corrosion as a 
transformative physical process engenders fear and power, producing the 
obscure and reducing form to the darkness ‘beneath all beauty as promise of 
its ultimate annihilation’.4 It is nature at its most sublime — a nature 
characterized by the arbitrary and ambivalent and a sense of the ineffable 
found in the base and the abject. Corrosion embodies the orientation towards 
the negative that has arguably determined the conception of the modern and 
postmodern sublime. It serves as a broad term to encompass a painting 
practice increasingly driven by strategies of reduction, erasure and 
destruction. For the purposes of a research project that examines the 
figure/ground relationship in relation to the un-presentable, corrosion is 
employed poetically — as conceptual scaffold — and practically as studio 
strategy, relating to painting process and the figure. Through experimentation 
with the ruination of both content and painting’s plastic, material properties the 
study reflects upon how tactics of negation, the disruption or destruction of 
(figurative) image and/or surface might articulate a contemporary sense of the 
sublime after the exhaustion of traditional forms of language.  
 
!
∀!
Within the history of twentieth century art painters have courted negation 
variously as critical tactic, analytical process and strategy of abstraction. 
Clement Greenberg’s pervasive self-reflective, cannibalistic essentialism 
prescribed the destruction of the immediate past in search of new forms of 
expression that bore comparison to the established cannon of masterworks. 
Art’s will to eat itself, prominent particularly in late modernist painting — its 
‘desire to destroy beauty’, as Barnett Newman declared in his now famous 
text ‘The Sublime is Now’, published in the sublime issue of The Tiger’s Eye 
Magazine, 1948 — can be seen to have arisen from the collapse of traditions 
of academic representational painting and the subsequent need to confront 
the un-presentable. Stripped of the cozy surety offered by the pursuit of the 
representational, painting over the course of the first half of the twentieth 
century turned inwards on itself, from prosaic objective visuality towards 
‘totality’ — towards subjectivity, governed by the experience of material and 
process. Painting developed under the sign of absolutism particular to 
material and medium, resulting in vehement self-criticality — in acts of 
negation that T. J. Clark cites as the defining spirit of the modernism.5 In his 
appraisal of Greenberg’s theory of art Clark comments that ‘Modernism would 
have its medium be absence of some sort — absence of finish or coherence, 
indeterminacy, a ground which is called on to swallow up distinctions’.6  
 
Though Clark himself resists offering examples of what might be described as 
a culture of privation, much mid-century art can be seen through the prism of 
negation. At the same time that Greenberg is writing his seminal text ‘Avant 
Garde and Kitsch’, in 1949, Samuel Beckett purges himself of James Joyce’s 
influence by writing Waiting for Godot in Paris. Beckett declares, ‘I realized 
that my own way was in impoverishment, in a lack of knowledge and in taking 
away, in subtracting rather than in adding’.7 Performed for the first time in 
1953 — a year defined by erasure on both sides of the Atlantic — Waiting For 
Godot is a work of irreducible nothingness, it is an emptying out the theatrical 
from theater. Illusion is extinguished by existential abstraction leaving the 
equivalent of the theatrical monochrome. Also published in 1953 is Writing 
Degree Zero by Roland Barthes — likewise an essentialist manifesto for 
literature where language is stripped of style and manner in favor of the binary 
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— in the economy found in the relationship between negative and positive. 
1953 also witnessed Robert Rauschenberg exhibit his White Paintings at 
Betty Parsons’ Stable Gallery in New York. In a letter to Parsons 
Rauschenberg described them as 
 
Dealing with the suspense, excitement and body of an organic silence, the 
restriction and freedom of absence, the plastic fullness of nothing, the point a 
circle begins and ends. They are a natural response to the current pressures 
of the faithless and a promoter of intuitional optimism. It is completely 
irrelevant that I am making them — Today is their creator.
8
 
 
Though the negative language of the monochrome was by 1953 already 
established through precedents set variously by Kazimir Malevich (Black 
Square, 1915), Barnett Newman (Abraham, 1949) and Ad Reinhardt, 
Rauschenberg’s White Paintings caused critical consternation and division. 
Branden Joseph comments that for both Greenberg and Art Digest writer, 
Hubert Crehan, the 
 
White Paintings [!] crossed the razor-thin dividing line between a 
determinate negation (upon which the dialectic of formalist modernism's 
perpetual self-critique was founded) and an indeterminate or abstract form of 
negation that marked a revival of earlier avant-garde shock.
9
 
 
Clement Greenberg too apparently felt that the White Paintings fell on the 
wrong side of the right kind of negation, seeming rehearsed and without the 
‘feeling’ of material truth. Ambivalent about them, he waited until 1967 to 
describe them as ‘familiar looking and even slick’, reiterating his view that 
though a tacked up bare canvas might qualify as a picture it is not 
‘necessarily’ a good one.  
 
Rauschenberg’s White Paintings erased the figure/ground distinction entirely, 
leaving behind a silence that, rehearsed or otherwise, would inspire John 
Cage — a colleague of Josef Albers at Black Mountain College — to his own 
seminal act of negation, the sonic monochrome ‘4.33’ in 1953. The same year 
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would also eventually witness Rauschenberg’s notorious act of iconoclasm, 
The Erased de Kooning Drawing. Having convinced an understanding, but 
nevertheless disapproving, Willem de Kooning to give up a work to the idea, 
Rauschenberg spent close to a month fastidiously removing all trace of the 
abstract expressionist’s valuable figurative drawing. No easy task thanks to de 
Kooning’s choice of a formally complex and materially obstinate work.  
 
As with his experiments with the monochrome Rauschenberg’s Erased de 
Kooning Drawing oscillates between a kind of material sincerity and 
conceptual gesture, between repudiation and affirmation, between authentic 
process and shock tactic. Rauschenberg himself described his act of erasure 
as poetry — a particular kind of language, intrinsically abstract and counter to 
narrative, to history’s linear prose. The Erased de Kooning Drawing functions 
on the one hand as image of negation, as socio-cultural critique, and on the 
other as the negation of image, as process of abstraction that orientated 
subject from image to surface, material and medium. In the former sense 
erasure serves as a mechanism of revision, a means of purging history — of 
silencing a rarely compliant past. 1953 was very much in the shadow of a 
recent past defined by purges, from the Soviet show trials of the 30s, to the 
Nazi eradication of degenerative culture in the 40s, to the post war epuration 
campaign against artists, writers and politicians that had collaborated with 
Germany during the occupation of Paris. The Erased de Kooning Drawing 
might also be viewed through the lens of the second red scare that gripped 
America around 1953. The rise of communism had provoked the notorious 
witch-hunts orchestrated by the conservative US senator Joseph McCarthy 
that laid waste to numerous careers throughout the political, social and 
cultural spheres. This, combined with the nuclear paranoia that had taken 
hold globally after the Soviet Union exploded their first hydrogen bomb in 
August 1953, contributes to the sense that Rauschenberg’s act of negation 
indirectly reflects an age of anxiety.  
 
Artistically Rauschenberg’s performative, vandalistic negation of image has 
been received as the purging of Abstract Expressionism’s domineering 
presence — an Oedipal act of violence against the father. As Vincent Katz 
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argues, Rauschenberg himself is more equivocal, stating in interview that ‘I 
erased the de Kooning not out of any negative response’.10 It was not de 
Kooning that Rauschenberg’s iconoclasm aimed at but rather ‘given ways of 
working’ — language that had become familiar, comfortable and, therefore, 
untrustworthy and unreliable.11 While much can be made of Rauschenberg’s 
erasure critically and conceptually it remains in simple terms a material 
response to the question of subject — a matter of artistic methodology. It is a 
process of renewal, a restatement of potential through negation. Erasure is a 
clearing out. As Gilles Deleuze points out such a process of negation is 
universal and unavoidable, he writes ‘it would be a mistake to think that the 
painter works on a white and virgin surface. The entire surface is already 
invested with all kinds of clichés which the painter will have to break with’.12 
Deleuze continues 
 
They are all present in the canvas as so many images, actual or virtual, so 
that the painter does not have to cover a blank surface, but rather would have 
to empty it out, clear it, clean it. He does not paint in order to reproduce on 
the canvas an object functioning as a model; he paints on images that are 
already there, in order to produce a canvas whose functioning will reverse the 
relations between model and copy.
13
 
 
Rauschenberg produces a model that obliterates de Kooning’s copy. The 
figure, which, no matter how abstracted in de Kooning’s hands remains 
loaded with history and the sediment of association, is reduced by 
Rauschenberg to unending, infinite nothing. The Erased de Kooning Drawing 
is a return to square one; its states silently do not pass go. ‘Go’ being the 
point of optimum torment for the artist — where future is set in opposition with 
the past, where limitless potential conflicts with the constraints of language, 
where the inability to express conflicts with the obligation to do so. Meaning 
and value are defined by failure and emptiness, where action is embodied by 
paralysis and unending anticipation. Erasure testifies to failure, to the 
inadequacy of existing forms of language, to the impossibility of presentation 
and the futility of expression.  
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The artist’s relationship to failure is central to my practice as a painter, both in 
terms of subject matter and process of production. It contributes to a sense of 
negation that Beckett characterized as impoverishment in art — where 
language, be it visual, written or spoken, re-orientates towards negative 
space, silence, the gaps between words, phrases and images — towards 
what Beckett termed a ‘literature of the unword’.14 He writes 
  
As we cannot eliminate language all at once, we should at least leave nothing 
undone that might contribute to its falling into disrepute. To bore one hole 
after another into it, until what lurks behind it — be it something or nothing — 
begins to seep through; I cannot imagine a higher goal for a writer today.15  
 
The limit of language is fundamental to his claim that ‘there is nothing to 
express’, that the principal task of the artist is to confront this obligation, to 
express nothing as the lack that reveals threshold and, therefore, the 
possibility of its transcendence. In this sense, for the painter, failure it is not 
terminal, merely grounds for divorce. Beckett comments that ‘The history of 
painting, here we go again, is the history of its attempts to escape from this 
sense of failure, by means of more authentic, more ample, less exclusive 
relations between representer and representee’.16 In their essay ‘Samuel 
Beckett: Inhibited Reading’, Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit state that 
  
Impotence, incompetence, and failure, as well as the lack of subject material, 
do not lead to the end of art; they are instead the necessary conditions for 
what Beckett describes as a break with the compromises of art in the past. 
They are in other words formulas for starting again, not apocalyptic 
announcements of the end of art. What we must therefore try to understand is 
how something that Beckett calls the failure to express can renew what we 
can, after all, only designate as artistic expression.
17
 
 
Like Bataille’s conception of the formless, Beckett’s ideal of failure strips 
meaning, association and narrative from language and reduces it to function. 
A ‘Literature of the unword’ ruptures language from its past. Such inversions 
of hierarchies return us to T. J. Clark, who contends that the associated desire 
for self-definition comes at the expense of broader socio/cultural value. He 
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argues that such tactics of reduction in the end prove counter productive, 
restricting meaning to practice itself. He states 
 
The practice in question is extraordinary and desperate: it presents itself as a 
work of interminable and absolute decomposition, a work which is always 
pushing “medium” to its limits — to its ending — to the point where it breaks 
or evaporates or turns back into mere unworked material. That is the form in 
which medium is retrieved or reinvented: the fact of Art, in modernism is the 
fact of negation [...] On the other side of negation is always emptiness: that is 
the message which modernism never tires of repeating and a territory into 
which it regularly strays. We have an art in which ambiguity becomes infinite, 
which is on the verge of proposing — or does propose — an Other which is 
comfortably ineffable, a vacuity, a vagueness, a mere mysticism of sight.
18
 
 
For Clark negation, under Greenberg’s rubric, is a road that ‘leads back and 
back to the black square’ — the inevitable, unavoidable and formally 
predictable essentialist vanishing point where values and meaning fold in on 
themselves.19 However, by discounting the subjectivity engendered by 
negation, by devaluing an encounter with medium at its limits, both in terms of 
material and idiom, Clark presents this particular ‘emptiness’ as a kind of all-
devouring tokenistic avant-gardism. The black square may well be a formal 
absolute zero, but as its persistence within the history of twentieth century 
painting has demonstrated it is far from being an end point absolutely. It is 
also the point at which past and future collapse into a singularity, into what 
Michael Fried refers to in his rebuttal of Clark’s argument as ‘presentness’, a 
kind of phenomenology of Now where the terms of a contemporary painting 
sustain comparison with the established canon of the past.20  
 
For mid-century painters this presentness equates to an experiential 
encounter with material fact. Rather than a slash-and-burn rejection of the 
medium’s lineage, negation is a proposition on the viability or vitality of the 
medium and its history — a means of taking painting’s pulse by responding to 
work of the past, recent or otherwise, ‘whose quality is beyond question’.21 
For Fried the glass is half-full. He insists that whilst ‘moments of negation’ 
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may be traceable in the development of modernism they are readable only in 
‘relation to a more encompassing and fundamental set of positive values, 
conventions, sources of conviction’. 22 Negation, as both tactic and technique, 
serves as catalyst for progression, for reaching beyond the limits of what Fried 
terms the ‘cognitive enterprise of modernist painting’; the black square 
functions as a reboot button for painting. As Alfred Barr, the first director of the 
Museum of Modern Art, comments ‘Every generation must paint its own black 
square’. Drawing on his own previous paper ‘Art and Objecthood’, Fried 
comments that 
 
The essence of painting is not something irreducible. Rather, the task of the 
modernist painter is to discover those conventions which, at a given moment, 
alone are capable of establishing his work’s identity as painting.
23
 
 
Such conventions, such new forms of language defined by processes of 
reduction during the mid-century period cannot be categorized as critique 
alone. They also allude to the relationship between the work and the 
beholder, or to use Beckett’s terms between ‘representer’ and ‘representee’. 
Insisting that such policies of reduction downgrade practice to ‘indeterminate 
negation’ — to nothing more than a mode of shock and novelty — Clark short-
circuits the material encounter, by-passing the potentiality of direct experience 
and feeling, where vacuity, vagueness and the infinite conspire to a sense of 
the ineffable that is far from comfortable. To dismiss alterity derived from the 
negative or the impoverished as ‘mere mysticism of sight’ is to undervalue the 
contribution of visual language to a ‘literature of the unword’, to an evolving 
discourse that continues in contemporary terms to chart a downward 
trajectory for the ineffable, for an Other orientated towards the base, the 
partial and the contingent.  
 
Negative values have continued to shape certain developments in 
contemporary painting. In 2009 the American writer Raphael Rubinstein, in his 
Art in America essay ‘Provisional Painting’, marked the re-emergence of 
concerns with limit, failure and futility in painting through tendencies towards 
the self-cancelling, abandoned and unfinished. He comments that ‘A growing 
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number of younger artists (and a few who have been showing for longer) are 
entertaining the idea of impossibility in painting. This has led them to reject a 
sense of finish in their work, or to rely on acts of negation’.24 Rubinstein 
correlates these destructive, negative tendencies with the futility of 
expression, with the impossibility of painting in the face of an overwhelming 
history and the excesses of an infinite, pluralist postmodern cultural 
landscape. Rather than with divine spirit, transcendence, as such, is here 
orientated to an experience of the broken spirit — to painting of the barely 
there, the boggy, the squitchy, the unfinished, half attained, the failed — as 
Rubinstein would have it, the provisional. Perversely, painting is all the more 
optimistic for the material pessimism that comes from the torture of a fleeting 
glimpse of that which exceeds the limits of language and expression. As 
Rubinstein points out 
 
Provisional painting is not about making last paintings, nor is it about the 
deconstruction of painting. It’s the finished product disguised as a preliminary 
stage, or a body double standing in for a star/masterpiece whose value would 
put a stop to artistic risk.
25
 
 
Rubinstein puts forward a roster of current painters that produce work through 
self-cancelling, consciously downward facing methods. Erasure, subtraction, 
material reduction and defacement are the principal means of production for 
artists like Christopher Wool, Albert Oehlen, Jacqueline Humphries and 
Charlene Von Heyl; painters for whom the lure of the unfinished and its 
gestural language best serves the practice of negation. In an article from 2011 
Jordan Kantor discusses Oehlen’s recent Fingermalerei series of paintings in 
which the artist jettisons the brush in favor of the fingers.26 Kantor raises the 
question of whether such elemental, primitive mark making can be taken as 
sincere in a contemporary period defined by citation. Can such a language 
still effectively carry ‘auratic presence’, or are such tactics ‘inescapably 
haunted by their previous artistic uses’? 27 Citing works like Oehlen’s 2011 
painting FM 48 (Figure.1), a work in which finger-painted marks have taken 
center stage from a previous reliance on text and other elements of  
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Figure. 1 Albert Oehlen, FM 48, 2011  
(Oil on board, 137 x 205 cm) 
 
courtesy of artist  
and Gagosian Gallery, New York 
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appropriated image ephemera, Kantor suggests that despite history’s 
overbearing antecedents there remains potential for the language of gesture 
in relation to unmediated experience. Oehlen’s Fingermalerei, Kantor states, 
testify to an authentic ‘elemental will to communicate’. He continues 
 
By setting a mood, by evoking a feeling, or by implicating the viewer’s body in 
imagining the gestures that made those marks. Indeed this series might help 
us reframe the essential question of communication and expression that 
animates all of Oehlen’s paintings: At a time when languages and codes 
seem to define all areas of experience and understanding, “Fingermalerei” 
points to the promise of a space beyond linguistic or informatic 
representation’.
28
  
 
Painting becomes articulate under the conditions of its own repression —
figuration, through the sublimation of abstraction. FM 48 is one of Oehlen’s 
more sparse paintings from his Fingermalerei cycle. The compositional space, 
such as it is, is dominated by de-composition — by erasive wipes dragged 
vertically down through the body or syntax of energetically delivered gestural 
smears and fingermarks. Such erasure sets the painting at tension, on the 
one hand being a decisive, declarative act that re-instates or reclaims the 
potential of the exposed white ground of the primed canvas, while on the 
other being an expletive of failure, an invective of doubt that leaves in its wake 
a void that returns the crushing proposition, ‘and what now?’ — a question 
that occupied painters of the postwar period and particularly the Abstract 
Expressionists, whose search for form and content in the wake Auschwitz and 
cubism prompted the renewal of visual language under the auspices of 
negation.  
 
It is a vocabulary that rejects or at least provides a counter point to the 
ubiquity and spectacle of the digital image, de-sensitized and diluted through 
an unending cycle of re-appropriation and re-production, in favor of the 
prototype — particular, unique, something wholly Other — with an autonomy 
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and material truth. That current ‘provisional’ trends in painting have their roots 
in the language of negation that defined modernism is made apparent in 
Oehlen’s Fingermalerei series, through which he declares an affiliation, after 
the fact, with Willem de Kooning. Oehlen comments that ‘I developed my 
paintings without looking at de Kooning and now I see that de Kooning did all 
the things that I do. I’m not afraid to tell anyone who wants to hear it. He is the 
most interesting artist at the moment’. He continues 
 
It was a very deliberate decision of mine to make something that recalls the 
art of that time. So it’s the technique, this pathetic idea of the painting with the 
hands, the sensibility, feeling of the paint, feeling the canvas!That’s what I 
wanted to do after seeing a show of Action Painting [!] But, coincidentally, 
on that set-up, I came across de Kooning again. Because he did more than 
what you see at first glance [!] It looks like it’s just a one-to-one expression 
of these feelings at that moment, but it’s more.
29
 
 
For Kantor Oehlen’s invocation of such post war painterly language stops 
short of ‘absolutist claims to the transcendental power of gesture in itself’. 
Kantor suggests that Oehlen keeps his ‘inner Abstract Expressionist’ at arms 
length. His inner existentialist, however, would seem to be a much closer 
companion. He writes ‘Oehlen has said that all of his abstract paintings come 
from an inability to paint what he wants to paint. Nevertheless, the paintings 
embody the dialectical push-and-pull of “I can’t, but I must” that characterizes 
much challenging art’.30 Once again Beckett is summoned from the grave in 
the name of ‘fidelity to failure’ — where the inability to act constitutes, or gives 
ground for, ‘an expressive act, even if only of itself, of its impossibility, of its 
obligation’.31 
 
Rubinstein answers his own question of whether the gestural language of 
Oehlen, Wool and Humphries can be read as sincere in a follow up essay to 
‘Provisional Painting’, entitled ‘To Rest Lightly on the Earth’.32 In it he aligns 
contemporary concerns with the impossibility of painting with a return to doubt 
and inner experience as defined during the post war period by artists like 
Alberto Giacometti. While Rubinstein stops short of investigating the socio-
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cultural conditions that have prompted the re-emergence of ‘failing better’ he 
suggests that painters are rediscovering the existential as material to their 
medium, reclaiming the likes of Newman and the ‘tutelary spirit of Samuel 
Beckett’.33  
 
Arguably, the existential angst provoked by the loss of optimism and the 
perceived failure of language in the aftermath of World War II has parallels to 
the trauma of the contemporary period, and the subsequent shifts in painting 
that re-engage with the limits of representation and the inexpressible. The 
sublime, though rarely named directly as such, has returned to circulation 
during a period of renewed psychological and metaphysical upheaval. As 
Christine Battersby points out, ‘the landscape of the twentieth-first century has 
been transformed by a new kind of ‘terror’, as well as by a new type of 
encounter with ‘the various and multiple forms of otherness’.34 Nuclear 
paranoia, fiscal oblivion, religious fanaticism and ecological catastrophe 
contribute to a period that could justifiably be termed a new age of anxiety — 
an age that returns us to something close to Burke’s conception of the 
sublime fuelled by terror and privation.  
 
It is privation or absence that the provisional turns on. The provisional is lack 
— the lack of finish, the lack of means and method with which to articulate 
what is entirely beyond language. Rubinstein aligns the commitment to the 
derelict or failed in painting to the history of negation and self-criticality within 
twentieth century art here outlined. In terms reminiscent of Clark, Rubinstein 
states, ‘The history of modernism is full of strategies of refusal and acts of 
negation’.35  Along the way he cites Philip Guston’s statement from 1966 that 
what persists from Newman and the Abstract Expressionists is not a question 
of style, but instead the issue of whether it’s possible to create in our society 
at all.36 The deconstructive wipe of solvent, the figure of erasure that cleaves 
Oehlen’s FM 45 apart leaves the question open. It returns us to the matter of 
threshold. The work oscillates between limit and the potential of its 
transcendence. The presentation of error, the exposure of the do-over, is 
visual testimony to sense of failure that initiates a Mobius band-like 
experience of time where beginning and end conflate into endless succession 
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and repetition. Rubinstein concludes that it is the strategies of negation, the 
resistance to taste — the ‘complete lack of pretense’ that marks provisional 
painting ‘as belonging to NOW’.37  
 
Employed to position such downward looking painting on the vanguard of the 
contemporary situation Rubinstein’s capitalized NOW returns us to Barnett 
Newman’s trenchant and oft-cited statement, ‘The Sublime is Now’. Might 
Rubinstein be leaving enough interpretational wriggle-room to suggest that 
provisional painting — this painting of the half-attained, the indefinite, the 
squitchy, the ambivalent and the abject — belongs to the Now of the sublime, 
an instant extrapolated to the infinite, defined, as Newman comments, by ‘the 
physical sensation of time’? 38 Like Beckett’s characters we are condemned to 
‘know the anguishing nature of time that has been de-narrativised’ where 
‘each moment appears to us as monadically self-contained, unrelated to what 
proceeded it and to what may follow it’.39  
 
Newman’s Now figures centrally in Jean François Lyotard’s correlation 
between negation and the modern sublime. Lyotard suggests that it is a kind 
of Nietzschian sublime that has provoked these destructive, nihilistic 
tendencies and given modern and postmodern art its ‘impetus’ and the ‘logic 
of the avant-gardes find its axioms’.40 Like Beckett, Lyotard invests waiting 
with negative value. It carries the possibility that nothing may come, both in 
terms of inability — the lack of facility or paralysis — and in terms of the 
immanent arrival of the nothing — the infinite void, which snuffs out ‘light, 
language and life’.41 Such a void, Lyotard argues, is at the heart of modern 
artistic endeavor stripped of representation and the patronage of religion. His 
conception of the sublime in a postmodern context is that which puts forward 
the un-presentable in presentation itself. He draws on the experience of 
painting and the painting experience to establish Now as a contingent, 
indeterminate articulation of time — an in-between state loaded with a kind of 
torture that Lyotard relates to the genealogy of the sublime from Longinus 
through Edmund Burke’s privations to Immanuel Kant and the notion of 
negative presentation. Lyotard states that  
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This is the misery that the painter faces with the plastic surface, of the 
musician with the acoustic surface [!] Not only faced with the empty canvas 
or the empty page, at the beginning of the work, but every time something 
has to be waited for, and thus forms the question at every point of 
questioning, at every ‘and what now?’ 
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Post representation, the medium of painting, perhaps more than any other, 
intrinsically leans towards the question of the non-demonstrable, and 
dialogizes the tension between impossibility and the obligation to express. 
The hit of the sublime, the sudden fleeting feeling of anxious delight (to use 
Burke’s phrase) forced from between the contradictory states of pleasure and 
pain is only actuated at a degree of remove, at distance from the source of 
pain, in the experience of relief that reverses poles, from negative to positive. 
Rather than nothing there is an occurrence, an event, or for Beckett an 
‘occasion’, even if it is repetition. Lyotard remarks that ‘In the determination of 
pictorial art, the indeterminate, the ‘it happens’ is the paint, the picture’.43 
Silence and the end of language is postponed, even if only temporarily, 
through the event — through tactics of disruption, reduction and sabotage; 
through Newman’s vertical ‘zip’, Christopher Wool’s ambivalent gesture, and 
the smear of Oehlen’s fingers. While devoid of the grandiloquence of the 
grand style the fundamental task for the modern and postmodern painter 
remains that which occupied the artists of the romantic period. As Lyotard 
makes clear, that task remains ‘bearing pictorial or otherwise expressive 
witness to the inexpressible’.44  
 
This task — the ‘demonstration of the existence of the invisible in the visual’ 
— is ultimately one that is doomed to failure. 45 To represent pure idea would 
be to enforce a relative state upon the absolute, a context that proves 
immediately contradictory and subsequently undermines the premise. In 
pointing up the impossibility that confronts the painter in the modern period 
and beyond in their efforts to answer the question ‘What is painting?’ Lyotard 
lays the foundations for Rubinstein’s conception of the provisional in painting. 
Lyotard argues that while representation of the absolute may be impossible, 
the presentation or demonstration of its existence is not — through ‘negative 
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representation’, which Kant called the ‘abstract’.46 The end results, which 
Lyotard categorizes, in relation to public taste, as ‘monstrous’ ‘purely 
‘negative’ non-entities’, subverts the ‘communal sense of shared pleasure’ 
that props up the beautiful and privileges subjectivity over the objective, over 
the relational, nostalgic and referential.47 For Rubinstein the end results 
culminate not so much in the monstrous, but in a more unstable formlessness 
— a formlessness of the neglected, disintegrated, defaced, and derelict. With 
or without a postmodern nudge-and-a-wink, the contemporary vocabulary of 
the provisional is a return to surface, to mid-century concerns with the 
materiality of painterly mark. However, such contemporary gestural 
abstraction resists the textural monumentality of postwar painting. It resists 
the thickness, the physical presence of European Art Informel painting or the 
overwhelming scale of American Abstract Expressionism, in favor of a fragile 
form of painterly expression. Where, for example, Willem de Kooning’s livid, 
insistent and heavily accumulated slashes of impasto paint made a 
declarative gesture of adventure on a new visual frontier, Wool, Humphries 
and Oehlen produce a less physically present material surface, frequently 
defined by the removal of paint, by the possibility of non-existence — or by 
the possibility of existence erased — by the gesture of misadventure. 
 
Lyotard locates the postmodern sublime within conditions of language. The 
matter of the sublime, its material concern, in the end is the silence that 
descends when forms or ‘phrases’ within a given lexicon prove inadequate to 
experience. The silence makes explicit the limit of expression encountered at 
the threshold of understanding; at this point language is incapacitated. In 
articulating the nondemonstrable, Lyotard writes, painters finds themselves 
facing not just the question ‘What is painting’, but also ‘How do we 
communicate our painting to those who are not painters?’ inferring that there 
is a potentially terminal linguistic disparity between work and spectator.48 
Presentation, as a kind of temporal irruption, testifies to an event that ‘despite 
everything within this threatening void’ postpones the bitter end and 
supersedes defunct and moribund conventions of language.49 Discussing 
Newman’s painting Lyotard comments 
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The message is the presentation, but it presents nothing; it is, that is 
presence [!] Newman is concerned with giving color, line or rhythm the force 
of an obligation with a face to face relationship, in the second person, and his 
model cannot be look at this (over there); it must be look at me or, to be more 
accurate, listen to me. For obligation is a modality of time rather than of space 
and its organ is the ear rather than the eye.
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Lyotard here re-orientates painting towards the facility of language — towards 
an abstraction of the spoken word — severed from the meta-narrative of the 
sublime. In doing so he alludes to a fundamental shift within the discourse of 
the concept. He suggests that Newman’s Now, the vocabulary of ‘color, line 
and rhythm’ that refers to nothing other than the unmediated physical 
sensation of time, contests Edmund Burke’s insistence that painting was 
incapable of meeting the demands of sublime experience due to a persistent 
residue of (figurative) representation and that poetry — ‘what we would now 
call writing’ — was most capable, with its ‘infinite number of associations for 
the mind’, of meeting the challenge that sublime experience presented.51  
 
In the postmodern period the splintering of the cultural landscape has led to a 
reversal of Burke’s hierarchy. Over burdened with symbolic association and 
the literature of the sublime, it is the written word that now collapses under the 
weight of representation. As Lyotard remarks, ‘The task of having to bear 
witness to the indeterminate carries away, one after the other, the barriers set 
up by the writings of theorists and by the manifestos of the painters 
themselves’.52 The ‘unheard of phrase’, the form that exceeds cognitive 
perimeters, destabilizes the terms of discourse. The visual language of 
painting, ambivalent to the tyranny of such discourse, provides the linguistic 
means for a concept in perpetual crisis to remain articulate after a failure of 
language. In the face of such a failure the provisionality of painting, its 
particular and intrinsic subjectivity, ensures that a ‘literature of the unword’ 
remains a viable proposition. 
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The Sublime is Dead: Long Live the Sublime 
 
As the 2010 Tate research project, ‘The Sublime Object: Nature, Art and 
Language’, attests, the sublime is once again now.53 In truth, despite being 
the concept that dare not speak its name for prolonged periods of the 
twentieth century, due in part to perceived latent religious tendencies and 
association with moribund classical, representational traditions, the sublime 
has, nevertheless, always been present even if it hasn’t always taken this 
name. As its critical currency has surged over recent years, so too has the 
complexity of the concept. It is widely accepted that the sublime is again in 
crisis. Where once it could be safely approached through reassuringly 
recognizable and theologically pertinent signs — the awe-inspiring landscape, 
the impenetrable dark, animal terror — with the advent of modernism the 
territory of the concept shifted towards a secular articulation of 
transcendence. This shift prompted a re-calibration of the notion of the sacred 
itself. There is a consensus among contemporary writers that the pluralist 
postmodern culture has prompted a fracturing of the concept into seemingly 
endless sub-clauses. The convenient malleability of the concept, its readiness 
to lend a sense of gravitas to that which is speculatively declared subjective or 
indeterminate has seen the sublime become something of an art school cure-
all.  
 
As a contributor to the Tate project the writer Simon Morley comments that his 
recent book, The Sublime (2010), is an attempt to make sense of the 
bewildering proliferation of readings of the sublime. Chameleon-like, the 
concept is able to change colors at will. Despite this the historical baggage 
that the concept carries remains heavy and intrusive. Subsequently the 
concept is caught between a past that undermines the case for the 
contemporary sublime and a future that is fatally fragmented. As Morley writes 
 
Discussions of the sublime in contemporary art can sometimes be covert or 
camouflaged devices for talking about the kinds of things that were once 
addressed by religious discourses and nevertheless seem to remain pertinent 
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within an otherwise religiously skeptical and secularized world. 
 
But often contemporary perspectives on the sublime reject traditional 
conceptions of a self, or a soul or spirit, seen as moving upwards towards 
some ineffable and essential thing or power. Instead, the contemporary 
sublime is mostly about immanent transcendence; that is, it is about a 
transformative experience understood as occurring within the here and now.
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Stripped of theologically inclined elevation the postmodern sublime lowers its 
gaze from the heavens to witness transcendence reconfigured through 
contingency — through a certain sense of the abject. Without the stabilizing 
religious associations of the pre-modern period the concept has encroached 
into far less optimistic neighboring territories. Limit-experience, divested of a 
final divine reckoning, spills over into the existential — into materialist 
interpretations of self-revelation that purposefully disrupt symbolic orders and 
conceptual hierarchies. Under these terms, as alluded to by Lyotard in his 
theory of the unpresentable and the avant-garde, the sublime’s negative, 
somewhat cannibalistic drive serves to corrupt the past and it’s codes. While 
Bataille resists invoking the sublime by name his theories on inner experience 
nevertheless provide a compelling proposition of how experience of the 
sacred might function in the absence of God.  
 
Whether employed in hair-gel advertising, football commentary or in the 
appraisal of contemporary art works the term sublime has, itself, become 
boundless. If painting is impossible so too is the taming of a concept of 
transcendence that has devolved and fractured so substantially. It would 
seem that the sublime revelation of self in contemporary terms is first to be 
found in the sense of inadequacy experienced when confronted with the 
exponentially expanding lexicon of associative terms and their resultant forms. 
Throughout this research project I have continually been asked to qualify, 
clarify and restrain the terms employed — to contain the many phrases and 
terms that run into each other in relation that to the sublime. Herein lies the 
problematic central to the research — that of categorizing the uncategorizable 
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— that of containing the boundless — that of locating language forms for the 
unsayable. The core of this problematic is the failure of language, that is, the 
inability of the word to accommodate a contemporary discourse of the 
sublime.  
 
There is a view among certain writers that the concept has ceased to be 
serviceable, that the narrative of the word or the literature of the sublime has 
become over burdened with historical and aesthetic baggage, each phrase 
framing an association — the ineffable with pre-modern romanticism and the 
gothic, the inexpressible with the modern, and the un-presentable with the 
excess and spectacle of the post-modern. Describing the sublime as 
‘damaged goods’ in his essay ‘Against the Sublime’, the art historian and critic 
James Elkins considers that the sublime is not just in crisis but that it in its 
death throes. 55 He writes 
 
I think the sublime needs to be abandoned as an interpretive tool, except in 
cases of romantic and belated romantic art. Contemporary writers that use 
the word can always find synonyms to express what they mean, and those 
synonyms are apt to be more telling, and more useful, than the word 
sublime.
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Elkins goes on to call for a moratorium on the term sublime and a redress of 
language in favor of ‘fresh’ and ‘exact’ terms.57 Through studio practice this 
research asks if painting can facilitate this redress and provide these terms. !
 
The sublime has surely little to do with exact-ness. The precise and the 
qualified are necessarily at odds with an encounter with that which exceeds 
cognition and understanding. It is absolute in-exactness or, as George Bataille 
would have it ‘non-knowledge’, that props up such experience. Bataille writes 
 
Ultimate possibility. That non-knowledge still be knowledge. I would explore 
night! But no, it is night which explores me […] Death quenches my thirst for 
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non-knowledge. But absence is not rest. Absence and death are without reply 
within me and, without fail, absorb me cruelly.
58
 
 
Under such conditions we grope for language, as though in darkness, and at 
the point of its failure all we are left with is feeling.  
 
The aim of this thesis is not to attempt the impossible — to define the sublime 
or to impose a conceptual structure on subjective, transcendent experience.  
Instead it is to create a body of work that expands the material language of 
the sublime through painting as negation — through painting as a destructive 
business. Rather than containing or constraining language this research 
considers that the sublime necessarily demands an expansion of terms, a 
renewal of language forms, away from the word and its attendant nostalgia, 
towards the direct and the operative. Bataille marks this differential in his 
oblique articulation of the subversion of language under Formless in the 
Critical Dictionary of the Documents project. Here he states, ‘A dictionary 
begins when it no longer gives the meaning of words, but their tasks’.59 
Bataille advocates a de-limiting of language through a shift from descriptive 
effect to material affect. In this sense abstraction is an operation that 
disassociates language from its received hierarchy of imagery and narrative. 
This process has a downward trajectory, it is corrosive — as Bataille makes 
plain when he states ‘Thus formless is not only an adjective having a given 
meaning, but a term that serves to bring things down in the world’.60 This 
corrupting process results in a point of cognitive and linguistic rupture, 
creating a non-verbal ‘space which is interior and sovereign, locked by the 
Unspeakable which exists at its margins, an impossible abyss glimpsed at the 
moment of transgression’.61 This research considers that it is within this space 
that an abject language of painting can be said to function.  
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An Other Discourse: How Paint Moves 
 
It is not the sublime that is in crisis — rather it is its discourse. While writers 
like Phillip Shaw, Guy Sircello and Jane Forsey stop short of Elkin’s insistence 
that the term be altogether abandoned they do, however, submit to a general 
view that postmodern plurality has irrevocably infected and diluted the concept 
and that the inherent contradictions at its core make an overarching 
coherence largely unachievable. Once again, impossibility rears its ugly head. 
James Elkins cites Peter De Bolla’s distinction between discourse on the 
sublime and discourse of the sublime as further evidence of what Phillip Shaw 
describes as the “absurdity of spanning the gulf between the theoretical and 
the practical”.62 Discourse on the sublime is located within a historical 
narrative. It seeks to contain or measure the concept through analysis of 
forms, causes and effects. In his investigation, ‘How is a Theory of the 
Sublime Possible?’ Guy Sircello labels such discourse as ‘talk’ about the 
sublime — chatter about the usefulness, sustainability and coherence of the 
concept that depends upon or contributes to the ongoing dialogue within the 
subject between what Elkin terms ‘external authorities’ — the ambassadors of 
the critical and historical institution. 63 The language of this dialogue is 
epistemological and descriptive — it offers the sublime in proxy, reliant on 
hand-me-down associative references, images and symbols. Such an over 
burdened lexicon has become prone to slippage, as the sublime has 
accumulated an ever-expanding list of prefixes, from the pre-modern gothic to 
the post-modern technological.  
 
Discourse of the sublime on the other hand is located within in an experiential 
account of the concept. In contrast to the din of the talk about the sublime, 
discourse of the sublime privileges what might be termed a language of 
silence — one that serves an interrogation of religious experience in the 
absence of God. This deconsecrated confrontation with self is to be found in 
the “interior mind” — within direct, subjective experience. 64 Where talk about 
the sublime describes and measures effect, discourse of the concept actuates 
!
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sublime affect. Such discourse, while cognizant of the literature of history that 
surrounds it, is far from bound to it. Sircello’s account of the prospects of a 
concept compromised by the inherent contradictions of a logic that seeks to 
reconcile experience that exceeds the territory of knowledge, cognition and 
language within material, objective reality is ultimately optimistic. His 
‘argument against theory’ suggests that there is a need to expand the terms of 
discourse to include the experiential through alternative poetic forms of 
language. 65  While Sircello frames such a re-orientation within the written 
word, visual language is an implicit associate. Citing Wordsworth, Lao-tzu’s 
Tao te Ching and avant-garde prose Sircello defines a certain ‘nothingness’ 
common to Bataille’s theory of inner experience — ‘one of the sources of the 
recent revival of interest in the sublime’.66 The language of inner experience is 
that of abjection. Formlessness leans towards the visual, towards the 
possibility of seeing as knowledge.  
 
While sharing none of Sircello’s optimism, Elkins too would seem to concede 
that sublime discourse could be receptive to, or accommodating of, the 
potential of alternative forms of language. He comments that ‘the sublime 
cannot be adequately explored unless the writing finds a way to move back 
and forth from discourse on to discourse of.’ 67 This research considers that 
painting might offer the vehicle to move between these distinct but not 
mutually exclusive species of discourse. In this sense the relationship 
between theory and studio practice is direct and integral to the research — 
the language of painting is approached as discourse of the sublime.  
 
Recent commentary on the sublime has positioned painting on the margins of 
the discourse. Viewed predominantly as witness to overwhelming mass media 
and the violence of history, the language of the sublime in painting has largely 
been determined by image, spectacle and scale. There is very limited 
research into how the sublime might be articulated through the material 
language of [figurative] abstraction. Consequently there is limited 
understanding of how mark making, gesture and material process in painting 
might relate to the term sublimation. Painting was conspicuous in its absence 
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from the Tate Sublime Object research project, perhaps because, as Simon 
Morley states, ‘most sublime artworks these days tend to be installations. It is 
certainly getting harder for painting, the traditional vessel for evoking visual 
sublimity, to elicit such effects’.68 This thesis examines Morley’s position by 
asking if paint is an intrinsically transcendent medium and by considering how 
the composition of the un-presentable may be alluded to through de-
composition in painting.  
 
At the center of this research is the figure/ground relationship. This binary 
serves as foundation for what I would describe as an expressionist enquiry 
into the relationship between mark, surface and the sublime. The term 
expressionist is consciously employed, evoking as it does ‘The postwar 
paintbrush’ and the primacy of authorship, authenticity and materiality. 69 In 
doing so the research approaches the issue of whether sublime experience, 
driven by sincerity, faith and commitment to subjectivity, can function in 
relation to painting in a postmodern age determined by skepticism, irony, 
pastiche and citation. 
 
Necessarily heuristic in approach the research engages with subjective, felt 
experience in painting characterized by and articulated through the primacy of 
gestural abstraction — through a Jacqueline Humphries or a Christopher 
Wool thin-ness rather than the post-war thickness of Dubuffet’s soupy haute 
pate of oil paint mixed with sand, gravel, tar, plaster, coal and drying agents. 
In this sense the research is a question of mark over matter.  
 
Common to the work of the ‘provisional’ painters cited by Rubinstein is the 
primacy of the material qualities of paint — or more specifically the material 
qualities of gesture. Rather than through the physical, concrete presence of 
post-war matiere painting the ‘competitive interaction between the artist, his 
tools and his medium’, to use Jean Dubuffet’s phrase, is instead manifest 
through a vocabulary of subtraction, erasure and correction — through 
gesture as negation. 70 Fundamental to the sublime is the idea of the 
disruption or destabilization of the harmonious. Destabilization is central to the 
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painting process of contemporary painter Charlene Von Heyl. She comments 
that 
 
When you create something indifferent and destroy, transform, and 
manipulate that into something that you can’t quite read anymore, but that 
has a strong feeling of atmosphere, then you have created something new; 
this process of extraction is actually quite brutal. I find that when I start 
working again, I always have to get to the point where I really disrespect my 
work.
71
 
 
These strategies of abstraction and disruption determine an approach to 
painting as a kind of corrosive process — a downward movement between 
states, from presence to absence, object to subject, form to formless. Von 
Heyl likens the process to sabotage. She states ‘Sabotage is always a kind of 
violent change, the sabot — a wooden clog — thrown into the machinery, 
creating a new situation through disruption or destruction’.72 Such tactics rely 
on intuition to navigate an area of indeterminacy found between 
representation and abstraction. This area of ‘becoming’ characterizes the 
distinction made by Lyotard and, to a greater extent, Gilles Deleuze between 
figuration, rooted in illustrative form relating ‘to an object that it is supposed to 
represent’, and the ‘figural’, bound to form ‘related to sensation’ — sensation 
that is ‘transmitted directly, and avoids the detour and boredom of conveying 
a story’.73 The transmission or communication of such sensation from one 
‘order’ to another, to use Francis Bacon’s term, is a process of corruption or 
deformation; it is a matter of movement or the movement of matter. 
 
In simple terms this research serves an ongoing fascination with how oil paint 
moves, with its particular fluidity and its unpredictable kinetic potential — a 
potential that mediates between control and accident, intent and intuition, the 
nascent and the moribund, between expression and its limit. In this respect 
the ‘clog’ thrown into the machinery is the smear of a finger, the catastrophic 
drag of a rag or the erasing scythe of the brush or blade. This downward 
movement becomes a process of painting that negotiates between figurative 
source and figural outcome. Largely focused on the figure under abstraction, 
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studio research experiments with a language of failure embodied in the smear 
and other catastrophes — catastrophes that corrupt image, corrode the figure 
and defile surface. In particular the smear is explored in relation to abjection, 
which Julia Kristeva conceives of as a ‘wellspring of sign for the non-object’ 
that destabilizes the distinction between ‘symptom: a language that gives up 
[!] a non-assimilable alien [!] a cancer that the listening devices of the 
unconscious do not hear’ and sublimation as the ‘possibility of naming the 
pre-nominal, the pre-objectal’.74  
 
The smear forces slippage, under its influence phrases within painting shift 
from the legible to the unreadable. The territory between these states is 
constantly oscillating; subjectivity propels the work back and forth between 
past and future tense, between its pictorial origins and its aspirational 
presence. The fundamental oppositions of inside/outside, I/Other, 
conscious/unconscious that Kristeva alludes to are pushed and pulled into 
ambiguity. Delivered directly with fingers the smear drives pictorial structure to 
collapse — the boundaries of body (both in terms of work and author) become 
indistinct. The compositional membrane is stretched to the point of tearing 
and held there at tension between one thing and another — between 
presentation and the un-representable, between the open and closed form. 
This is the tension that Francis Bacon alludes to when he describes a 
‘complete interlocking of image and paint, so that the image is the paint and 
vice versa’.75  
 
My painting process is defined by the search for, or the navigation of this 
tipping point where a fleeting relationship between marks made in paint 
communicates image, articulates feeling and divests resonance. Citing 
George Didi-Huberman’s interest in Bataille’s Informe, Yve-Alain Bois 
describes this tipping point as ‘a rhythmic condition of form’ found ‘once the 
human face is decomposed and resemblances ‘shriek’’.76 Focusing on the 
figure in relation to gesture and abstraction the research investigates a visual 
language of direct forms, largely through the erasive or subtractive mark. 
Using the idiom of the portrait the project explores painting as a felt 
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experience through the feeling of paint — under fingers, brushes, blades and 
rags. This materiality of gesture is here embodied in techniques of abrasion, 
blurring, smearing, dragging, scraping, and scoring and in self-cancelling 
strategies of production that drive the spectator from image to surface, from 
illustration to intuition, from the optic to the haptic — from seeing to feeling. 
 
Through experimentation with the textural, physical properties of mediums, 
varnishes and supports the research looks at what Charlene Von Heyl has 
obliquely referred to as ‘speed in painting’.77 This might be described as 
variation in perception through the experience of material surface — or how 
variation in surface and material gesture ‘sucks the eye in’ — resulting in 
‘seeing as a triggering and an experiencing’.78 Correlation between the plastic 
and the perceptual is articulated by Deleuze in his discussion of painting as 
what he terms an ‘analogical language par excellence’ — ‘a language of 
relations, which consists of expressive movements, paralinguistic signs, 
breaths and screams, and so on’.79 In this sense the research investigates the 
tension between fast and slow, between open and closed language forms in 
painting — between direct gesture and indirect effect, between the malerisch 
and the taped-off, between wetness and dryness, gloss and matt, between 
the smear and the drip.  
!
This research considers the possibility that where the sublime is failed by 
language painting takes over. Conscious of the central problematic of sublime 
theory — that of the limit of the word in relation to that which exceeds 
description and critical faculty — a reflective approach is applied to the 
relationship between theory, or critical thinking, and practice, or thinking in 
paint. In this respect the research aims to create a body of work that expands 
the discourse of the sublime through painting as a corrosive, self-destructive 
business — through a material language whose spirit is not that of cohesion, 
resolution and conformity, but rather that of restlessness, fracture and failure; 
a material language of ‘expressive movements’ that drives sublime/inner 
experience downwards from the vertical to the horizontal, from elevation to 
the abject — revealing what Bataille refers to as the ‘disjunction between the 
sacred and transcendental substance (consequently impossible to create)’.80  
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While Forsey and Elkins condemn the sublime with evidence of its inherently 
contradictory nature, Bataille suggests that it is this irreconcilable logic that 
continues to make the ‘quest’ and its ‘indeterminable object’ viable. Bataille 
writes ‘The conditions for the search were, moreover, obscurity and the 
limitless character of the goal that it had resolved to attain’.81 Discourse of the 
sublime itself necessarily remains indefinite, half-attained, unimaginable, 
boggy and squitchy.  
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NEWMAN’S NOW: LIMIT & LANGUAGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 2 Barnett Newman  
Onement I 1948  
(Oil on masking tape on canvas, 69 x 41 cm) 
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‘Gods, too, decompose’. George Bataille 1 
 
Published by the poet Ruth Stephan and the painter John Stephan in nine 
quarterly issues between 1947 and 1949, The Tiger’s Eye magazine 
positioned itself as an actively inclusive conduit for the ideas, art and literature 
of the immediate post war period. As outlined by Pamela Frank’s history of the 
magazine the publication maintained an avowedly open-door policy that 
sought to capitalize on and promote cultural cross-pollination, incorporating 
contributions from the creative communities of New York, from where it was 
produced, as well as those from around the world.2 
 
Whilst its editors eschewed an overtly programmatic agenda, committing 
themselves ‘not to make a paradigm’, insisting on themselves as observers 
rather than critics, nevertheless, the publication was strident in its will to 
stimulate creative confrontation.3 The magazine rejected traditional 
conventions of review and commentary in favor of a structure orientated 
towards work itself — towards the provocative juxtaposition of both the visual 
and the written. Polemics were held at arms length by an editorial focus on 
direct observation, on experience over dogma. For the contributors to the 
magazine the written word should compliment rather than countermand; they 
declared in the first issue, ‘any text on art will be handled as literature’.4 
 
Issue six was published in December 1948 and was dedicated to the sublime 
(Figure. 3). Calling aesthetic hierarchies into question, its stated aim was a 
democratization of the concept as ‘the visitor of many and the not the 
exclusive guest of the rhetorical thinker or of religiosity’.5 Noting that ‘medieval 
definitions have long been outmoded’, elevation could no longer be held as an 
unimaginable realm. The magazine’s editorial statement maintained that the 
moment science had conquered ‘cloud stratas’ any association with mystery 
and divinity had been undone. The sublime was ‘again an abstraction 
demanding symbols for revelation’. Stripped of familiarity and context, any 
such symbols subsequently demanded a re-evaluation of language as 
mediator of abstraction. Issue five, published in October 1948, declared, ‘We 
!
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must realize that a sentence is not the only packmule for an idea. It is in the 
realm of the pictorial where language can find new expressions of reality’.6  
 
 
Figure. 3 John Stephan, Untitled, 1947 (oil on canvas, 18 x 24”) 
 The Tiger’s Eye cover issues 1-4 
 
This turn to the pictorial is well illustrated in the sublime issue, which afforded 
a large page count to painting, including works by, among others, Clyfford 
Still, Mark Rothko, Max Ernst, Ad Reinhardt and Barnett Newman. Through 
his relationship with Betty Parsons, whose gallery served the art and artists of 
!
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the magazine, Newman was an ardent supporter and regular contributor to 
the publication, as artist and theorist, creative and commentator. The Sublime 
issue of The Tiger’s Eye carried his brief but influential essay, ‘The Sublime is 
Now’. Declarative and confrontational, Newman’s text seeks to contextualize 
modern American painting outside western European traditions where, in his 
view, the sublime had continued to be propped up with myth, legend and 
archaic values, values associated to a greater or lesser degree with religion. 
Newman’s argument seeks to re-draw the territory of the sublime to 
accommodate (pure) abstraction. However, he does so by drawing almost 
exclusively upon a historical narrative. Though the concept of the sublime had 
once again become abstract, its discourse evidently remained shackled to 
‘literature’ — to the memory, association and symbolic order intrinsic to 
language and aesthetics. Weighed down with the accumulated baggage of 
the concept’s complex narrative ‘the sentence’ ultimately falls short in its 
function to delineate, categorize or describe the subjective visual experience 
of the painting published in the sublime issue.  
 
Newman included his then recent painting Two Edges (Figure. 4), generally 
considered to be the immediate precursor to Onement I (Figure. 2, January 
1948) — the painting that the artist considered his breakthrough in relation to 
form, subject and matters of the sublime. For Newman Two Edges was a 
transitional work. Modest in scale (48 x 36”) and in portrait, it moved beyond 
his early biomorphic paintings like Genesis – The Break (1946) towards the 
formal economy of work that followed in the wake of Onement I. Created with 
masking tape the vertical gestures of the work’s title interrupt an earth-brown 
monochrome. The ‘edges’, prototypes of the ‘zips’ that would come to define 
Newman’s post Onement period, are very different from one another. 
Bleeding under the tape has left a ragged, blunt quality to the left hand edge, 
with one side of the tape having been washed almost entirely into the tonal 
variations of the painting’s surface — a surface which seems to carry the 
remnants of Newman’s early more expansive, fluid, botanically inspired 
endeavors with abstraction.  
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Figure. 4 Barnett Newman, Two Edges, 1948  
(Oil and tempera on canvas, 48 x 36”) 
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On the other hand, the right ‘zip’ is rigid and unyielding to the surrounding 
umber ground. The edges here are hard, clean, and declarative — a searing 
gesture conjured through intense tonal contrast. While Newman’s painting 
past can be read in the intuitive exploration and textural variation across a 
ground, characterized by thin washes of pigment, so too can be seen the 
formal economy of Newman’s future. For Newman there was too much 
painting in Two Edges, too much of what he would subsequently dismiss as 
‘atmosphere’. Yet it also stands on the threshold of the reduced vocabulary of 
‘totality’ he aspired to, where ‘the beginning and the end are there at once. 
Otherwise, a painter is a kind of choreographer of space, and he creates a 
dance of elements, and it becomes a narrative art instead of a visual art’.7 
 
Two Edges marks a shift from cognition, with it attendant processes of 
association to the corporeal and unfamiliar. Newman characterizes this shift in 
terms of a transition from space — constrained, ‘institutional’ and defined — 
to place, open and inconceivable. Exaltation, for Newman, was to be realized 
through ‘open painting’.8 
 
Though printed upside down and in black and white in The Tiger’s Eye, the 
language of Two Edges, immediate, un-mediated, abstract, is in marked 
contrast to Newman’s strident, referential, dogmatic text on the sublime. 
Exploring this tension between his writing and his painting reveals the 
inherently contradictory nature of a concept in crisis — disassociated not just 
from its historical and symbolic scaffolding but also from language itself.  
 
After the terrors of global conflict the void is articulated with the material 
language of painting — silent and subjective. Reflecting upon the text of ‘The 
Sublime is Now’ alongside the painting Two Edges potentially opens a 
valuable perspective on how, in a contemporary context, the language of 
painting materially declares that the sublime is once again Now. 
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How Now Became Negative: Trauma and the Sublime. 
 
We are freeing ourselves of the impediments of memory, association, 
nostalgia, legend, myth, or what have you, that have been the devices 
of Western European Painting.9 
 
Reverberating, as it was, with the aftershocks of the Second World War, 
Newman’s declaration that ‘The Sublime is Now’ is historically contingent. 
Held in tension between negative and positive, between past and future 
tense, between non-recuperable memory and the possibility of optimism, 
Newman’s Now is an irruption in a linear narrative that exposes a fissure 
intrinsic to the aesthetic concept. The interrelation or oscillation between plus 
or minus values is at the foundations of the sublime’s traditional logic, as 
traced through Burke, Kant and later Jean François Lyotard. Not for the first 
time the re-emergence of the concept occurred in the wake of historical 
events that provoked a need for a restatement of dignity, potential and a 
recalibration of faith — faith stripped of the divine.  
 
A pattern of transposing or, more appropriately transcending, individual fear 
and collective trauma via cultural production can be traced back through the 
development of the sublime. As Gene Ray demonstrates, in his essay 
‘Reading the Lisbon Earthquake: Adorno, Lyotard, and the Contemporary 
Sublime’, the concept and its manifestations have been shaped, to a greater 
or lesser degree, by the impact of ‘catastrophic history’.10 
 
Where previously this compensatory cultural processing — this sublimation of 
history — had favored positive aesthetic experience, legislating fallibility, 
inhumanity and the pain of memory through signs and symbols presented at a 
safe distance from the subject, several historical pivots set the sublime on a 
downward trajectory over the course of the modern and postmodern periods, 
reorienting its essential aesthetic bias towards negative presentation.  
 
Ray credits Nicolas Boileau-Despreaux’s 1674 French translation of Pseudo-
Longinus’s first century treatise on the sublime with the subsequent rise in 
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critical currency of the category — a rise that would eventually peak a century 
or so later with Edmund Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of Our 
Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, published in 1756. Ray suggests that 
with its emphasis on intensity of feeling the sublime gained traction over the 
course of the eighteenth century thanks in no small part to the ‘corporeal 
experiences’ of an increasingly geographically mobile bourgeois encountering 
the power of nature on the Grand Tour. Terror and destruction glimpsed over 
Alpine precipices laid psychological and literary foundations for Burke’s 
categories of privation, and for a language of negation.  
 
Just a year prior to the publication of Burke’s influential text on the aesthetics 
of the sublime, on the 1st November 1755 an earthquake obliterated the city 
of Lisbon, killing ‘roughly a quarter of its 250,000 inhabitants and damaging 
towns and villages from Morocco to France. Tremors were felt throughout 
Europe, and tidal surges observed in Finland and at the mouth of the Elbe’.11 
Whether experienced directly or at safe remove, through countless extensive 
witness accounts, this catastrophe presented terror as a sensorial, bodily 
encounter on an unimaginable and incomprehensible scale. The narrative of 
this event and its subsequent impact on collective psychology was detailed in 
a radio broadcast for children by Walter Benjamin in 1931. Benjamin draws 
upon the written account of an English eyewitness to portray the near biblical 
scale of the devastation brought about by one of the largest earthquakes ever 
to be recorded. This disaster ‘preoccupied the entire world like few other 
events in that century’, shaking consciousness and belief to the core.12 
Benjamin alludes, albeit indirectly — due no doubt to the age of his audience 
— to its seismic effect on the philosophical landscape, pointing out that one of 
the notable subsequent accounts published was produced by Immanuel Kant.  
 
The Lisbon Earthquake was Kant’s Now. He published three separate treaties 
relating to an event whose ‘massive, scaring, overwhelmingly powerful 
materiality’ proved to be ‘an essential moment, if not the essential moment, in 
the transformation of European thought that made it finally modern’.13 Such 
was the destructive force of the earthquake that faith — blind and 
irreproachable — was shattered. The ‘notion of infinity previously located in 
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God’ — ordered, just, and purposeful — suffered a tectonic collapse that 
would force a paradigm shift from the speculative to the experiential in Kant’s 
work. Prior to the earthquake he had framed his approach to the relationship 
between nature, God and human capacity with divine metaphysics. After the 
cataclysm, where speculative and philosophical accounts had ultimately come 
up short both in descriptive and explanatory terms, Kant assumed a more 
observational outlook through the more materially conscious language of 
‘causality’ and science. In the aftershocks of the Lisbon Earthquake, the 
conception of the sublime, a core of Kant’s aesthetics, shifts from the infinite 
cosmos to the violence and grit of physical event and material process. For 
Kant, the negative experience of encountering what is beyond our grasp, 
beyond our limits both physically and intellectually, is ultimately resolved 
positively in the possibility for knowledge — in the very awareness of the limits 
of capacity. He maintains that it is the confrontation with this potentiality that 
triggers or constitutes sublime feeling. The divine is experienced negatively —
as an absence of God. In the search for this absolute Kant lowers his eyes 
from the heavens to the ground beneath his feet, to the sulphorous eruptions 
and boiling hot springs he witnessed in Toplitz in Bohemia. Kant’s 
recalibration of the sublime towards ‘human freedom’ springs from a 
landscape turned to a ‘sea of fire’, from abject desolation.14 
 
Kant’s faith in possibility, in an ultimately positive extrapolation of natural 
cataclysm was not shared by all. In the face of such indiscriminate destruction 
and merciless, incomprehensible natural force faith in the inherently idealist 
values of a god-guided universe elsewhere gave way to pessimism. But if the 
Lisbon Earthquake was, as some viewed it, ‘the death of optimism’, 
Auschwitz, crucial to the reading of Newman’s Now, was the death of 
language which precipitated a radical overhaul of Kant’s formulation of the 
sublime.15  Ray uses the writing of Theodor Adorno to account for the impact 
of collective trauma on the concept, citing the holocaust in particular. Any 
lingering positivity is here stripped from sublime experience. Where 
traditionally the destructive and overwhelming force of nature was recuperable 
through the progress of knowledge, reason and self, the violence of the 
holocaust left the self bereft of the final revelatory reward offered by idealism’s 
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steady march to future perfection. Ray states that ‘The compensatory, second 
stage pleasure of the traditional sublime, anchored in metaphysical optimism, 
is no longer possible: after the industrialized genocide of the camps, all we 
are left with is the anguish of the imagination and a desolation of human 
dignity’.16  
 
Where previously ‘cloud stratas were beautiful billows for the imagination to 
soar through’, elevation after the Second World War had little to do with 
rapture. 17 Instead the skies were associated with fear and the annihilation of 
the material world. The idealism at the heart of the pre-modern sublime is 
transfigured beyond recognition by the unimaginable heat of atomic fission 
above Hiroshima — a heat that razes form and figure, leaving the contingent 
and the indeterminate. Though the editorial statement for the sublime issue of 
The Tiger’s Eye ‘wished’ for the beginning of a greater sublimity ‘apart from 
the tawdry, the picayune, the brutish’, in the wake of collective trauma, it was 
just such (negative) language that would define the spirit of the modern and 
post-modern sublime.18  
 
Barnett Newman: Dissident Surrealist 
 
 ‘The impulse of modern art was this desire to destroy beauty’. 19 
 
For Newman Now marks a point of rupture with western, specifically 
European, cultural history and the associated aesthetic philosophies. His text 
‘The Sublime is Now’ reads in parts like a revolutionary manifesto; a call to 
arms declaring difference and distance from the European landscape and the 
moribund tradition of the sublime found therein. Such history, Newman makes 
clear, has ensured that the category of the sublime has become irretrievably 
entangled with ideal form. Beauty, he maintains, has lingered beneath the 
surface of the sublime. Newman argues that despite the modern will to 
‘destroy the established rhetoric of beauty’ early efforts amounted to little 
more than a ‘transfer of values’, rather than a lasting recalibration of 
‘experiencing life’. The impressionist ‘insistence on a surface of ugly strokes’ 
ultimately equated to a continuation of a value system that could or would not 
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slip the shackles of the ‘culture values of their plastic history’. This system’s 
bottom line remained beauty. In short, for Newman, elevation of means and 
(low) materials, like Dada’s use of sandpaper or newspaper, was merely 
misdirection. One that failed to address the experiential core of the sublime as 
it developed in the modern age.  
 
However, there are clues in Newman’s text that would suggest that the 
rupture was merely a surface tear, and that he was far from ‘free from the 
weight of European culture’. Unlikely though it seems on face value, it is 
possible that his conception of the sublime as an experiential, subjective 
encounter with painting, devoid of association and the figure, turned on a very 
continental perspective on interiority. Newman’s notion of secularized 
elevation was potentially informed by the anti-hierarchical, anti-institutional 
cultural agenda espoused in the writing of George Bataille and the dissident 
surrealists that contributed to the Documents magazine project. 
 
Founded in 1929 by Bataille and Pierre d’Espezel with financial backing from 
Georges Wildenstein, Documents served as platform for Bataille’s 
‘paradoxical philosophy’ during the inter-war years. This philosophy was 
based on his belief that ‘thought was incapable, by it’s very nature, of 
illuminating the essential areas of human existence’.20 Such a philosophy 
promoted the tearing down of the aesthetic institution and the tyranny of 
critical language — a language that had propped up the western visual culture 
that Newman’s Two Edges stood in opposition to. Documents, writes Alastair 
Brotchie 
 
attempted a de-coding of European culture on a par with the emerging 
disciplines devoted to understanding “primitive” social structures. No 
distinction was made between high and low culture; only their usefulness to 
understanding was significant [!] The very name of the magazine implied an 
examination of the given: not art but evidence; not literary writing but 
documents.21 
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A kindred spirit can be discerned in The Tiger’s Eye editorial determination to 
eschew conventional critical apparatus. Its ‘direct approach’ aimed at 
eliminating the distractions of ‘historic or analytic process’ by presenting work 
without identifying the artist responsible for it.22 Form within the magazine, 
determined by contrasting formats, typefaces and visual juxtapositions, 
privileged direct experience and resisted conventional critical interpretation. 
The magazine’s format was ‘intimate, encouraging the reader to hold the 
volume in both hands as if closing a circuit’.23 
 
Within Documents Bataille, along with key contributors like the German avant-
garde novelist Carl Einstein and critic Michel Leiris, established the Critical 
Dictionary. A magazine within a magazine, the Dictionary was a critique of 
definition and, as such, questioned the limits of language itself. ‘Words,’ states 
Carl Einstein, ‘are pertifications which elicit mechanical reactions in us’.24 
Barnett Newman points out that the turn to the visual in the languages of 
modern painting and prose has been a drive away from such petrifications —
 away from the ‘confusing dichotomy of meaning inherent in their media’. He 
credits James Joyce as giving the surrealists their ‘language’. ‘It was James 
Joyce’, writes Newman, ‘who taught the surrealists how to use words as if 
they were clay that could be molded and shaped to produce a plastic form’.25 
Plastic form in this sense comes close to the insistence on the function of 
words as espoused by Bataille et al. Newman qualifies modern painting in 
terms redolent of Documents when he writes that its development was 
derived from a ‘concern with — or more correctly, a return to — its primitive 
function, that is, its original function as a vehicle of human expression’.26 That 
the broad church of surrealism was in the background for Newman is made 
clear when he states ‘To me Burke reads like a surrealist manual’.27 His 
familiarity with the movement and his forthright opinions on it are further 
evidenced in strident comments that reveal his view that surrealism had failed 
to shake off traditional perspective and ‘high realism’.28 Newman was at pains 
to distance the American ‘new painter’ from the threat of being assimilated 
into what he perceived as a polluted landscape of surrealism.  
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However, just several pages after the image of Newman’s Two Edges, The 
Sublime Issue of The Tiger’s Eye featured a written piece entitled ‘The 
Torture’ (elsewhere translated as ‘The Torment’) by ‘one of the foremost of 
the French contemporary philosophers’, George Bataille. 29 The extended 
extract used in the magazine is taken from ‘L’Experience Interieure’, Bataille’s 
exploration of and meditation on ‘a strange world where anguish and ecstasy 
coexist’.30 While not directly addressing the sublime, Bataille’s writing 
nevertheless muses laterally on God, knowledge and ‘the extreme limit 
(l’extreme) of the possible’. At this threshold or point of transgression begins 
what he terms a ‘singular experience’ whose ‘tradition is difficult; the 
introduction of its oral form is really only barely written’.31 The singular 
encounter, sublime in sensation if not in name, found in ‘tangible experience 
and not by logical explanation’ is a downward looking absolute — an absolute 
zero that marks the point at which obligation to express is abandoned by 
method. ‘When nothing is possible any longer is in my eyes to have an 
experience of the divine’, writes Bataille, ‘it is analogous to a torment’.32  
 
Written in 1943, several years after the demise of the Documents project, 
Bataille’s atheological treatise, L’Experience Interieure (Inner Experience), 
resonates ‘with the absence of God’ and locates transcendence in the 
negative, in the back and forth of limit transgressed. 33 For Bataille, Now is a 
point of collapse that provokes a ‘dramatic loss of self’.34 This collapse is 
kinetic; it is a downward movement or ‘fall’ — a leveling force that relates to 
his theory of informe, articulated in his brief categorization of formless in the 
Critical Dictionary. Though obliquely, in the ‘Sublime is Now’ Newman brings 
Bataille’s informe to mind when he contrasts Greek idealism with the Gothic or 
the baroque, where ‘the sublime consists of a desire to destroy form, where 
form can be formless’. Whilst Newman’s use of the term formless might only 
circumstantially invoke Bataille’s conception, there remains a sense that 
Bataille is in the shadows when Newman calls for a break with the ‘rhetoric of 
exaltation’ and aligns the sublime with the impulse of modern art to ‘destroy 
beauty’.35 Engaged in a ‘struggle’ with beauty as idealized form the sublime 
that Newman portrays is antagonistic, demanding disassociation from the 
subsequent ‘confusion in philosophy’ that defines its past.  
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The contents of Newman’s library at the time of his death fail to reveal any of 
Bataille’s writing. However, as Richard Schiff points out, during Newman’s 
early career he was unable to afford an extensive book collection. 36 Much of 
his reading was likely facilitated by libraries and with borrowed texts. In view 
of this and the evident relationship between Bataille and The Tiger’s Eye it 
remains conceivable that the painter was intimately familiar with his notion of 
the leaking of the sacred into the profane.37  
 
In 1948 Newman produced an essay for the third issue of The Tiger’s Eye 
entitled ‘The New Sense of Fate’. Ultimately unpublished due to its length, it 
considers the cultural and social fallout of the catastrophe of World War II. In 
it, and the subsequently published condensed version, ‘The Object and the 
Image’, Newman draws parallels with ‘attempts made in previous eras to 
grapple with overwhelming experience through the media or art’.38 This he 
does by framing the plight of the modern painter with that of the ancient artist. 
He writes 
 
After more than two thousand years we have finally arrived at the tragic 
position of the Greeks, and we have achieved this Greek state of tragedy 
because we have at last ourselves invented a new sense of all-pervading 
fate, a fate that is for the first time for modern man as real and as intimate as 
the Greeks’ fate was to them [!] Each of us now stand like Oedipus and can 
by his acts or lack of action, in innocence, kill his father and desecrate his 
mother.
39
 
 
Such bleak, near Nietzschean rhetoric reinforces the notion of a potential 
proximity between Newman and Bataille, who a decade prior to Newman’s 
characterization of a new sense of fate defined by trauma, included a section 
on The ‘Tragic Time of Greece’ in a paper entitled Obelisk, published in 
Mesures (April 15, 1938). Musing on war and Nietzsche’s prophecy of the 
Death of God, Bataille invokes tragic and violent myth to negotiate the modern 
condition — citing Cronus, whose strength was engendered by the ‘bloody 
mutilation of his father’ and Dionysus, ‘whose coming into the world depended 
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on the murder of his mother by his father’.40 ‘Going in the opposite direction 
on the road travelled by the ancient world,’ writes Bataille, ‘this world, as its 
riches accumulate and everything in it decomposes, aspires in its depths to 
the tragic deliverances of primitive Greek naiveté’. Echoing this sentiment 
Newman describes the modern American artist as a ‘barbarian’ — a primitive 
confronted with the opportunity to be free of the ‘paraphernalia’ of language 
and idealized form and to ‘come closer to the sources of the tragic emotion’. 
‘Shall we not, as artists,’ asks Newman, ‘search out the new objects for its 
image?’ 41  It can be argued that Bataille pre-empts Newman’s question when 
he states in broader terms that  
 
The movement of all life now places the human being before the alternatives 
of either this conquest or a disastrous retreat. The human being arrives at the 
threshold: there he must throw himself headlong into that which has no 
foundation and no head.
42
  
 
This threshold gives way to the ‘vertiginous fall’. For Bataille it is arrived at by 
guillotine, for Newman by the zip.  
 
Bataille’s writing on The Obelisk offers further evidence of parallel concerns 
and themes in Newman’s work. The image of the obelisk itself is a key 
example. In 1967 Newman turned to the Egyptian form with his sculpture, 
Broken Obelisk (Figure. 5). In this work he fuses two ancient forms, central to 
Bataille’s text, into a kind of modern formlessness. Created in industrial cor-
ten steel the inverted obelisk balances implausibly on the apex of a pyramid. 
Newman calls into question the permanence and stability of these signs that 
Bataille states ‘transcend the intolerable void that time opens under men’s 
feet’.43 Idealized form is literally turned on its head, hierarchies are leveled — 
‘the high places themselves topple, to ensure a total revelation’.44 Newman 
presents the ‘paraphernalia’ of the ancients broken and upended — he 
presents such a language in ruin. The nostalgia inherent in their form is 
subverted, renewing a plastic language for tragic content.  
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Figure. 5 Barnett Newman, Broken Obelisk, 1963-9, MOMA 
(Cor-ten steel, 749.9 x 318.8 x 318.8 cm) 
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In measuring the force and resonance of these ancient icons Bataille 
considers what he terms the ‘sensation of time’ in the face of a collapse of 
‘imperishable unity’. Here ‘The lands stray from their sun, the horizon is 
annihilated’.45 This ‘state of glory’ writes Bataille, ‘is thus deftly linked to the 
feeling of an endless fall’.46 Such a fall equates to experience made concrete 
once image as such fails. This fall, this sensation of time is also to be found at 
the heart of Newman’s view of the sublime experienced in painting. 
Commenting on his experience of the Indian earth mounds of Ohio in 1949, 
Newman writes  
 
the Egyptian pyramid by comparison is nothing but an ornament [!] 
Suddenly one realizes that the sensation is not one of space or [of] an object 
in space [!] The sensation is the sensation of time — and all the other 
multiple feelings vanish like the outside landscape [!] I insist on my 
experiences of sensations in time — not in the sense of time but the physical 
sensation of time.
47
 
 
Reflecting on Broken Obelisk through the prism of Bataille’s writing potentially  
recalibrates the perspective on Newman’s painting and his conception of the 
sublime. Under these terms Newman’s Now becomes an existential matter. 
After ‘all the other multiple feelings vanish like the outside landscape’ it is 
inner experience that is left behind. The vertical visual gestures of Two Edges 
that would develop into the zip of Onement I destabilize established aesthetic 
structures. Like Bataille’s conception of formless, Newman’s zip is an 
operative phrase that orientates to the experiential. It too functions as a term 
serving to declassify traditional critical formulations — a ‘term that serves to 
bring things down in the world’.48 We are reminded that Bataille’s states in his 
brief oblique text for formless in the Critical Dictionary that ‘A dictionary beings 
when it no longer gives the meaning of words, but their tasks’. For Newman a 
painting begins when it no longer gives the meaning of image, but its task — 
that of giving ‘man a sense of place: that he knows he’s there, so he’s aware 
of himself’. Such subjectivity is an isolating, negative experience. Recalling an 
incident that occurred at his first solo show at the Betty Parsons Gallery in 
1950, Newman recounts an acquaintance furiously confronting him, distraught 
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and in tears protesting ‘You called me names, you made me aware of 
myself”.49 Newman’s zip is a threshold and as such is ‘a thing of dread, 
because there one must manifest or cast aside one’s qualities, because there 
it is necessary to register, forcibly or with levity, the rank one occupies in 
society’.50 Like the Critical Dictionary the zip marks the limit of language. 
 
Painting: Limit and Language  
 
Carl Einstein’s contribution to the Documents project and his wider influence, 
before his eventual suicide in 1940, has recently been re-evaluated by 
commentators like Rainer Rumold and Georges Didi-Huberman. After Bataille 
and Leiris, Einstein signed the most articles in the magazine’s two-year run. 
At the core of the aesthetic theory that he developed during the inter-war 
period was ‘the notion of contemporary painting as “a language”’.51 Framed 
within the context of the kulturkampf of modernism that purged language of 
representation and narrative from artistic modes, Einstein’s theory aimed at 
over turning established hierarchies to achieve a democratization of form — 
an aim that also characterized Documents’ critical drive during its short life 
span.  
 
Focused largely on the cubist painting of the period, particularly that of Pablo 
Picasso and Andre Masson, Einstein’s conception of painting as language 
was based on a rejection of the autonomy of literature. This ‘turn to the visual’ 
aimed at a paradigm shift away from the privileged position of the written word 
and the inescapable systems, polemics and ‘metaphors’ — the memory — 
that came with it. In opposition to Breton’s mainstream surrealism, where the 
sovereignty of the word remained, the dissident surrealists of Documents 
believed that conventional language had become compromised and infested 
with cliché, symbol and sign that obstructed pure aesthetic experience. 
Literature had ceased to be an effective structure for the interrogation or 
deconstruction of the real — the real being that which is necessarily beyond 
the object and, therefore, objective description. For Einstein ‘literature as an 
institution had turned into stereotype and exclusion, any linguistic text being, 
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to begin with, always a narrow translation of sensorial perceptions into a 
“completely other sphere”’.52  
 
Words had failed to realize their promise. Corrupted as they were with 
stagnating critical and theoretical association Documents articulated the view 
that conventional language could only realize secondary, proxy-images for 
experience passed. It was simply not up to the job of mediating the duality 
between object and subject. As Einstein comments, ‘Nightingale’ stands in for 
love and longing, the ‘stars’ for the ‘the Absolute’. At best words offer material 
experience ‘paraphrased’.53 Devalued by sentimentality for defunct 
metaphysics, words were unable to shake off memory, affiliation and 
attendant, distracting meaning. Einstein continues 
 
The nightingale is almost always a cliché, a narcotic, a form of laziness and 
ignorance. Indeed, what we designate with the help of words is less an object 
than a vague opinion; one uses words as though they were ornament of one’s 
own person. Words are usually petrifications that trigger mechanical reactions 
in us. They are instruments of power suggested by the cunning or by drunks. 
The nightingale falls into the category of paraphrases of the absolute; it is the 
grand master of all the techniques of classic seduction in which one resorts to 
the charm of smallness.
54
  
 
In the wake of the moral and artistic crisis that defined the first half of the 
twentieth century, painting too had suffered a certain petrification. Global 
conflict had exposed society to the extreme limit of experience. ‘We now know 
the terror to expect’, writes Newman, ‘Hiroshima showed it to us. We are no 
longer, then, in the face of mystery’.55 Such experience leaves culture with the 
obligation to articulate it but without the language to do so. At this point of 
impasse one is left with silence. But that silence is particular. 
 
The weight of this silence drags the sublime from the heavens and crushes it 
beyond recognition. As Adorno suggests, the extreme violence of Auschwitz 
and the continued turbulent history of the late twentieth century inverted the 
internal compass of the concept. Lyotard argues that literature, the ‘cognitive 
!
∀#!
regimen’ of history’s narrative and its associative language, reaches its limits 
and fails in the face of catastrophic events. 56 Unable to absorb or assimilate 
categories and ‘phrases’ associated with trauma on the scale of the 
holocaust, Lyotard states that the silence imposed equates to an ‘instant of 
language wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases 
cannot yet be’.57 Where traditional structures of language cannot sustain 
cognitive process, the direct, unmediated language of painting takes over.  
 
Newman’s Two Edges is the silence after Auschwitz and Hiroshima — a 
silence that remains articulate. It does not paraphrase, allude to, or narratively 
recount history — as Ray points out, Newman’s Now is not an ‘acting-out’ or 
‘working-through’ of collective trauma.58 Rather the silence or ‘negative 
phrase’, as Lyotard conceives of it, embodied in Two Edges refers the viewer 
only to the material fact of experience. As Lyotard comments in his essay 
‘Newman: The Instant’, ‘the message is presentation, but it presents nothing; 
it is, that is, presence’.59  
 
Newman’s ‘nothing’ is without visual association or literary allusion, but it is far 
from empty. As presentation it seeks nothing more than to elicit the direct 
‘physical sensation of time’. 60 This is not to be confused with duration, which, 
Newman argues has been the underlying subject matter of painting, and 
carries nostalgia or high drama and consequently remains associative and 
historical. Instead Newman is concerned with the present tense — or the 
tension of presence. 
 
As the engine of the modern and postmodern avant-garde the negative 
phrase, without nostalgia, divorced from its original (traumatic) object, speaks 
of presentation itself, of subject. This phenomenological language is, in 
Lyotard’s opinion, encountered by the ‘common person’ rather than the 
scholar, or as The Tiger’s Eye would have it, by the many rather than just the 
rhetorical thinker. Such experience is ‘aroused by the negative presentation of 
the indeterminate’.61  
 
!
∀∀!
Lyotard makes it clear that if ‘there is any ‘subject-matter’, it is immediacy. It 
happens here and now’.62 The silence of Newman’s Two Edges is deafening. 
Lyotard continues: 
 
I (the viewer) am no more than an ear open to the sound, which comes from 
out of the silence; the painting is that sound, an accord. Arising [se dresser], 
which is a constant theme in Newman, must be understood in the sense of 
pricking up one’s ears [dresser son Oreille], of listening.
63
 
 
For Lyotard Newman’s sound — his material language — embodies the event 
that occurs despite chaos and the ‘threatening void’.64 The (sublime) threat 
that ‘language or life will soon be extinguished’ is mitigated in Newman’s 
presentation of the creative act — in the unity of the pictorial plane sheared 
vertically. 65 The privileged position of the written word is challenged by Two 
Edges, by what Newman insists is a direct visual experience ‘whose reality is 
self-evident’.66 
 
Lyotard draws our attention to a tension between ‘writing’ or literature and 
painting in relation to the sublime by reflecting upon Edmund Burke’s 
hierarchical structuring of the concept. Here literature supersedes painting in 
its facility to conjure an ‘infinite number of associations’ for the sublime 
sensations of terror and delight. Painting, on the other hand, Burke maintains, 
fails the sublime because of the persistent constraints of figurative 
representation. Lyotard suggests that Newman escapes these constraints 
through 
 
[!] chromatic matter alone, and it’s relationship with the material (the canvas, 
which is sometimes left unprimed) and the lay-out (scale, format, proportions), 
which must inspire the wonderful surprise, the wonder that there should be 
something rather than nothing.
67
 
 
In 1948 it is literature that is constrained by association, it is the written word 
that is unable to break free of figurative representation, of representing the 
figure at the center of cataclysmic history. Newman’s abstract painting 
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accommodates the ‘unheard-of phrase’ in its articulation of imperative 
gesture. Such an act testifies to being. Despite the threat of nothing, despite 
teetering on the edge of the abyss ‘the zip, takes place, divides the shadows, 
breaks down the light into colors like a prism, and arranges them across the 
surface like a universe ‘.68 Two Edges embodies the sublime at tension, as 
polarities reverse from representing romantic proof positive of sublime 
experience in vistas of vast and violent nature to the negative — to the 
presentation of that which cannot be represented. 
 
Two Edges, a sign of the extreme reduction to come in Newman’s painting, is 
material articulation of that ‘new tragedy that is playing itself out on a Greek-
like stage under a new sense of fate that we have ourselves created’. 69 
Newman argues that the artist’s response cannot ‘play with an art of over 
refinement, an art of quality, of sensibility, of beauty’ — rather, a more violent 
approach was required to ‘tear the tragedy to shreds’.70 From this historical 
perspective, Newman’s Now is bound to human dignity corroded, with nobility 
and the ‘myth of progress’ corrupted not by the arbitrary, yet ultimately rational 
forces of (previously divine) nature, but instead by an irrational evil intuited by 
mankind, one that insists on a re-evaluation of language itself.  
 
For Carl Einstein such a re-evaluation provoked the turn to the visual. 
Painting, he argued, facilitated the liberation from ‘cults’ of the past, from 
‘immortalized dead turkeys’ and the ‘convention of the spine’ — the historical 
and critical narrative whose language, overburdened with memory, spawned 
what he termed ‘mnemonic images’. 71 Newman’s rhetoric runs parallel. For 
him it was the ‘obsolete props of an outmoded and antiquated legend’ that 
were the obstacles to a renewed relationship with ‘absolute emotions’. 72 
Where Einstein declares that ‘Artists no longer work from an image of the 
gods but from their own conceptions’,73 Newman states ‘Instead of making 
cathedrals out of Christ, man, or ‘life’, we are making them out of ourselves, 
out of our own feelings’.74  
 
Newman’s Now, conceived of as the immediacy of a concrete physical 
experience has proximity with the real experienced absolutely as articulated 
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by Einstein. It seems plausible that when Newman writes, ‘The image we 
produce is the self-evident one of revelation, real and concrete, that can be 
understood by anyone who will look at it without the nostalgic glasses of 
history’ he is doing so with Einstein and Bataille’s conception of an earth 
bound, ‘concretized absolute’ in mind.75 ‘This absolute’, writes Einstein, 
‘confined as it is within the limits of an experience, is simply a marker of the 
intensity of human self-assertion’.76   
 
The term ‘a marker of the intensity of human self-assertion’ might justifiably be 
applied to the gesture of the zip in Newman’s painting. Einstein’s rhetoric 
would seem in part to have resonance to Newman’s determination, through 
his painting, that ‘Man’ — not God — ‘Is Present’, and that ‘pure visual 
function’ instills in the viewer an awareness of self, even if that self is 
temporarily lost to the chaos experienced beyond limits of cognition. Whilst the 
intensity of human self-assertion might be disassociated from the 
metaphysical as a religious, ideological generality, nevertheless, it has 
specificity in terms of a secularized notion of transcendence — an experience 
of an unknowable other grounded in the immediacy or physicality of presence. 
In conversation with the noted European critic and writer David Sylvester, 
himself a contributor to the sublime issue of The Tiger’s Eye, Newman states 
‘One thing that I am involved in about painting is that the painting should give 
a man a sense of place’.77 Place is used in opposition to space, which 
Newman associates with renaissance perspective. Newman describes this 
place, this here, this Now, as ‘metaphysical fact’ — an apparently 
contradictory phrase that exposes the problematic of categorizing an 
experience of the unverifiable and reveals the conflict between the idea and 
it’s embodiment.  
 
Newman was acutely aware of the schism between concept and conception, 
of the absurdity of trying to reconcile subject and object, theory and practice, 
of the distance between the text for ‘The Sublime is Now’ and the texture of 
Two Edges. He highlights the inherent contradiction of seeking to categorize 
the un-categorizable when he comments ‘What I’m saying is that my painting 
is physical and what I’m saying also is that my painting is metaphysical [!] 
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the attempt to describe something that is alive is impossible’.78 Within the 
pages of Documents we find this tortuous, contradictory state explored in the 
abstraction of the Critical Dictionary. As Robert Label remarks 
 
A dictionary’s sole purpose is the imposition of form and homology, definition 
fixes objects in thought, extracts them from the world and pins them to a 
page. A dictionary is never critical, any element of subjectivity would allow in 
the formless, that heterological gob of spittle. Formless declassifies and is the 
negation of definition.
79  
 
It is this heterological gob of spittle that lubricated the liberation of language 
from ancestor cults. The process was far from genteel. The movement from 
the language of image to the vocabulary of surface was determined through 
and by a ‘dialectic of destruction, or, better, decomposition’.80 New forms 
could only be generated as a result of violent operation that amounted to the 
‘assassination of other versions’.81 Commenting on the painting of George 
Braque, Einstein declares ‘tableau = coupure’ (Picture = rupture). Qualifying 
this edict, George Didi-Huberman comments 
 
The cubist picture is ‘rupture’, which is why, after the death of God, it was 
able to reinvent the power of beholding in its spectator — the opposite of the 
come-on — as it withdrew from every form of familiarity; thus it could reinvent 
and secularize the aura.
82  
 
A transgressive, transformative force, rupture can be said to characterize 
Einstein’s notion of the operative violence driving cubism and subsequently 
modern painting in general. It is the means and method of critical, historical 
and pictorial dissociation. As Didi-Huberman notes, cubist painting presents 
rupture optically. Such tactics decompose visual cohesion, perspective and 
object. As plane ruptures from plane, forming ‘tectonic dissociations’, it is 
surface that subsequently defines image. No longer read narratively, image is 
isolated from burdensome cultural and historical association. Divorced from 
literature, metaphor, illustration and representation, it is instead subjectivity 
experienced directly and materially that is privileged. As objects rupture, new 
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un-imagined, prototype forms are revealed across a psycho-active surface 
and articulated through the act and action of painting; in processing the 
objective world, not in terms of visual representation, but rather in terms of 
representing as visual experience the sensation of the unconscious and the 
real.  
 
Einstein equated the expressive facility of painting and the ‘murderous force’ 
of its processes — ‘vis-à-vis the pulverized ‘identity of object’ — with the 
spontaneity and fluidity of speaking. 83 He cites André Masson’s expressive, 
automatic painted images being as the most ‘advanced visual language’.84 
Einstein’s conception of painting as a language centered on what he saw as 
its capacity to de-familiarize form. His term ‘verformen’ is closely bound to 
broader conceptions of the informe, which, as developed by Bataille in 
Documents, ‘desublimates and reveals, and thus lays bare, the material, 
physiological base of imaginary formal processes as open’.85  
 
Newman’s Two Edges might then be approached in relation to the language 
of the informe. The informe image is one in flux. It is not statement of fact, 
relating to the nature of objects, but rather the fact of stating seeing as 
subjective process. Such subjectivity, post representation, drives painting 
towards a reduced base state — towards the physical immediacy of gesture, 
mark, and the material relationship between support and medium. Through 
the prism of the informe painting becomes an open proposition — a form of 
material discourse. By virtue of its isolation from memory and cliché, or 
because of its capacity to destroy them, mid-century avant-garde painting, 
driven by the informe, serves as vehicle for critique. Such production, Didi-
Huberman categorizes as a ‘dialectical image’, one that corrodes traditional 
aesthetic experience through material insistence. 86 Under these terms the 
painted surface, autonomous and irrational, becomes theoretical — it 
becomes an ontological statement on the limits of vision. With the objective 
world ruptured, seeing is made ‘conscious’. The spectator is left with a 
language of ‘verformen’ — of disruption, transgression and sabotage — 
severed (all be it temporarily) from logic and the written word. Without the 
scaffold of simile and reference the ‘I’ is unable to orientate. The compass 
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needle snaps and ‘self’ is lost, abandoned. The limits of cognition are exposed 
in prototype forms. Interpretive systems are superseded by visual gesture 
processed purely experientially — but nonetheless concretely.  
 
Einstein uses the term ‘concrete’ to strip the absolute of mysticism and the 
divine. He makes his case explicitly: 
 
This painting of the absolute, this grasping of the pure visual function, 
demonstrated that the absolute is not some ideological generality, but always 
a perfectly concrete individual experience that has nothing to do with any 
metaphysical or posthumously retrospective theoretical product. As function, 
the absolute is thoroughly un-metaphysical and un-transcendent. The 
experience of the absolute can be represented as fully or as inadequately as 
any other experience, once the artist, instead of representing lazy, run-down 
metaphorical objects, turns to inventing freely the forms appropriate to this 
function. 
87
 
 
Where Documents insisted that words reveal task rather than meaning, so too 
painting must resist description and reveal only function — that being 
experience of the real manifest through the tactility of ‘hallucinations of pure 
act’.88 Einstein positions painting as conduit for an absolute of material 
immediacy, and in so doing provokes the shift from discourse on the sublime, 
to discourse of the sublime; from the language of critical interpretation, 
historical narrative and aesthetic gymnastics to the language of the painted 
surface — primary, experiential and true. Einstein’s dissolute absolute was 
painting as the spontaneous expression of forms devolved to formlessness, 
direct and sensational, with process made visible through visual gesture, 
through ruptured perspective, material presence and the artist’s mark. 
Irrespective of aspiration, of final destination, of image, Newman’s language 
of painting conjures an absolute determined by textured form, by raw 
materials — by smeared paint bleeding through masking tape (Figure. 7A) 
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Figure. 7A Barnett Newman, End of Silence — detail, 1949  
(Oil on canvas, 96 x 76 cm) 
 
courtesy of Barnett Newman Foundation 
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Discourse and Discord: The Sublime Beyond Now  
 
The question that now arises is how, if we are living in a time without legend 
or mythos that can be called sublime, if we refuse to admit any exaltation in 
pure relations, if we refuse to live in the abstract, how can we be creating a 
sublime art? 
89 
 
Newman’s question remains pertinent. Despite establishing a genealogy that 
includes a broad range of artists whose work developed from the ‘negative 
possibilities of specific historical images and materials’, from the post-war to 
the contemporary period, Gene Ray’s account of a sublime transfigured by 
the trauma of cataclysmic events surprisingly omits a perspective on the 
attack on the World Trade Center on 11th September 2001, an event which 
once more exposes the limits of language, imagination and cognition. 90 The 
early years of the twenty-first century have produced a steady increase in the 
cultural and critical currency of the sublime.91 As Christine Battersby suggests 
in her book, The Sublime: Terror and Human Indifference, as a transformative 
event — an event that has operative potential, politically and culturally — 9/11 
has been made to ‘function as the equivalent to the sublime’.92  
 
Like the Lisbon Earthquake or the devastating history of both World Wars the 
collective trauma produced by the events of 9/11 cannot be assimilated 
through established interpretive frameworks. Subject and object are once 
more disassociated. Concept cannot be attached to that which proves 
inconceivable. Once again an irruption in the ‘grand narratives of legitimation 
that characterize modernity in the West’ produces a schism between past and 
future.93 Arguably the ‘spirit’ of the contemporary age, terror has never had 
such traction in the collective consciousness. Oscillating between the known 
and the unknown, terror is the abstraction that resurrects the sublime. Against 
it we wage an unwinnable, unpresentable, perpetual and infinite war. 
 
As was the case for Newman and post-war painters on both side of the 
Atlantic such moral and cultural crisis precipitates an inward turn. At this 
turning point the individual and the social are set at tension. The articulate 
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silence of Newman’s Two Edges, if not overtly political, alludes to a proto-
Kantian moral dimension to sublime experience. When Newman was asked at 
a gathering that included Harold Rosenberg, Robert Motherwell and David 
Hare what Two Edges meant ‘in terms of society, in terms of the world, in 
terms of the situation’ Newman responded as follows 
 
If my work were properly understood, it would be the end of state capitalism 
and totalitarianism. Because to the extent that my painting was not an 
arrangement of objects, not an arrangement of spaces, not an arrangement of 
graphic elements, was an open painting, in the sense that it represented an 
open world, to that extent I thought, and I still believe, that my work in terms 
of its social impact does denote the possibility of an open society, of an open 
world, not of a closed institutional world. 
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‘A closed institutional world’ well describes Newman’s view of the European 
academic cultural landscape, based, as it was, on ‘objective rhetoric’ as 
opposed to the subjective revelation painting potentially provokes. Two Edges 
marks a break away from what Newman perceived as the tyranny of language 
— with the unavoidable historical, associative narrative that accompanied the 
western formulation of the sublime. Newman comments that 
 
So strong is the grip of the rhetoric of exaltation as an attitude in the large 
context of the European culture pattern that the elements of sublimity in the 
revolution we know as modern art, exist in its efforts and energy to escape 
the pattern rather than the realization of a new experience.
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Newman presents forms that are direct in their communication of an 
experience of the new and the now, unmediated by or unfettered with the 
straining historical formulation of the sublime. Two Edges, or perhaps more 
aptly his later painting End of Silence (1949) (Figure. 6) — a heavier, more 
aggressively textured and painterly variation on Onement I — arguably breaks  
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Figure. 6 Barnett Newman, End of Silence, 1949  
(Oil on canvas, 96 x 76 cm) 
 
courtesy of Barnett Newman Foundation 
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the ‘grip of the rhetoric of exaltation’. It de-limits traditional pictorial language 
and transcends the failings of rhetoric unable to articulate the concept post-
Hiroshima/Auschwitz.  
 
The current resurrection of the sublime has revealed a concept once again in 
crisis. Like Frankenstein’s monster the postmodern, contemporary sublime is 
an assemblage of decomposing parts from increasingly complex aesthetic 
rhetoric and bears only passing resemblance to the concept of old. Lacking 
the coherence of a theologically orientated pre-modern sublime, the 
splintering of cultural production that has characterized a disparate post-
modern landscape has subsequently been reflected in the fracturing of the 
concept in a contemporary context.  
 
Jane Forsey argues that the groundswell of interest in the sublime over the 
course of a tumultuous last decade well suited to notions of the inexplicable, 
overwhelming and the horrendous has resulted in such confusion that a 
theory of the sublime is simply not possible.96 Such pessimism in relation to a 
concept notoriously difficult to capture is shared by James Elkins who argues 
that it is consequently only effective in relation to a narrow range of artworks, 
explicitly Romantic, produced during the nineteenth century. Its use value in a 
contemporary context has been compromised by writers determined to 
‘smuggle covert religious meaning into texts that are putatively secular’ — the 
resulting postmodern sublime, Elkins suggests, is so intricate as to be 
redundant without extensive qualification.97  
 
Both Guy Sircello and Forsey agree that such confusion comes largely from 
the intrinsic ‘problem of the sublime’ — that is the irreconcilable difficulties of 
the spiritual, post-God, formulated around cognitive failure derived from 
epistemological or ontological transcendence. Orientated towards the 
possibility of such experience articulated via an object that is necessarily un-
knowable, that is epistemologically inaccessible, Guy Sircello argues that 
such theorizing quickly becomes unstable, falling into incoherence and 
contradiction. He likens the problem to the impossibility of having a visual 
experience of an invisible object. As Forsey points out, the inherent 
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contradiction is that the ‘sublime object is both transcendent and familiar’.98 
The concept is cannibalistic. Forsey argues that epistemological 
transcendence — that is movement beyond limits of knowledge — depends 
on, but fails because of, its proximity to ontological transcendence. The 
confrontation with that which exceeds the boundaries of cognition, that 
presents itself as unknowable, is an experience that demands object and 
environment but ultimately accedes that no such concrete manifestation, no 
such presentation, nor presence can articulate or represent such experience. 
Being cannot be reconciled with the unknown in relation to the overwhelming. 
The postmodern sublime eats itself.  
 
Where Sircello ultimately remains optimistic, viewing the concept as critically 
injured at worst, Forsey and Elkins argue that it is in its death throes. Forsey 
takes issue with Sircello’s thesis for a ‘wholly epistemological account of the 
sublime’ — an account that necessarily supposes Immanuel Kant was wrong 
to link cognitive failure with moral transcendence. She points out that without 
the moment of moral reckoning that comes in the final (in her view positive) 
movement of the mind, the field of contemporary sublime is left open to ‘any 
encounters that likewise humble us or draw attention to our vulnerability’ — 
from the New York Times crossword puzzle to the rush hour cycle ride 
home.99 In this respect, we might also include the inadequacy experienced in 
the face of the apparently infinite, irreconcilable complexities and 
contradictions of sublime theory. Forsey implies that if anything can be 
sublime, then nothing is.  
 
Sircello recognizes that the sublime has an intimate relationship with nothing. 
In his efforts to move beyond the perceived impasse of contradiction and 
incoherence within the concept he addresses what he calls the ‘intuition of 
nothingness’, and draws attention to the fact that despite the ‘revelatory force’ 
ascribed to the concept, sublime discourse ‘often indicates, in a variety of 
ways, that there is nothing there to be revealed’.100 The Now beyond the zip is 
empty. That is not to say that the use value of such an experience is zero. 
That is not to say that it has nothing to offer, but rather that it offers the ‘great 
nothing’.101 An endless emptiness, but one filled with eternal possibilities.  
!
∀#!
 
The post-9/11 sublime continues a downward trajectory initiated under 
modernism. This will to the negative is governed by a certain sense of 
absence — an absence that returns us to the writing of George Bataille. 
Referring to his theory of ‘inner experience’, Sircello locates absence in 
Bataille’s particular conception of nothingness found in the inadequacy of non-
knowledge. Here the possibility of nothing is glimpsed through the cracks of 
failure. Bataille writes, ‘But I cry out to the sky: “I know nothing.” And I repeat 
in a comical voice (I cry out to the sky, at times, in this way): “Absolutely 
nothing”’.102 
 
While acknowledging that ‘Bataille’s historical connection with the early 
modern tradition of the sublime is neither explicit nor direct’ Sircello sees 
proximity and relevance in his theory of subjective, reflective experience.103  
‘Experience’ that Bataille states ‘attains in the end the fusion of the object and 
the subject, being as subject non-knowledge, as object the unknown.104 In 
developing his case for epistemological transcendence Sircello quotes 
Bataille as follows 
 
I hold the apprehension of God — be he without form and without mode [!] 
to be an obstacle in the movement which carries us to the more obscure 
apprehension of the unknown; of a presence which is no longer in any way 
distinct from an absence.
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Bataille locates the (deconsecrated) sacred in this in-between state — in a 
sense of the abject. Like Bataille, Sircello marks the distinction between 
experience and its rhetoric. Nothing or ‘non-knowledge’ reveals the limits of 
theoretical discourse and its language and returns us to the experience itself 
— to feelings invoked.  
 
For Forsey attending only to sublime experience itself leaves the possibility of 
a coherent theory further off than ever. Feelings, she argues, intentional or 
otherwise, have little to do with cognition and its limits. She insists that 
expressive ‘poetic language’, used to communicate ‘a feeling the author has 
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or has had’, is restricted to written accounts or evocations of experience by 
definition secondary to or proxy for the reality they attempt to capture. 106 To 
rely on such amounts to a rejection of the traditions of the concept’s 
discourse. If we are left with nothing but poetic expressions of a certain 
category of experience then a historically grounded, coherent theory is no 
longer possible. Consequently, as consensus would have it, aesthetic logic 
has been exhausted. The sublime has arrived at a kind of rhetorical ground 
zero; overburdened with association and nostalgia, the language of the 
limitless has reached its limit.  
 
How then might we transcend this limit? Any worthwhile continued discourse 
demands consideration of alternative modes of articulation. Forsey’s 
disparaging view of ‘poetic language’ in relation to the sublime fails to take 
into account the theoretical potential or relevance of non-verbal language, like 
that of painting, in relation to the unknowable, overwhelming or cognitively 
inaccessible. An encounter with the sensation of anxiety attributed to the 
collapse of reason or self is not contingent on a familiarity with ‘medieval 
definitions’ and the historic complexities of aesthetic logic.107 Sircello suggests 
that the breaking up of established rhetorical hierarchies is essential to the 
contemporary revitalization of the category of the sublime. This anti-
institutional perspective brings us, via Bataille, full circle to Newman’s 
contribution to the sublime issue of The Tiger’s Eye. 
 
Newman’s text ‘The Sublime is Now’ and his painting Two Edges represent 
the distinction of categories or discourse within the sublime as determined by 
Sircello and, to a greater extent, Peter De Bolla. Like De Bolla, Sircello 
separates ‘language that is or purports to be more or less immediately 
descriptive or expressive of sublime experience, i.e. discourse that proceeds 
or is represented as proceeding more or less directly from such experience’ 
from ‘talk about the sublime’, or the language of analytical discourse that 
includes not only reflection on, and therefore distance from, sublime 
experience but also ‘other talk about he sublime’. Such chatter might be 
described as the institution of sublime rhetoric from Longinus to Lyotard and 
beyond — what De Bolla distinguishes as discourse on the sublime. 
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Despite his rejection of the impediments of memory, association and 
exaltation, Newman’s text ultimately contributes to talk about the sublime. 
Two Edges, on the other hand contributes to a material discourse of the 
sublime. This, De Bolla states, consists of poetic language in the broadest 
terms that produces sublime effects and conjures the experience directly. 
Drawing on these distinctions James Elkins qualifies the discourse on the 
sublime as being located ‘out there, in the world’, whereas the discourse of 
the sublime is located in ‘the interior mind’ and requires no further validation 
other than the experience itself.108 It is to this discourse that Newman’s 
painting contributes. There is no distance, no mediation between experience 
and direct interpretation, or reception. Now, it transpires, is the discourse of 
the sublime found in the extreme reduction of painting as abjection. Here the 
umbilical chord of aesthetic language is severed by the immediacy of a 
subjective encounter. This moment is terrifying in its autonomy. ‘It is neither 
seductive nor equivocal’, writes Lyotard, ‘it is clear, ‘direct’ and ‘poor’.109 For 
Lyotard, Newman’s zip is an instant manifest in visual gesture — gesture that 
testifies to event alone. The discourse to which it contributes is operative, not 
referential. The zip, comments Lyotard, ‘accomplishes an ontological task, 
that is, a ‘chronological task’. It accomplishes it without completing it’.110 
Newman’s gesture leaves experience open — the instant is fleeting. In terms 
that bring Bataille back to mind, Lyotard equates the experience with a 
‘search for apparition itself’.111  
 
Writing on the sacred, Bataille draws on the Sufi conception of this moment as 
a ‘slicing sword’ that ‘cuts the roots of the future and the past’.112 This 
‘privileged instant’   
 
flees as soon as it is seen and cannot be grasped [!] This gives rise to a 
mixture of unhappiness and exultation, of disgust and insolence; nothing 
seems more miserable and more dead than the stabilized thing, nothing 
seems more desirable that what will soon disappear.
113
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Once again we are reminded that presence is barely distinct from absence —
the positive from negative. Likening pursuit of this moment — this ‘grail’ — to 
a quest through ‘successive, deceptive and cloudy depths’, Bataille too, 
distinguishes between theory — what he calls ‘discriminating intelligence’, 
with its will to stabilize and contain — and discourse; active, undetermined 
and open. Bataille notes that ‘the search, intellectually undertaken at the 
promptings of unsatisfied desire, has always preceded theory’s delineation of 
the object sought’.114 Lyotard also marks the territories as distinct. He writes,  
‘Being announces itself in the imperative. Art is not a genre defined in terms of 
an end (the pleasure of the addressee), and still less is it a game whose rules 
have to be discovered’.115 Painting’s discourse is wholly other. 
 
Intrinsically unstable, the contemporary experience of the sublime, once again 
post-trauma, demands an abstract mode of discourse appropriate to the 
conditions set by the subject. For Forsey and Elkins such a mode can no 
longer be sustained by or generated from the traditional rhetorical institutions. 
Sircello, on the other hand, redirects us to the primary source, to the feeling of 
the sublime itself. He stops short, however, of offering an alternative language 
or forms for such direct experience. 
 
I have argued that while distinguishing his painting from European traditions 
the development of Newman’s visual language can be seen to carry 
surprising resonance with the radical, anti-hierarchical tenor of European 
dissident surrealist thinkers like George Bataille and Carl Einstein. The 
established symbol-systems and theory of the sublime proved entirely 
inadequate in relation to the trauma associated with early twentieth century 
global conflict that confronted artists. In place of such rhetoric and ‘confusion 
of philosophy’ Newman presented a starkly economical language of painting 
whose form insisted on unmediated material experience, subjective and self-
revelatory — his ‘zip’, like the sword, severing the roots of the future and the 
past. In ‘The Sublime is Now’ Newman decries an absolute derived from or 
confused with the ‘absolutisms of perfect creations’. At the turn of the twenty-
first century Forsey and Elkins lament an absolute confused with or bound to 
the perfect philosophical statement — which, as Newman points out, is an 
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‘objective rhetoric’, one, therefore, inherently at odds with the subjectivity at 
the heart of sublime experience it serves.  
 
While a unified theory of the sublime may well be beyond reach, its discourse 
nevertheless remains materially viable. The postmodern sublime avoids the 
nostalgic intimations of transcendence and instead looks to presentation that 
exceeds representation. Reflecting upon Newman’s early painting and a 
traumatic history that has precipitated a return to our relations with the 
Absolute has offered a perspective on how so called ‘poetic language’ may in 
fact provide a tenable discourse of the sublime more appropriate to the innate 
subjective conditions of the concept. Two Edges supersedes Newman’s talk 
about the sublime. Its formal vocabulary — its plastic language — offers direct 
terms, real and concrete. Post-war, Newman’s pessimistic ‘new sense of fate’ 
turned on the tragic. Post-9/11 tragedy gives way to terror — terror that 
transcends Burke’s objective and quantifiable literary and literal interpretation 
and returns the sublime to the abstract, to the negative, to the ‘tawdry, the 
picayune, the brutish’ — to a sense of corporeal abjection that summons the 
ghost of Francis Bacon.  
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     HIS DARK MATERIALS: 
FRANCIS BACON & THE ABJECT SUBLIME 
Figure 7. 
!
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This object, chaos of light and of shadow, is catastrophe. I perceive it as 
object; my thought, however, shapes it according to its image, at the same 
time that it is its reflection. Perceiving it, my thought itself sinks into 
annihilation as into a fall wherein one emits a cry. Something immense, 
exorbitant, is liberated in all directions with a noise of a catastrophe; this 
emerges from an unreal, infinite void, at the same time loses itself in it, with 
the shock of a blinding flash. 
George Bataille
1 
Tawdry, Picayune and Brutish: A Report from the Surface of a Painting 
Ulster Museum — June 3rd, 2014. Mid-afternoon, the twentieth century gallery 
rooms are largely empty. In front of me, a modest sized painting with a knife-
sharp gilt frame. The dark painting shifts unhelpfully behind reflective glass 
that at once binds the surface of the work together, offering the impression of 
a kind of unifying varnish, while at the same time splintering perspective and 
holding the spectator at remove (Figure. 7). Behind me another viewer 
comments, with some frustration, to a companion that, ‘the eye doesn’t settle 
anywhere’. Form appears indistinct from the physical properties of the paint 
itself. Such confusion draws the viewer closer to the painting, only to be 
forced back again, the work giving nothing up as the surface repels.  
Brutish well describes both the surface and the technique of the painting. It is 
an image of contortion in terms of material, form and content. The soiled 
yellow ochre of raw reversed canvas, with tooth like sandpaper, is the ground 
left exposed here and there (Figure. 8). The painted surface itself varies from 
the squitchy thin-ness of the sketched-in preliminary diagrammatic structure to 
the sedimented and caked-on figurative form that assumes the composition’s 
point of focus, such as it is. The black that functions as a frame within a frame 
is the cleanest and most chromatically vivid paint on the work and is 
testament to a surety of purpose that is not present throughout the rest of the 
surface. It has been put down quickly and left untouched. Elsewhere there is a 
fidgety, frustrated uncertainty to the working of the paint. Colour is almost 
entirely absent from the painting. It is from unaccountable masses of shades 
!
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Figure. 8 & 9 
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and shadows that the presence of a figure (in portrait) can be discerned — but 
it is one that appears eaten away by the physical process of painting (Figure. 
9). It seems impossible to disentangle figurative form from the form of the 
work’s material. 
The paint — which has a dust-encrusted consistency, like desiccated clay or 
tar — is scraped back off indeterminate zones of putty grey, broken with an 
uncertain, fleeting use of sap green. This dragging or smearing has resulted in 
a mottled, pockmarked, pot-holed surface (Figure. 10). Paint has clung 
doggedly to the tooth of the unprimed reverse — to the tawdry side of the 
canvas. This acrid surface directly reveals the painter’s efforts and exertions. 
The work’s material present-ness, its destabilizing now-ness, emanates from 
the physical working over and over of the image and the scrubbed out 
adjustments exposed in the development of the image.  
Figure. 10 
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Material endeavor has fused human head and shoulders with contorted, 
howling animal features — the ‘skin’ of the painting itself reminiscent of 
putrefying flesh, or elephant skin. Such brute force has made paint in certain 
sections slick, leaving it quick like the surface of wet limestone. The direction 
of the painter’s efforts contributes to the way the surface reads — to how the 
eye traverses the image. This material rhythm, this transitional movement 
between contrasting texture and gesture, equates to a kind of plastic thinking. 
As such the work comes close to the sculptural. Rudimentary pictorial 
elements that site the figure — a shirt collar, a key, an arrow — are somewhat 
clumsily cut away from their dark surrounds, and consequently raised above 
the thin-ness of the grey/black shadows. Similarly the teeth in animalistic jaws 
are cut out with soot black pigment (Figure. 9).  
This surface is a landscape that testifies to the tension between a crushing 
obligation to express, to paint, and the impossibility to do so. It attests to 
painting as research, to the trying of effects, techniques, and the testing of 
material limit. The painting’s surface is an exploration of a language of 
immediacy, of generalities, of broad ‘stokes’ or directness — of feeling as 
opposed to illustration. The work remains devastatingly open — offering the 
spectator only the indefinite, half-attained, and unimaginable. 1:1 in scale and 
hung just below head height — further enhancing the impression of a retching 
contortion — the unsettling influence on the psyche comes as much from the 
abject materiality of the paint and the way it is applied as it does from the 
image itself. 
The work makes its presence felt directly, but the immediate impact of the 
image is followed by the discomfort of the unknowable’s mocking slow-hand-
clap — the disorientation brought on through visual experience that refuses to 
surrender to cognitive resolution. The encounter equates to a kind of torture 
that comes from meeting extreme limit. I cannot look hard enough at Francis 
Bacon’s Head II, 1949 (Figure. 11).  
!
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Figure. 11 Francis Bacon, Head II, 1949, Ulster Museum, Belfast 
(Oil on canvas, 80 x 65 cm) 
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The pictorial structure of head and shoulders rendered with the barest of 
approximation on a comparatively discrete scale for Bacon creates an 
iconographic scaffold from which he then freely and deliberately deviates. 
Temporarily comforted by the formal qualities that might bring to mind, say, 
the drama of dark and light found in seventeenth century portraiture, and in 
particular Bacon’s muse Rembrandt Van Rijn, the spectator is soon 
destabilized, as any such historical familiarity dissolves into indeterminacy 
and a painted surface that attests to what Philip Shaw refers to as ‘the raw, 
material ooze of embodied experience’.2 Suspended above the abyss, the 
traumatized spectator is left with more questions than answers.  
 
Head II (Figure. 12) confronts the viewer with the meager, residual fragments 
of a human head and shoulders presented as a rudimentary articulation of 
corporeal mass that traverses the boundary between presence and absence. 
With no concession made to flesh tone, Bacon’s phantasmal figure is painted 
in ghostly whites that come and go as the dark ground rises to reclaim 
ascendency. This pictorial vacuum is tempered only by the most basic 
diagrammatic traces of interior geography. An inferred sense of foreground is 
described in the most basic of compositional terms. As such, a threshold of 
sorts is determined, transforming the infinity of blackness into space 
contained.  
 
The figure, however, resists such attempts at confinement. Albeit in an 
inconclusive, provisional, derelict state, against the odds the figure endures 
against Bacon’s brutalizing material force. The top of the head dissolves into 
blackness, before it fuses with a gaping bestial mouth, set perpendicular to 
the human profile and screaming into a void of night black. This scream is 
subjective. It appears on the one hand desperate, loaded with the terror of 
Sergei Eisentein’s frequently associated image of the stricken nursemaid from 
the silent 1925 film Battleship Potemkin, while on the other hand, exploding 
with the confrontational power of animal aggression. The image is further 
intensified through the visceral plastic qualities of the painted surface.  
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Figure. 12 Head II 
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Like much of Bacon’s painting, Head II challenges historical canons as well as 
contemporary conventions of the post war period. As Allon White states, ‘One 
of many dialogues, or contestations which Bacon is involved in is with the 
transcendental escapism of the European painting tradition. First with the 
major forms of religious and classical iconography and secondly with the 
aesthetic formalism of his bourgeois contemporaries’.3 !
 
Francis Bacon: Dissident Romantic 
 
Bacon is not historically associated with the sublime. However, his absence 
from the concept’s mainstream discourse is perhaps puzzling if one considers 
that his painting has been consistently dialogized in terms of silence, terror, 
darkness and death — terms White summarizes as the ‘phobic 
psychopathology of daily life’.4 At the very least Bacon’s painting would seem 
to warrant further consideration in relation to the sublime as formulated by 
Edmund Burke.5 Bacon’s absence from the account of the modern and 
postmodern sublime illustrates the schism between imagery of the sublime 
and sublime imagery, in other words between sign of affect and affect itself.  
 
While critics like Philip Shaw and Richard White accept that Bacon’s painting 
carries such signs of the sublime, they question to what extent the experience 
itself is activated in his work. Furthermore they share a consensus that more 
than merely failing to meet the historically established ‘criteria’ of the sublime, 
his painting, in fact, does much to unsettle its foundations, calling into 
question the plausibility of a coherent, unified aesthetic concept. Bacon’s 
work, it has been argued, resists the final redeeming moment that follows a 
breakdown in cognitive process during an encounter with the terrifying, 
inconceivable, inexpressible and overwhelming — the self finds no comfort in 
his flayed figuration and eviscerated surfaces. Such a view exposes the 
problematic of the hierarchy intrinsic to discourse on the sublime. It is a 
hierarchy inherited from a pre-modern account of the concept; one that, fuzzy 
headed with a hangover from the excesses of Romanticism, continues to 
privilege the vertical over the horizontal — the elevation of self above an earth 
bound notion of the ‘sacred’ located in an abject materialism.  
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White and Shaw insist that in Bacon’s painting the logic of the sublime is 
undone. But this is to afford too much importance to historically bound 
aesthetic structures based largely on the frailties of transcendence bound to 
the heavens and the divine. It is not the sublime itself that Bacon obliterates, 
but rather its narrative. Beyond ‘remobilized religious iconography’ 
contextualized in the backwash of Neo-Romantic Horror, Bacon delivers a 
traumatized material surface that alludes to subject — to presentation itself.6 
The question thereby raised is, despite Bacon’s refusal of transcendence is 
his painting any less sublime?  
 
Echoing James Elkins’ rhetoric that the literature of the sublime has failed 
under the weight of ever increasing critical and aesthetic complexity, White 
argues that rather than qualifying the sublime, Francis Bacon’s painting 
serves to demonstrate that its structural foundations have been fatally 
compromised. Like Elkins, White calls for the abandonment of terms that no 
longer adequately service contemporary art. Framing a discussion on the 
limits of the aesthetics of the sublime in relation to contemporary work, White, 
somewhat anachronistically, draws a line between Bacon’s painting and 
notions of poiesis established in Gotthold Lessing’s Laocöon. He suggests 
that the complexities of Bacon’s painting prove the inadequacy of language to 
maintain such categories of subjective experience. For White, Bacon’s 
painting’s puts traditional conceptions of subjectivity at tension. Undoubtedly 
unsettling in form, content and, indeed, execution, Bacon’s works seems to 
threaten. As Ernst van Alphen suggests 
 
Seeing a work by Francis Bacon hurts. It causes pain. The first time I saw a 
painting by Bacon, I was literally left speechless. I was touched so profoundly 
because the experience was one of total engagement, of being dragged 
along by the work. I was perplexed about the level on which these paintings 
touched me: I could not even formulate what the paintings were about, still 
less what aspect of them hurt me so deeply. 7 
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Such subjectivity flirts with melodrama. It is reliant upon the complicity and 
commitment of the spectator. Such threat turns on faith. Crucially, White 
points out that Bacon’s work resists the ultimately positive resolution of and 
with self, experienced once threat has been mediated and the sovereignty of 
self is restored. For White the signs of the sublime may well be present in 
Bacon’s painting, in the terror of the scream and the violence of imagery, but 
in the final analysis the positive reconciliation between concept and idea, 
between the inexpressible and the material, between the supersensible and 
the sensible is withheld. Fractured, unstable and irresistibly active, Bacon’s 
work refuses to surrender; it cannot be contained by straining traditional 
aesthetic categories. White concludes that his painting only encourages the 
abandonment of such terms.  
 
However, it is possible to argue that it is the language of the sublime that fails 
Bacon, rather then Bacon failing to ‘qualify’ as sublime, and that within the 
materiality of his painting there is a mode of communication, direct and 
subjective that equates to a language — and with it Bacon is better able to 
‘articulate’ the logic of a concept fundamentally beyond words. Far from being 
a figure on the fringes of a sublime long since free of the burden of traditional 
associations with transcendence, Bacon deserves re-evaluation as a painter 
whose material language has much to contribute to a postmodern conception 
of sublimation and the un-representable. 
 
The Shock of the New: A History of Violence 
 
In 1948, the same year that Barnett Newman painted Onement I and declared 
‘The Sublime is Now’, Francis Bacon painted Head I (Figure. 13). It was the 
first of a series of works that depicted the human head wildly distorted, 
mutating with the animal and almost entirely contingent. Shown at his first 
solo show at the Hanover Gallery in November 1949 the Head series is surely 
among Bacon’s most visceral, textured and raw images. Culminating with the 
first of his papal studies, Head VI, 1949 — based on the work of a 1650 
portrait of Pope Innocent X by Diego Velazquez — the Head paintings are 
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Figure. 13 Head I, 1948,  
(Oil and tempera on board, 100 x 74 cm) 
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unsettling portraits of abstraction and abjection, of the tension between noble 
and base, between high and low, between form and formlessness.  
 
Set against each other there would seem little common ground between 
Onement I and Head I. Resolutely figurative, Bacon’s painting would appear 
polemically opposed to Newman’s reified color field abstraction that boldly 
and vocally staked a claim to the territory of the sublime. However, rather than 
viewing these early and pivotal works as mutually antagonistic, what might be 
revealed by instead exploring their potential dialogue? If, as Lyotard states, it 
is the sublime that has given all modern art its impetus and axioms, by 
interrogating such radically different vocabularies what might be revealed 
about painting as language of the inexpressible? 
 
The language of painting and painting as language can be seen as central to 
the concerns of both artists. Newman’s painting, loaded as it is with his 
insistent, ever-present critical perspective, keeps faith with written language 
and its ability to articulate and inform the lofty aspirations of self-revelation 
and the re-presentation of transcendent experience. For Bacon, on the other 
hand, painting exposes the limits of language in relation to inner experience 
— as the sublime overwhelms the self, so too it overwhelms language. Struck 
dumb, our ability to articulate is suspended, leaving only un-mediated 
sensation. The paralysis is traumatic. Both Head I and Onement I share a 
common history of violence. Transgressing long established traditional 
modes, these works painfully exposed the limits of language in relation to the 
experience of new forms. Referring to earlier paintings by Bacon (Three 
Studies For Figures at the Base of the Crucifixion) exhibited in April 1945 at 
the Lefevre Gallery in London, John Russell comments that Bacon’s work 
proved incendiary — ‘They caused a total consternation’ he comments. 
Russell continues 
 
We had no name for them, and no name for what we felt about them. They 
were regarded as freaks, monsters irrelevant to the concerns of the day, and 
the product of a mind so eccentric as not to count in any possible permanent 
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way. They were specters at what we all hoped was going to be a feast, and 
most people hoped that they would just be quietly put away.8 
 
Newman’s Onement I proved no less divisive. Providing the foundations to his                   
first solo shows at the Betty Parsons Gallery in New York in 1950 and 1951, 
the painting confronted spectators with a subjective experience, which at that 
point went beyond categorization. Where consternation greeted Bacon’s 
painting, Newman’s work was met with open hostility among critics and the 
artistic community he was so often an outspoken advocate for. Like Bacon, 
who, as a self-taught late starter was on the fringes of London’s post war 
painting community, Newman was also something of an outsider. A native 
New Yorker, periods teaching and an intellectualized perspective on painting 
resulted in a marginalized position among the more overtly bohemian 
immigrant artists congregating around the Cedar Tavern. Confronted with the 
body of work that developed from Onement I for the 1951 Parsons Gallery 
show this community all but turned their back on Newman. Thomas Hess 
recounts an un-named member of the New York clique attacking Newman 
directly, commenting, ‘I thought you were one of us, but I see you’re a threat 
to us all’.9 As Hess points out Newman’s work was viewed by his immediate 
contemporaries as the shock tactics of an ideologue intent on dragging 
painting ever closer towards degree zero. Clement Greenberg reflects that 
Newman’s painting was among that which provoked violent protest against 
what was seen as the ‘reductio ad absurdum of Abstract Expressionism and 
modern art in general’.10 
 
In the wake of protest and consternation, critical theory sought to find the 
language to assimilate these new forms into the ongoing post war cultural 
narrative. To a greater or lesser extent, each artist soon found a champion. In 
1952 Clement Greenberg defended the ‘nerve and truth’ of Newman’s 
painting against the rejection and resentment the painter had experienced 
from a ‘quarter where one had the most right to expect a puzzled judgment to 
be a suspended one’.11 For Greenberg the accusation of mere shock tactics 
was baseless. He writes 
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Newman simply aimed at and attained the maximum of his truth within the 
tacit and evolving limits of our Western tradition of painting [!] These 
paintings have the effect that makes one know immediately that he is in the 
presence of art [!] A work of art can make you angry only if it threatens your 
habits of taste; but if it tries only to take you in, and you recognize that, you 
react with contempt, not with anger.12 
 
Published in the Partisan Review, Greenberg’s comments in support of 
Newman were made in an article entitled, perhaps anachronistically 
considering his devout formalism, ‘Feeling is All’. In it honesty and authenticity 
are what seems to differentiate the threat of genuinely avant-garde painting 
from that which merely hoodwinks the spectator with coarse, transparent ‘up-
to-date devices’. In other words, good painting comes down to a matter of 
faith, no longer rooted in theology and the divine, but rather in material 
presence/essence. Good painting — painting that stands up to the accepted 
triumphs of ‘high classical art’ — comes down to faith in matter. As Greenberg 
would have it feeling should not be confused with emotional content, as for 
example, witnessed in European post war painting as existential crisis, nor as 
a mandate for transcendence; rather feeling counts formally, as concrete 
material authenticity. For Greenberg feeling is generated when medium is all.  
 
Material integrity or truth to medium prevents painting succumbing to its 
innate desire for (a return to) the ‘grand manner’; a phrase Greenberg used 
during an interview in Studio International in 1968 to disparage the painting 
ushered in after Burke’s theory on the sublime had gained the ascendency in 
the mid-eighteenth century. Associated with Haydon, John Martin and Turner, 
this ‘grand style’ or terribilita that saw British art get its ‘nose bloodied for a 
time’ is for Greenberg once again detectable in post war European art — ‘The 
dream of the grand manner has come up again in England’, he comments.13 
Greenberg names several artists’ likely responsible for the renewed threat of 
the sublime. Francis Bacon is prominent among them. His view of the painter 
is characteristically caustic. While admitting that some of Bacon’s work 
succeeds in ‘getting to him’, viewed in totality it fails to win him over. For 
Greenberg, Bacon is guilty of 
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[!] the cheapest, coarsest, least felt application of paint matter I can 
visualize, along with the most transparent, up-to-date devices [!] Bacon is 
the one example in our time of inspired safe taste — taste that’s inspired in 
the way in which it searches out the most up-to-date of your “rehearsed 
responses”. Some day, if I live long enough, I’ll look back on Bacon’s art as a 
precious curiosity of our period. In the meantime I’m caught in the same 
period. Actually, I enjoy it: I mean I enjoy being taken in as long as I know I’m 
being taken in.14 
 
There would seem to be little room in the ivory tower of high modernism for 
painting whose approach to materiality resists flatness, whose truth to 
medium conspires to allow illusory depth to persist and the figure, however 
mutated or abstracted, to endure. It endures, however, in the context of a truth 
to materials that challenges the ivory tower’s foundations. As Allon White 
comments, ‘Bacon’s painting’s are figurative and representational, yet what 
they figure is a process, an act of graphic expulsions’ — expulsions that insist 
upon immediate understanding of material experience. 15 
 
Greenberg was not alone is taking issue with Bacon’s perceived lack of 
authenticity. As David Allen Mellor establishes, critics like Lawrence Alloway 
and John Berger decried Bacon’s rising status.16 Accused of constructing 
‘pictorial cabinets where perverse scenarios were melodramatically 
represented’ Mellor points to Berger’s contention that Bacon was merely a 
‘brilliant stage manager’, sunk in abjection and fundamentally at odds with the 
irresistible tide of cultural modernism. 17 However, with equal weight given to 
Bacon’s apotheosis, sanctioned by, in the first instance Robert Melville and 
then by David Sylvester and later Gilles Deleuze, his painting serves to reveal 
how the boundary between critical positions proved ultimately illusory, 
exposing the inadequacy of aesthetic logic and the fragility of critical meta-
narratives. Un-categorizable and uncontainable, Bacon’s work resides 
between territories. His painting forces slippage between boundaries; 
between aesthetic rules and between polarities of critical theory. For example, 
Mellor points out that Lawrence Alloway ‘grappled with the dialectics of mass-
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cultural referents and the persistence of the Grand Manner’ in Bacon and 
even Berger eventually recanted’. 18 He goes on to note that  
 
The trajectory of moulding Bacon for different cultural audiences, from 1945 
to the mid-1960’s, which began with commentary and ventriloquizing from 
nervous Bloomsbury commentators, culminated in the sovereign televisual 
personality who, in the words of the Radio Times, ‘above all [!] speaks for 
himself’. 19  
 
Newman too brought pressure to bear on the carefully ‘policed’ borders of 
critical writing. Stridently associated with the sublime his painting asks 
questions of Greenberg’s puritanical formalism, where the notion of feeling 
has little to do with the sensation of the sublime, with anything that might raise 
the specter of the Grand Manner. Apparently cautious of muddying the waters 
with mis-appropriated language, when Greenberg’s article was re-printed in 
Art and Culture he changed its title from ‘Feeling is All’ to the more neutral 
‘Partisan Review “Art Chronicle”, 1952’.  
 
Negotiating presentation itself, the material language of modern painting in 
the end could not be contained within the logic of modernism. The sublime 
pays no heed to carefully plotted critical agenda. No sooner has its form 
become accessible, familiar and comprehendible, the concept sheds its skin 
to be reborn — quasi-theological Romantic awe manifest in the power of 
nature gives way to the nature of the inexpressible manifest in materiality, a 
broad vocabulary of mark and gesture as well as the properties of paint as 
physical matter. The trajectory of the sublime through the twentieth century 
and beyond, in relation to painting particularly, has been a downward one; a 
process of reduction — towards absolute flatness in Onement I and towards 
absolute abjection in Head I, the ‘reductum ad absurdum’ of the human figure. 
‘Speaking for itself’ painting continued to expand its language, beyond the 
frame of critical writing and the limits of aesthetic logic as they struggled to 
absorb an increasingly diverse vocabulary.  
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Although the positioning of Bacon as London School archetype, ratified 
through a perceived kinship with the old masters, articulating a downbeat 
vision of modern (urban) life irreversibly tainted by wartime trauma, is 
understandable, such a narrative ultimately seems to fall short when one gets 
close to the surface of his work. Similarly, the view later developed of the 
painter as arbiter of an alternative modernism where chance, mass-produced 
photographic imagery and a brutish material resolution conspired to undo 
traditions of transcendence by refusing ‘to allow conventional beauty to 
obliterate or falsify the moments of abjection which permeate daily life’, relies 
on the impossible task of reconciling the complexities of Bacon’s abstraction 
of the figure with a constantly and necessarily regenerating aesthetic 
concept.20 
 
Both Onement I and Head I contribute to a language of negation, of ‘self’ and 
transcendence. In these paintings the sublime is arguably brought back down 
to earth from the heavens with shock that erupts from the new. Inches away 
from either work the impossibility of presentation becomes painfully clear in 
the material facts of Now. The direct language of painting trumps aesthetic 
logic. To a greater or lesser degree both works confront the spectator with the 
(negative) realization that subject and object, void and presence, the sacred 
and the profane cannot be reconciled. Temporarily suspended in the physical 
body of paint the complexities of sublime logic unravel — the gestures and 
marks found therein pointing instead to an open conception, to discourse de-
limited. 
 
Dust to Dust: Painting and the Abject Sublime 
 
In his 2013 essay ‘Modernism and the Sublime’, Phillip Shaw describes the 
‘uneasy’ relationship of nineteenth and twentieth century art to the sublime. 
He charts the collapse of the religious scaffolding that previously supported 
the concept under the weight of materialism, and in so doing arrives at ‘The 
Abject Sublime’ and the painting of, among others, Francis Bacon.21 
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Figure. 14 Francis Bacon, Blood on Pavement, 1988  
(Oil on canvas 198 x 147.5 cm) 
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Shaw comments that on the face of things Bacon’s viscous material resolution 
would seem to have little to do with the sublime.22 He states that in Bacon’s 
painting ‘an idea of the sublime is raised, only to be mocked, interrogated, 
mourned and finally torn to pieces’.23 He sets Bacon’s painting Blood on 
Pavement, 1988 (Figure. 14) against later works by Mark Rothko to argue that 
‘Bacon sets out to destroy the sublime through a violent immersion in abject 
matter’.24 Drawing on certain formal, compositional affiliations between 
Bacon’s Blood on Pavement and Rothko’s painting he makes the case that, in 
the end, the revelatory response associated with the transcendental 
structures of abstract expressionism are suspended by Bacon’s insertion of 
the livid red blood stain of the works title. The veil of the infinite is suddenly 
and shockingly removed. The eternal contemplative horizon is polluted, 
poisoned, desecrated and brought low by the smear that traces human 
remains — that traces human pain. As Shaw makes clear 
 
Whatever remained of the transcendent in Rothko’s painting is completely 
obliterated with the introduction of this ugly, anamorphic stain. In imitation of 
Rothko’s earlier work, the red mark seems to hover on the surface of the 
painting; but rather than providing an intimation of immortality, it serves 
instead as a memento mori.
25
 
 
Bacon’s bloodstain embodies a negative, abject conception of a sublime 
Other. Where Rothko and Barnett Newman pursued an ultimately affirmative 
moment of self-awareness, Bacon steadfastly denies any such positive 
resolution. There is no redemption alluding to anything ‘higher’ as such. The 
sacred is reduced to nothing more than the smear, profane and abject — the 
sacred is reduced to blood on the floor, provoking the anxiety that comes with 
the final revelation that ‘you are this, which is so far from you, this which is the 
ultimate formlessness’.26 Bacon’s painting re-orientates the sublime 
experience from the vertiginous towards the horizontal, to an unflinching 
confrontation with the terrifyingly finite, visceral and bodily nature of human 
existence. Shaw writes 
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The sublime, even in Lyotard’s contemporary version, is ultimately reassuring 
insofar as it opens up a higher or more authentic plane of being that we are 
held to belong to. But nothing like this is present in Bacon’s work which offers 
no reassurance — even though it must be said that Bacon’s work is not 
simply nihilistic, for in focusing intensively on the human figure, and by 
addressing and uncovering the powers of darkness that threaten us, it also 
seems to speak for an intensely charged life.27  
 
The material reality of Head II is charged with just such intensity — a sense of 
presence derived from expressive and material gesture that reduces the 
human form to the in-between — to the state of formlessness. The image 
becomes if not equal to then, in fact, subsidiary to the paint itself. Describing 
this balancing act, Bacon comments that ‘One of the problems is to paint like 
Velasquez but with the texture of a hippopotamus skin’.28 The textured body 
of paint in Head II, likely thickened with the dust and filth Bacon had begun to 
use in his paintings from the chaos of his studio, is applied with no reverie. 
Unusually for Bacon Head II was a painting that he allowed to develop over 
time, completing the work in ‘about four months’.29 His failed attempts to scrub 
paint off, to cancel out, gives rise to a partial, broken, or decomposing 
surface, composed of paint and literally decaying matter (dust), that makes 
manifest the base materialism of Bataille’s informe.  
 
Bataille employs dust to re-form, invert/subvert category in the Critical 
Dictionary. Agent in the irresistible erosion of the figure/ground distinction, 
dust is the quintessence of formless-ness. A heterogeneous compound 
formed from the other, it is the physical, objective world brought low, 
figuratively and literally. Among these abject materials the human form or 
figure — skin, hair and bone — is in ruin. Dust, Bataille offers, will be there as 
material witness when hierarchies are leveled once and for all and new 
language evolves from the ‘obsessions, phantoms, spectres’ of cultural forms, 
long since buried, like the fallen of Pompeii, under the silencing blanket of 
dust and decay. Bataille writes 
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One day or another, it is true, dust, supposing it persists, will probably begin 
to gain the upper hand over domestics, invading the immense ruins of 
abandoned buildings, deserted dockyards; and, at that distant epoch, nothing 
will remain to ward off night-terrors, for lack of which we have become such 
great book-keepers!
30 
 
The language of the literature — the ‘book-keeper’s’ logic — is superseded by 
a contingent, non-objective but nevertheless physical presence that ushers in 
the ‘night-terrors’ of unmediated experience of the (sub-conscious) 
imaginative. Echoing Bataille’s sensibility Bacon comments on his technique 
of mixing dust with his paint, stating ‘Well, dust seems to be eternal — seems 
to be the one thing that lasts forever’.31 The ‘eternal’ here is devoid of mythic 
or mystical memory. Nevertheless, Bacon elevates dust to the status of 
material vehicle for realism re-configured as a conception of sensorial fact, 
based on ‘lies that are truer than the literal truth’.32 Where he allows paint to 
settle it is to make plastic a visual, gestural language of immediacy. Michel 
Leiris, with whom Bacon was well familiar, qualifies this ‘immediacy’, this 
sensational experience, this feeling as being 
 
akin to that blend of ecstasy and anguish which is known as sacred horror, 
and which is perhaps experienced most acutely in those vertiginous 
moments, prompted by the most widely different causes, when we have the 
sensation of entering into intimate contact with ultimately revealed reality.
33 
 
Leiris argues that this experience is ‘innocent of any aspiration to the sublime’, 
going on to suggest that Bacon’s pictorial features, his particular diction aims 
at 
the power to entangle the spectator in the toils of what might be called a 
blank liturgy which, having no transcendental references whatsoever, and 
existing only for its own sake, is all the more moving through being quite 
untinged by any dubious implications. 34 
 
Bacon’s work may indeed be innocent of aspirations to a defunct pre-modern 
form of the sublime tethered to religion, however, the destabilizing force of his 
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‘blank liturgy’, manifest in the abject surface of Head II, ensures that an 
experience equivalent to transcendence, albeit God-less, is nevertheless 
activated. Simply because traditional language fails to accommodate such a 
paradigm shift from the theological to the secular does not necessarily mean 
the experience that Barnett Newman equated with ‘the ecstasy of true 
understanding’ cannot serve to re-configure the sublime. 
 
In the Head series Bacon takes the figure as historical motif of beauty and 
butchers it. His painting process is orientated towards the violence of the 
abject. Such techniques are employed in an ‘attempt to bring the figurative 
thing up onto the nervous system more violently and more poignantly’. 35 
Movement, gesture, material and mark disrupt and subtract leaving the 
figurative remnants latent, half-formed, demanding collaboration and self-
reflection from the spectator. In Head II paint as flesh is vulnerable and 
perishable — like stain and spittle Bacon’s paint in bodily and base. As 
William Townsend comments Bacon’s paint is ‘a kind of slime, showing that a 
human being had passed through’ (a description Bacon was to subsequently 
claim as his own in 1955).36 
 
In his exploration of phenomenological ontology, Jean Paul Sartre, conceives 
slime or sliminess as a kind of materiality of ambiguity or intuition — as a 
‘substance between two states’ which ‘transcends the opposition of the 
psychic and the physical, by revealing itself to us as the ontological 
expression of the entire world’.37 Sartre separates the material eloquence of 
slime from its symbolic value, from the temptation to endow it with morality or 
psychoanalytical associations and meanings. While he acknowledges the 
potential of such symbolic or interpretive appropriation, Sartre posits slimy as 
a mode of being and as such reliant upon sensory intuition rather than 
cognition or analysis — upon feeling rather than thinking — upon the psychic 
qualities of materials rather than their symbolic value. These psychic qualities 
transcend the ‘brute being there’ of ‘pure encountered existence’. Slimy 
alludes to a mode of being, writes Sartre, ‘which is eternity and infinite 
temporality because it is a perpetual change without anything which 
changes’.38  
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Within Sartre’s conception of slimy we find a language of the abject that would 
subsequently have proximity to that of George Bataille and later Julia 
Kristeva. Slimy serves a process of degradation. In sliminess self is reduced 
to a low other. ‘It lives obscurely under my fingers,’ Sartre writes, ‘and I sense 
it like a dizziness; it draws me to it as the bottom of a precipice might draw 
me’.39 Like slime, Bacon’s paint has a gluey, sucky, stickiness that gives and 
resists in equal measure — It is a ‘leech sucking me’.40 This dizziness 
equates to an experience of the sacred devoid of religious association. Oil 
paint too has a certain innate sliminess. Sartre’s words have resonance to 
Bacon’s physicality and process. Beneath scrubbing brush, rag and fingers, 
the boundaries between body and material become indistinct. Sartre writes 
 
That sucking of the slimy which I feel on my hands outlines a kind of 
continuity of the slimy substance in myself. These long, soft strings of 
substance which fall from me to the slimy surface (when, for example, I 
plunge my hand into it and then pull it out again) symbolize a flowing of 
myself toward the slime [!] If I sink in the slimy, I feel that I am going to be 
lost in it; that is, that I may dissolve in the slime precisely because the slimy is 
in the process of solidification [!] In the very apprehension of the slimy, a 
gluey substance, compromising and without stability, there is the haunting 
memory of a metamorphosis.
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It is form once known that haunts memory dissolved back to nothingness, 
back to substance, to pure stuff-ness. The metamorphosis is the figure 
corroded back into the ground and left contingent, incomplete. This haunting 
is manifest, in a sense, in the calcified crust of pigment that accounts for the 
figure in Bacon’s Head II. In contrast to the flow of slime, to the speed of paint 
being worked across the support, here pigment has returned to its primary 
mineral-like state — leaving a kind of geology of expressive endeavor and 
impossibility caked to the support like gobbed-up phlegm dried hard to a 
school desk. 
 
!
∀##!
The acid surface sees the distinction between figure and ground irreversibly 
degraded, leaving only a no-mans-land of subjectivity. This non-object 
establishes the overwhelming conditions that push the spectator over the 
precipice into sublime experience. While Bataille resists the term sublime, 
Julia Kristeva does not. ‘The abject’, she states, ‘is edged with the sublime’.42 
It is not merely a physical state, but, like Bataille’s informe, it is operative — it 
is process. Kristeva argues that ‘It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that 
causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not 
respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the 
composite’.43 Abjection is, in this sense, gesture — gesture that fills the void 
left in the wake of the collapse of religious scaffolding that for so long propped 
up transcendent experience. As Kristeva writes, ‘Abjection accompanies all 
religious structurings and reappears, to be worked out in a new guise, at the 
time of their collapse’.44 Bacon’s material vocabulary of disruptive gesture 
terrorizes the figure and scrambles the distinction between the self and the 
abject. The sublime is reconfigured not around the figure as reflection of 
divine image but rather around the brutish Bataillean fact of corporeal 
mortality — around the smeared and the secreted, around the ‘ugly, 
anamorphic stain’ of Bacon’s Blood on Pavement. Insides are turned out — 
there is a kind of continuity of the slimy substance in myself. Without the 
security of coherent figuration in relation to established symbolic value we 
sink into unmediated experience — we sink into Now. There is no longer 
separation between the object and our self.  
 
‘The abject’, writes Kristeva, ‘confronts us [!] with those fragile states where 
man strays on the territories of the animal’.45 In the smeared and the 
scrubbed paint of Bacon’s Head II we can locate such fragile states. ‘The 
“sublime” object’, writes Kristeva, ‘dissolves in the raptures of a bottomless 
memory’ — the haunting memory of a metamorphosis. There is a downward 
shift — the sublime object dissolves in the rupture of the abject in painting. 
Held on the threshold between becoming and corroding, the figure strays 
irresistibly towards the bodily, base and bestial — There is a flowing towards 
the slime. The spectator ventures too close to the material surface, lured by 
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the ambiguities of formlessness, and is overwhelmed, like a ‘wasp which sinks 
into the jam and drowns in it’.46  
 
Such an abject conception of the sublime, found in Bacon’s painting, Shaw 
suggests, offers nothing more than the abstract medium of paint alone to 
account for ‘supernatural experiences’ once affiliated to the divine.47 
Regarding Rothko, by way of Bacon, Shaw writes,  
 
The viewer may well come away with the impression that there is, after all, 
nothing to see in this work. Thus, while on the one hand the painting seems 
to encourage a revelatory response, akin in many ways to the effect of the 
Romantic sublime in works by Turner, of whom Rothko was a great admirer, it 
works no less to baffle or block such a response [!] In the face of this work it 
becomes impossible to sustain the sense of a determinate beyond. 
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The sublime is no longer adequately defined, nor contained — rather it is 
sticky, the sublime itself is sucky, slimy. Such a state returns us to Sartre who 
characterizes slimy as an ‘Antivalue’ — ‘a type of being not realized but 
threatening which will perpetually haunt consciousness as the constant 
danger which it is fleeing’.49 This irreconcilable state, not realized but 
threatening, condemns the sublime to the in-between of the abject. Shaw 
marks such an impasse in the painting of Cezanne. He writes 
 
For Cezanne [!] a painful awareness of the inadequacy of form and content, 
an inadequacy directly related to the impossibility of presenting a synthesis 
between mind and the world, culminates not in the discovery of a capacity for 
transcendence but in the acknowledgement of the mind’s entanglement with 
the alien matter of the world [!] What these brush marks signify is not the 
resurgence of an occluded world, but the anamorphic oozings, the traces of 
the Real that remain when the world submits to signification. 
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In his conclusion Shaw quotes Jean Fisher, who states ‘It may be that 
sublimity consists in nothing more than ‘the movement of desire’: in our desire 
to know what is beyond the painted veil; in the feeling that something “lost” 
must be recovered’.51 Such movement can be determined in Bacon’s painting 
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process — in the ‘explosive impulses’ cauterized into the surface of paintings 
like Head II. Such materiality testifies to the impossibility of any such 
redemptive recovery. The veil remains drawn. 
 
Painting the Scream: Obligation and Impossibility 
 
Shaw’s discussion of Bacon in relation to Rothko demonstrates the potential 
value of perspectives gained from the collision of that which appears opposite. 
While traditional art historical narrative would have painters like Barnett 
Newman and Francis Bacon placed in distinct and mutually exclusive 
territories, viewing their work through the prism of a Bataillean, downward-
facing sublime instead reveals unexpected common ground between unlikely 
contemporaries. It is worth noting that Shaw employs late-career paintings by 
Rothko and Bacon. Slick, established and commodified, such late works drift 
into the category of the familiar, the crafted — the merely beautiful — 
arguably undermining his dissection of a modern sublime defined by 
abjection. In this respect there is perhaps more to be mined from the violence 
and disruption of Newman and Bacon’s early exploration of experimental 
forms of visual language. Despite employing markedly different vocabularies 
Newman and Bacon expand, transform and re-contextualize a language of 
alterity no longer confined to traditional, failing categories of subjective 
aesthetics. Both painters articulate an existential sense of limit experience — 
Newman and Bacon both paint the scream.  
 
While the dense, windowless space of The Rothko Chapel, or the sheer scale 
of Newman’s Vir Heroicus Sublimis (1951) may physically overwhelm the 
spectator; Bacon’s paintings do so psychologically. They provoke a state of 
‘giddying instability and fear’, derived not merely from the ghoulish imagery 
frequently found therein, but from their purging of divinity through paint as 
viscera.52 As the body succumbs to the material forces of abjection, identity 
fails. This corrosion of the self is also at the heart of an encounter with 
Newman’s painting. ‘The fetish and the ornament, blind and mute, impress 
only those who cannot look at the terror of self’ writes Newman, ‘The self, 
terrible and constant, is for me the subject matter of painting and sculpture’.53 
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Standing — as Newman expressly directed — just inches from the surface of 
his painting, boundaries between object and subject collapse. Self and other 
fuse in the white heat of the privileged instant of all-at-once visual experience. 
Such experience is neither stable nor positive. Yve-Alain Bois points out the 
affirmation of “Here I am” is almost immediately inverted — ‘I am barely 
visible, almost left over’. 54 Behind the veil of an ostensibly seductive surface 
Newman, like Bacon, proposed that art address ‘the basic truth of life, which 
is its sense of tragedy’.55  
 
Similarly Bacon’s means of delivery — how he physically puts paint down — 
attests to an unflinching ‘singular insistence on the brutish reality of human 
experience’.56 This particular handling of materials provokes a shift in 
discourse from the theoretical to the plastic. Bacon pursues an elusive in-
between state in painting to realize what he described as a ‘tightrope walk 
between what is called figurative painting and abstraction’.57 This tipping point 
activated what he termed sensation — a felt experience of visual gesture, 
privileging the nervous system above cognitive process. In its insistence upon 
subjective reciprocity, such sensation marginalizes the object in favor of new 
forms, factual but unreliable. Image is trapped, like a spider under glass. 
Much of his vocabulary points obliquely to a belief in the potential of painting 
as language — distinct from the written word and in opposition to the tyranny 
of aesthetic literature and historical narrative. ‘If you could explain your 
painting,’ remarks Bacon, ‘you would be explaining your instincts’.58 Newman 
too makes us acutely aware of the frailties of the word in relation to painting. 
‘Modern painting’, he states, ‘is an attempt to change painting into a poetic 
language’.59 As Mel Bochner comments, ‘He (Newman) understood that his 
work exposed the rupture between painting and language, yet simultaneously 
sought to close it’.60  
 
For Bacon ‘Painting is really a very unique thing in the sense that writing is 
not, because writing and common speech are very near to one another, 
whereas painting is something totally removed. It’s the most artificial of the 
arts’.61 The propensity for obfuscation and confusion in ‘common speech’ and 
the written word is made clear in Bacon’s misleading use of the word 
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‘artificial’. Bacon employs it as a positive term. He uses it against the grain to 
invoke a certain factuality, or authenticity that comes from the intrinsically 
artificial language of painting. 
 
While Newman’s Onement paintings are not as texturally verbose as Bacon’s, 
nevertheless there is a tension between control and accident in Newman’s 
work that points to something of a shared sensibility in intuitive methods. Like 
Bacon, Newman insisted that he worked without preparation. ‘I work directly’, 
Newman declares, ‘I move immediately to the canvas and I have never 
worked from a sketch or built anything up’. 62 Bacon shares such faith in the 
intuitive act of painting. He remarks, ‘my ideal would really be just to pick up a 
handful of paint and throw it at the canvas and hope that the portrait was 
there’.63 The apparent compositional rigor of the Onement series belies 
Newman’s pursuit of painting over and above mere picture making. ‘If my 
paintings have meaning,’ comments Newman, ‘isn’t it so because of my 
greater intuition and if that, isn’t it because they are exercises in contrived 
spontaneity?’ 64 Suzanne Penn gives a detailed account of the material and 
textural variation in Newman’s work.65 The use of masking tape in the creation 
of his zips facilitates an immediacy and unpredictability of form and surface 
defined by the physical process of painting. Bleeding tape edges, stained and 
flaking gesso, coagulated pigment, passages of dripping sprayed paint and 
sections of raw canvas exposed by a scything palette knife reveal an 
unexpectedly abject quality to Newman’s surface that brings him further into 
proximity with Bacon. 
 
Neither Head I nor Onement I can be viewed in isolation but rather as 
preliminaries. They form the foundations of a series that for both artists would 
ultimately comprise six works. For both, these paintings proved a catalyst for 
their approach to form, material and subject. Both painters progressed swiftly 
to consolidate their prototypes. Like Bacon, Newman privileges the intensity of 
concrete experience — the ‘physical sensation of time’ — encountered 
directly through material language. Newman doubled his scale and refined the 
painterly qualities of the ‘zip’ with Onement II (1948). While Bacon substituted 
the singular, flat black, diagrammatically described pictorial arena of Head I 
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with a more ambiguous, claustrophobic and textured geography in Head II —
established by his introduction of the curtain motif, a device that would persist 
for the remainder of the Head series and into the papal portrait studies 
thereafter. 
 
Much interpretive mileage has been derived from the curtain in Bacon’s 
painting. It is an undoubtedly obliging motif upon which countless interpretive 
references and associations have been hung. It lends itself to the notion of the 
‘extreme situation’, of confinement, isolation and incarceration prevalent in, for 
instance, John Russell’s view of the ‘circumstantially valid’ narrative of 
existential anxiety in Bacon’s work, born of history’s traumatized memory.66 
Russell associates the use of the curtain in Head II with the creation of a real 
but nevertheless fictive space that liberated Bacon to explore a kind of 
Bataillean interiority of the human condition. Something painting historically 
had not, to that point, sought to articulate was  
 
the disintegration of the social being which takes place when one is alone in a 
room which has no looking-glass. We may feel at such times that the 
accepted hierarchies of our features are collapsing, and that we are by turns 
all teeth, all eye, all ear, all nose.67 
 
This unmediated encounter with the unconscious of the ‘immediate human 
being’, wherein — to quote Carl Einstein —‘parts of objects, markers of ideas, 
surface like words’, an accurate summary, perhaps, of Bacon’s Head II, where 
a sense of figuration is implied formally, but as viewing continues semblance 
falls apart into heterogeneous parts — a shoulder, a gaping, screaming 
bestial mouth, a safety pin, an arrow.68 Like ideas themselves, the image 
forms briefly, coalescing in scrubbed and matted paint, before dissolving 
under the force of physical manipulation, as the mirage turns to dust.  
 
Bacon used the curtain as a kind of psychoactive mediator of atmosphere or 
feeling. It is threshold — a recognizable but nevertheless blank setting, 
projecting both spectator and participants to a place of Beckett-like non-space 
— theatrical, morphic and deceptive. With it Bacon screens off the abyss. He 
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draws a painterly, expressive and translucent veil across Malevich’s black 
square, across the totem of modernist dogma. As a pictorial structure the veil 
or curtain is a carrier of abstract form. Unstable and fluid it moves the painting 
back and forth between representation and abstraction and the spectator 
between within and beyond. Bacon uses it as context to explore indeterminate 
figuration through a sense of materiality that descends to the gutter. Here 
figure and ground, animal and human, noble and ignoble become 
indistinguishable. Behind the curtain, in stage whispers Bacon is talking the 
language of an abject sublime, an informe sublime.  
 
With Head II Bacon prioritizes surface over image. While his preference for 
presenting work under glass demonstrates a desire for material cohesion, 
Bacon is not interested in a decorative surface or intact pictorial space.69 He 
is not interested in a sense of finish, either in terms of craft or ‘complete-ness’. 
Unlike the resolution of surface in Newman’s work, Bacon’s painting, and in 
particular that of the Head series, seems inconclusive — abandoned. His 
method and means are fracture and impoverishment. Within the confines of 
the intermittently legible initial sketch, his painting is as much a process of 
removal as it is application. Where Newman’s material approach aspired to 
declare that ‘man is present’, Bacon’s articulated that the artist was. What is 
eminently visible in Head II is a discernable shift towards texture and gesture, 
towards the business of painting. Where Head I was painted on wood with oil 
and tempera, Head II is on coarse raw canvas. Its tooth offers such resistance 
that the application of paint becomes a more visibly violent process, one of 
material persuasion and coercion. While Newman preserves a more cohesive 
painted surface — a certain ‘one-ness’ to Onement’s surface — there is 
violence equal to that found in Bacon’s painting in the vertical cadmium tear 
that cleaves open Onement I’s unified field of Indian red. While more 
measured materially than Bacon’s visceral imagery, Newman’s zip is a 
scream all the same. 
 
Newman approaches the scream as an abstraction, both figuratively and in 
material terms, in his Stations of the Cross cycle of paintings, begun in 1958 
and subsequently completed over an eight-year period. These fourteen works, 
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while notionally framed by Christ’s journey along the Via Dolorosa, account for 
the intensity of a singular secular experience of physical and spiritual 
extremis. Newman reconfigures the Passion without the church — without 
what he terms the ‘pious legend’.70 In this respect the Passion becomes an 
open form, the cry of Lema — for what purpose? — becomes existentially 
driven. Newman writes, ‘I wanted to hold the emotion, not waste it in 
picturesque ecstasies. The cry, the unanswerable cry, is world without end. 
But painting has to hold it, world without end, in its limits’.71 Without the 
obstruction of religious iconography the scream becomes the nothing — the 
fall that defines inner experience in the wake of the ‘question that has no 
answer’. The language Newman uses to articulate this cry is stark in its 
economy and material candor. He states that ‘There would be no beguiling 
aesthetics to scrutinize’. 72 The Stations paintings employ severely reduced 
means — color is stripped out and, like Bacon, Newman turns to raw canvas. 
The statement of the cycle emanates from the plastic challenge itself — from 
the necessity to paint. He comments that ‘When there was a spontaneous, 
inevitable urge to do them is when I did them’.73  
 
Newman’s remark returns us to a sense of obligation articulated by Samuel 
Beckett in his discussion of the painting of Bram Van Velde with George 
Duthuit. Beckett states that 
 
The situation is that of him who is helpless, cannot act, in the event cannot 
paint, since he is obliged to paint. The act is of him who, helpless, unable to 
act, acts, in the event paints, since he is obliged to paint.
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It is the weight of this obligation to express the unpresentable in the absence 
of adequate means to do so which unexpectedly finds Newman and Bacon on 
common ground. Like Melville’s monomaniacal Ahab, Newman and Bacon 
hunt the whale — their singular endeavor the search for language, material or 
otherwise, for the unnamable. It is the torture of this intrinsically and 
necessarily doomed enterprise that elicits the scream — the scream as 
expression of the inability to express. A scream which, for Newman, resounds 
both physically and metaphysically. He likens the experience of such painting 
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to that of meeting another person, where the initial reaction, physical, 
immediate and corporeal, is succeeded by what he qualifies as ‘meaningful 
affect’ — the consequence of self awareness discovered in the sense of 
bereft isolation that comes in the wake of a meeting with resonance.  
 
‘I wanted to paint the scream more than the horror’, comments Bacon.75 For 
him it has little to do with reason or sensational narrative, rather is has to do 
with the sensation of direct concrete experience. ‘Ahab never thinks’ writes 
Melville, ‘he only feels, feels, feels’.76 Bacon’s scream is a manifestation of 
extreme limit, artistically, spiritually and psychologically. It marks the desire to 
express, at the point where words fail. Corporeal, the scream is an expulsion 
— an expletive of base material — that at once fills the silent void, while at the 
same time exposing powerlessness or paralysis. The violence and abjection 
of Head II testifies to this limit not only in terms of image, in terms of visual 
motif, but also in terms of material endeavor. The flayed surface of Head II, 
the material language of disruption, characterized by erasive, corrective or 
cancelling gesture that accounts for figurative presence, exposes the limit of 
expression and reveals the specter of failure — not necessarily as subject 
matter, but rather failure as a dynamic state of tension between the mystery of 
future potential and the predicament of a petrified past. The smeared surface, 
the corroded image, the raked-over furrows of Head II reveals a cannibalistic 
drive towards an existential nothingness, towards a Bataillean state on non-
knowledge. Bacon’s abject surface evinces the torturous pursuit of such a 
state. In this respect Bacon’s ‘material scream’ — his plastic drama — reveals 
despair as an operative mode. He remarks 
 
When things are going badly you will be freer with the way you mess up by 
just putting paint through the images that you’ve been making, and you do it 
with greater abandon than if things have been working for you. And therefore 
I think, perhaps, that despair is more helpful, because out of despair you may 
find yourself making the image in a more radical way by taking greater risks.
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Such despair reverses the charge between negative and positive poles. The 
scream is desperate but also provocative — operative. It fuels the violence of 
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Bacon’s gestural language — a plastic, painterly scream that articulates the 
desire for absolute experience, communicated directly through the mystery 
and materiality of oil paint. Bataille’s conception of the absolute — of inner 
experience turns on this duality of despair — on the movement between 
agony and ecstasy. For Bataille there is little to distinguish a scream from the 
hysterical laugh. He writes 
 
This eye which, to contemplate the sun, face to face in its nudity, opens up to 
all its glory, does not arise from my reason; it is a cry which escapes me. For 
at the moment when the lightning stroke blinds me, I am a flash of a broken 
life, and this life — anguish and vertigo — opening itself up to an infinite void, 
is ruptured and spends itself all at once in this void. 
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Bataille’s text accompanied a poem by André Masson and the reproduction of 
his paintings Aube á Montserrat and Paysage aux Prodiges (1935) in the 
Parisian surrealist journal ‘Minotaure’, edited by André Breton. In these works 
Masson responds to his experience of agony and ecstasy, of exhilaration and 
despair — of ‘double vertigo’ — while lost with his wife, over night, on the 
treacherous pinnacle of Mount Montserrat. ‘The abyss and the sky with 
shooting stars, the sky itself appeared to me like an abyss’, writes Masson, 
‘something I had never felt before — the vertigo above and the vertigo 
below’.79 As previously discussed, it is to the paintings of André Masson that 
Carl Einstein turns to expand his theory of painting as language. Masson’s 
visual language emanates from the hysteria inspired by the fall, from a secular 
experience of the sublime where  
 
Travellers lose their way on a mountain, are present at the death of a star, at 
its rebirth, descend to a religious place where one appears to celebrate that 
event and not at all the death of Christ. 
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As with Newman’s Stations of the Cross, Masson’s experience equates to 
spirituality in the absence of the church. Newman’s paintings celebrate the 
‘story of each man’s agony: the agony that is single, constant, unrelenting, 
willed — world without end’ and not at all the death of Christ. 81  
!
∀∀#!
 
Beckett too cites Masson’s work in terms of impoverished painting — ‘here is 
an artist,’ he comments, ‘who seems literally skewered on the ferocious 
dilemma of expression. Yet he continues to wriggle. The void he speaks of is 
perhaps simply the obliteration of an unbearable presence, unbearable 
because neither to be wooed nor to be stormed’.82 Beckett’s rhetoric might 
also be readily transposed to Bacon, who, like Newman, secularizes religious 
iconography in the name of inner experience. In this sense the scream that 
Bacon imposes on Head VI (1949) — the last of the Head series and the first 
of a cycle of studies based on Velasquez’s Pope Innocent X — is that of the 
unanswerable cry disassociated from myth and narrative. The cry of Lema is 
abstracted from the death of Christ and reduced or corroded back to an 
experience of the butcher’s shop counter, to an experience of the corporeal 
‘glitter and colour’ of blood and bone, teeth and saliva.83  
 
In conversation with the Bacon, David Sylvester comments on the painter’s 
‘transformation of the crucified figure into a hanging carcass of meat’.84 The 
scream, as figurative motif and material tactic, corrupts the territories of the 
sacred and the profane. The dignity of man is made indistinguishable from the 
base and the beastly. Once again Bacon’s obligation to express gives rise to 
a Bataillean articulation of spirituality, one that refuses to allow for a distinction 
between man and the animal. Bataille writes 
 
On important occasions human life is still bestially concentrated in the mouth: 
rage makes men grind their teeth, while terror and atrocious suffering turn the 
mouth into the organ of rending screams. On this subject it is easy to observe 
that the overwhelmed individual throws back his head while frenetically 
stretching his neck in such a way that the mouth becomes, as much as 
possible, an extension of the spinal column, in other words, in the position it 
normally occupies in the constitution of animals. As if explosive impulses 
were to spurt directly out of the body through the mouth, in the form of 
scream. 
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The experience of the ‘overwhelmed individual’ is here bound to the 
precarious abject state initiated by mainstays of the Burkean-sublime, ‘terror 
and atrocious suffering’.  
 
The profane material surface, experienced directly, served to liberate painting 
from ‘cults’ of the past, and sever what Einstein termed the ‘convention of the 
spine’ — the petrified language of an overburdened historical and critical 
narrative. As Noted by Didi-Huberman, this shift from image to surface was 
determined by a ‘dialectic of destruction, or, better, decomposition’.86 New 
forms could only be generated as a result of violent operation that amounted 
to the ‘assassination of other versions’.87 Pertinently, from the point of view of 
Bacon’s painting, the figure, as unity par excellence in traditional language 
and aesthetic systems, served, par excellence, as the ‘unity to be 
‘compromised’, to ‘decompose’.88 As Einstein comments 
 
To shake up the figurative world is to call into question the guarantees of our 
existence. The naïve person believes that the appearance of the human 
figure is the most trustworthy experience that a human being can have of 
himself; he dares not doubt this certainty, although he suspects the presence 
of inner experiences. He imagines that in contrast to this abyss of inner 
experience the immediate experience of his own body constitutes the most 
reliable biological unit. 89 
 
The laborious nature of descriptive, mimetic communication is superseded by 
something altogether more direct, more sensational. As objects rupture 
through the action of painting, new un-imagined, prototype forms are revealed 
across a psychoactive surface and articulated materially. Such painting 
processes the objective world, not in terms of visual representation, but rather 
in terms of representing as visual experience the sensation of the 
unconscious and the real. While Bacon may not be overly interested in 
painting the absolute, he is entirely concerned with absolute painting.  
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THE SMEAR:  
PORTRAIT OF THE SUBLIME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 15 Leviticus IX, 2011 
(Oil and shellac on RPC, 10 x 9 cm) 
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Saliva of the Gods: How Paint Moves 
 
‘The best way to know a thing is to eat it lick it’. So writes the midcentury, 
second generation, American Abstract Expressionist painter Sam Francis. 
‘Zen’ he states ‘is found in the saliva of the gods’. Jean François Lyotard 
quotes the artist’s words in a lyrically reflective commentary on Francis’ large-
scale work of 1957, ‘The Whiteness of the Whale’.1 Bodily and base, the 
glandular secretion is conceived of in terms that invoke Bataille’s material 
spirituality of the low and lurid. As Bataille would have it, God is found in 
saliva — he writes, ‘affirming that the universe resembles nothing and is only 
formless amounts to saying that the universe is something like a spider or 
spit’.2 As we have seen, this is the sacred devoid of religious association — a 
kind of corporeally driven elevation, perhaps reminiscent of the ‘strange sort 
of insanity’ that overwhelms Melville’s narrator, Ishmael, squeezing, hour after 
hour, the ‘gentle globules of infiltrated tissues’, the ‘delicious mollifier’ that is 
the unctuous whale spermaceti through his fingers aboard the Pequod in 
Moby Dick — a literary source to which Sam Francis alludes in a cycle of 
paintings known variously as the Japan Paintings or the Sail Paintings 
completed in Tokyo during 1957/8. This fleshy succulence, this limber 
secreted elasticity characterizes physical properties shared by oil paint and 
the body — both demand tactility, a directness of touch — both expect to be 
rolled between fingers. According to Lyotard, the painter’s hands, ‘prepare the 
fire, they flounder in paste and pigment’.3 While Melville’s narrator kneads and 
works the whale spermaceti until his fingers feel like eels, and begin, ‘as it 
were, to serpentine and spiralise’.4 This inversion of the sacred towards the 
secreted is also evinced in Michel Leiris’ writing for Documents — where he 
contributes, along with Marcel Griaule, on the matter of spittle. Leiris writes 
 
Spittle is finally, through its inconsistency, its indefinite contours, the relative 
imprecision of its colour, and its humidity, the very symbol of the formless, of 
the unverifiable, of the non-hierarchized. It is the limp and sticky stumbling 
block shattering more efficiently than any stone all undertakings that 
presuppose man to be something — something other than a flabby, bald 
animal, something other than the spittle of a raving demiurge, splitting his 
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sides at having expectorated such a conceited larva: a comical tadpole 
putting itself up into meat insufflated by a demigod.
5
 
 
At the studio while mixing the heavy, liquorice colour of raw umber and ivory 
black that makes up the monochrome ground of much of the painting for this 
research, I find myself reflecting upon the proximity of oil paint to Michel Leiris’ 
conception of spittle. Paint too might serve as something close to the very 
symbol of the formless, of the unverifiable, of the non-hierarchized. Moving 
the composite of ground earth and bone pigment around the palette with the 
variably viscous vehicle of stand oil and rectified fir turpentine, the paint 
gradually reveals its inconsistency, indefinite contours, the relative imprecision 
of its colour, and its humidity. Working the stuff of paint over and over with my 
palette knife reveals the transparency of the umber substrate under the 
opacity of the domineering ivory black. Its texture becomes ever more buttery, 
‘limp and sticky’ as more medium is added, until the blade, like Ishmael’s 
fingers, begins to ‘serpentine and spiralise’, eel-like, through the pigment. The 
oil paint assumes something of the consistency of slime — ‘I open my hands, 
I want to let go of the slimy and it sticks to me, it draws me, it sucks at me’.6 I 
feel a sense of continuance between the oil paint and myself as described by 
Jean Paul Sartre. ‘To touch the slimy is to risk being dissolved in sliminess’ he 
writes.7 ‘Nothing testifies more clearly to its ambiguous character as a 
“substance in between two states” than the slowness with which the slimy 
melts into itself’.8 As such oil paint, like spittle — all slipping slime — proposes 
language in a state of becoming, not yet articulate, but nevertheless 
communicative. It proposes language in an abject material state. 
 
As Griaule argues, spittle is ‘non-hierarchical’; it traverses both the high the 
low — it is both ‘balm’ and ‘filth’.9 While abject in its corporeal nature, spit, for 
all its base properties, for all its associations with bodily function, with 
‘nutrition’ and ‘secretion’, nevertheless also facilitates speech or 
communication, it is the lubricant of language — the oil that whorls words into 
the shape of syntax and sentence. It is the material vehicle for both sprayed 
and spluttered expletive as well as hush-toned homily or delicate dedication. 
While Leiris may not directly correlate spittle with the actuation of language 
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itself he does, however, acknowledge a link between the material of the body 
and that of expression or the articulation of knowledge. Leiris writes, ‘what 
value can we attach to reason, or for that matter speech, and consequently to 
man’s presumed dignity, when we consider that, given the identical source of 
language and spittle, any philosophical discourse can legitimately be figured 
by the incongruous image of a spluttering orator’ — in other words by the 
failure of language or the limit of its physical faculty. Being tongue tied or 
struck dumb is often associated with the anxious paralysis that comes from a 
‘dry mouth’ — from the absence of spittle. In its gummy, globular wetness spit 
carries faith — faith in language — faith to find the words for what cannot be 
expressed or described. Spit, Griaule states ‘must possess a magical nature 
because, if it bestows ignominy, it is also a miracle-maker [!] Spittle is soul in 
movement’.10 
 
Spittle is not merely vehicle for vocabulary, it is also materially articulate in 
and of itself. It possesses a kind of material, bodily directness that subverts 
the hierarchies of knowledge and the word. To spit at another is as immediate 
form of communication as one can conjure — a gestural form that sees 
language stray beyond knowing to Kristeva’s ‘territories of the animal’.  
 
The best way to know a thing is to eat it, lick it. Francis’ words suggests a 
perspective on painting as an unmediated experience, direct, sensorial — 
absolute — one that turns towards the haptic. We devour with our eyes. ‘To 
eat is to appropriate by destruction;’ writes Sartre, ‘it is at the same time to be 
filled up with a certain being’.11 He continues 
 
The sugary, for example, expresses the slimy when we eat a spoonful of 
honey or molasses, just as an analytical function expresses a geometric 
curve. This means that all qualities which are not strictly speaking flavor but 
which are massed, melted, buried in the flavor, represent the matter of the 
flavor [!] If I eat a pink cake, the taste of it is pink; the light sugary perfume, 
the oiliness of the butter cream are pink. Thus I eat the pink as I see the 
sugary.
12
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As Carl Einstein reminds us, seeing is knowledge. Governed by materiality 
and gesture, such knowledge is orientated by intuition — towards feeling, 
towards sensation. 
 
Oil paint moves like spit, it smears like slime. It shares a consistency that 
varies from the opaque to the translucent and a kind of slimy plasticity, a 
particular malleable fluidity that, like spittle, greases the gears of knowing — it 
is a medium of or for passing on, it facilitates communication. Paint slips and 
slides elastically on my palette as I consider its kinetic potential as medium for 
expression, as material vehicle for alternative forms of communication or 
rather the communication of alterity. Like spittle, oil paint is balm and filth — it 
too is soul in movement. 
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TOWARDS DARKNESS:  
PAINTING IN A MINOR KEY 
 
 
 Figure. 16 Paradigm, 2011  
(Oil on steel 12 x 8 cm) 
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Bring out all the perfumes of a silence that was hidden in our chatter 
with visible things, and that we knew nothing about. This is what must 
be done or permitted to happen; and at the same stroke, allow us to 
hear just how precarious these delicate polychromies are, that they 
emanate from a blind void and are going to return to vanish in it, 
vanishing Towards Black.13 
  
!
∀##!
Studio research has largely been situated against the black monochrome, 
qualified less in terms of the narrative of Modernism, of the prescribed 
literature that describes the drive of an inexorable and irresistible essentialism 
towards a logical and unavoidable formal end point, and more in relation to 
post-Kantian notions of negative presentation. While there may be tacit 
affiliation with the twentieth century critical history of the black monochrome 
as conceptual totem, for the purposes of this project it has been employed as 
a research tool for the exploration of painting as a felt experience or the 
experience of feeling in painting.  
 
In this respect it is worth noting a distinction between blackness and 
darkness, one that suggests reflection on the privations of Edmund Burke’s 
sublime. While Burke admits that darkness and blackness are in close 
proximity to one another he argues that there is distinction. Blackness, he 
writes, is ‘but a partial darkness’ and is ‘a more confined idea’.14 Burke 
comments that, as absence of colour, blackness is a relative proposition, in as 
much as it can only be appreciated by an eye ‘kept in some degree of tension 
by the play of adjacent colours upon it’.15 In this sense blackness is to be 
viewed — darkness, on the other hand, is sensorial, experiential. In the 
absence of light the eye is forced to surrender to other senses — to the 
sensation of the other. The capitulation of the eye to feeling is painful. Burke 
cites darkness as a primal and inherently terrifying state in its capacity to 
disorientate, destabilize and ‘produce a painful sensation’. In darkness, he 
writes  
 
Whilst the eye remains open, there is a continual nisus to receive light; this is 
manifest from the flashes, and luminous appearances which […] can be 
nothing but the effect of spasms, produced by its own efforts in pursuit of its 
object.
16
 
 
This pursuit of object, via a particular subjectivity, has shaped paintings like 
Paradigm, 2011 (Figure. 16). As chromatic matter black, like other colours, is 
‘an aspect of appearance and so only of the surface’.17 Chromatic 
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appearances constitutes the visual logic of the exterior world — how we read 
the physical domain. However laterally or abstractly employed, colours, like 
words, carry inherent associative content — the traces of familiar visual 
organization, the ghosts of narrative/image and the residue of representation. 
‘Colour’ writes Ad Reinhardt, ‘sticks in one’s eyes like something caught in 
one’s throat’.18 The referent is never far from the surface of colour. Being only 
‘partial darkness’, black lingers within the object, within the known. 
 
Darkness, on the other hand, dissolves such taxonomies, such classifications 
of the familiar into subjectivity, into the unperceivable. This marginal 
distinction between blackness and darkness is further evinced in the writing of 
Ad Reinhardt. While it is apparent here that blackness and darkness run into 
each other, with the terms on occasion interchangeable, there remains a 
degree of separation — a distance between the two that is, nevertheless, 
significant. ‘Black, symbol’ is the title of one of numerous written pieces 
Reinhardt composed on the subject. In this stream of consciousness text 
Reinhardt determines black as sign. He excavates an archeology of symbolic 
referents and literary associations from ancient myth and the Bible, through 
Shakespeare to kitsch collisions of good and evil in pop culture. Black under 
these terms is a proxy, a signal for ‘sin’, ‘vengeance’ and ‘cruelty’.19 It returns 
the viewer to the written word — to the constraints of conventional language 
and literature. In ‘Notes on the Black Paintings’, Reinhardt aligns black with 
processes of ‘rationalization’, with the categorization of ideas, forms and their 
narrative — his text loaded with a barrage of ‘isms’. He writes, ‘Ideas, labels, 
names all have been forced on me, I’ve accepted them’.20  
 
As Burke suggests, black is an idea confined — confined within a well-
established cultural narrative that charts frequent appearances across the 
mediums of writing, painting and sculpture. As Gabriel Ramin Schor has 
noted in his essay ‘Black Moods’, such appearances stretch as far back as, 
for example, Robert Fludd’s seventeenth century Utriusque cosmi maioris 
scilicet et minoris metaphysica (1617), where the black square is presented 
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as ‘nothing less than a representation of the prima materia, the beginning of 
all creation’. 21 More recent instances might include the black page in 
Laurence Sterne’s key work, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, 
Gentlemen, published in 1759; or the banal whimsy of Alphonse Allais’s black 
monochrome print of 1897 (after the poet Paul Bilhaud), Negroes Fighting in a 
Cellar at Night. Later the same year Allais also set a precedent for the sonic 
monochrome that John Cage would follow half a century or so later, with his 
Funeral March for the Obsequies of a Deaf Man, consisting of nine blank 
measures. Then, as Ramin Schor comments, some three hundred years after 
the black square served Fludd’s iconography of the infinite, it becomes the 
totem for radical non-representational painting. In the twentieth century the 
black monochrome becomes the apex of modernist theory — a theory whose 
essentialist logic transfigures it from the beginning of all creation to nothing 
less than its pre-determined end. Blackness within twentieth century painting 
is subsequently bound to ‘last paintings’ — to the monochromes of Kasimir 
Malevich (Black Square on a White Ground, 1914–15) and Ad Reinhardt 
(Abstract Painting, 1962), to name but two of the painters to have courted 
blackness during this period.  
 
Such art historical narrative reveals a broad spectrum of agendas affiliated 
with the black monochrome, and demonstrates it’s inherently split personality. 
It has evolved as an entrenched conceptual platform, with work as analytical 
proposition, while at the same time as expressive means of self-revelation. 
The monochrome is pure in its emptiness as it is polluted with metaphysical 
potential and critical force. Like the sublime itself it is by turns empty as it is 
full — at once the negation of color, the elimination of form, while at the same 
time presenting formlessness that makes the immaterial tangible. On the one 
hand it serves as conceptual icon, on the other, icon of the metaphysical. It is 
the silence that signals the exhaustion of the word — the limit of language —
 while at the same time being the definitive declaration.  
 
Reinhardt separates darkness from this literary and historical frame of 
reference. Darkness functions differently — ‘No exteriority, partial insights, 
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sense perception’.22 Darkness, he writes, is ‘non-paraphrasable’; in it we 
‘leave temple images behind’. The dark is ‘pure non-being’ — where ‘all 
distinctions disappear’. It is by a ‘luminous darkness […] we know the 
unknowable’.23 Aware of the paradox of using the written word to conjure the 
indescribable Reinhardt makes clear the limits of language in relation to 
painting and darkness. He states, ‘How can a thing be described which has 
no description but itself’.24 Where blackness equates to negation as concept, 
darkness constitutes a kind of metaphysical negation — negation, that is, of 
the self. In the wake of the cannibalistic essentialism that left modernism in 
the critical cul-de-sac of minimalism, the black monochrome has arguably 
been reclaimed in the name of metaphysical negation — in the name of 
darkness — by contemporary artists like Miraslaw Balka (How it Is, 2009), 
Jason Martin (Qaaba, 2011) and Richard Serra (Elevational Weight, Black 
Matter, 2010).  Paradigm (Figure. 16) privileges sense perception over 
cognition, conception over the conceptual — the dark over black. 
 
Beyond any theoretical and critical associations, from a practical point of view, 
the monochrome provides an effective ground from which to produce image 
through extraction and subtraction. Stripped of color, tone and pictorial 
structure the black monochrome is a kind of non-painting, whose economy 
enabled me to contrast opposite conventions such as 
abstraction/representation, whole/fragment, form/formlessness, figure/ground, 
control/accident and presence/absence.  
  
By stripping my painting of chromatic appearances and, therefore, the 
referents that obediently follow, a work like Paradigm is reduced to a kind of 
binary language. Zero or one — mark or no mark — flatness or depth. While 
not a direct evocation of the black monochrome, nevertheless, Paradigm 
alludes to a sense of the negative carried in that history. The black 
monochrome constitutes the turning out of the visible in painting in favour of 
direct physical sensation experienced visually. In the absence of colour 
materiality makes its presence felt. The black monochrome is not for reading; 
blankness subsumes its literature — the monochrome is for feeling.  
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Such an approach emanates from nothing — from the ground-zero of charred 
relics and decomposing artifacts of a painting practice left devastated by fire. 
It emanates from the silence of ashes — from being left speechless literally 
and artistically in the face a particular kind of ‘loss of self’. It emanates from 
the ‘blind void’ found at the limit of visual language. This particular nothing-
ness provoked the re-evaluation of my practice as a painter, re-orientating it 
from narrative forms — or what Lyotard terms the ‘chatter of visible’ things — 
towards the figure/ground relationship, towards painting as a felt experience. 
In so doing my practice has developed as something of a destructive 
business, with negation and abjection privileged in relation to the possibility of 
an expansion of the material language of the sublime, vanishing Towards 
Black. 
 
Though in no way comparable, this research is in some sense a response to 
catastrophe in the same way that mid-twentieth century abstraction in painting 
was a response to the artistic and moral crisis precipitated by global conflict 
and the exhaustion of cubist and representational modes of art. In this respect 
I faced the same paralyzingly succinct question that confronted postwar 
painters and gave common ground to artists as apparently diverse as Barnett 
Newman and Francis Bacon. That question being — what to paint? As 
previously argued, the socio/cultural and political backdrop of a tumultuous 
contemporary period might legitimately draw comparison to the postwar 
period.  
 
Then, as now, ‘the world was going to pot’.25 Lyotard asks, ‘What could one 
paint except the spleen that comes from those floods’.26 Such unsettling 
current conditions have contributed to a new ‘age of anxiety’ and provoked a 
return to subjectivity discernible in the numerous recent exhibitions concerned 
with the sublime.27 While such macro pressures may contribute to a climate 
my practice cannot help but be subliminally sensitive to, the development of 
my painting towards negation is a response to a personal point of crisis, a 
response to negative experience. The drift towards interiority and its 
expression has been determined by a need for subject matter after the ‘bric-a-
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brac’ of the external world has been blistered and burned, leaving the abstract 
and the abject — ‘a different subject matter that the painting itself entails, that 
the painting itself projects’.28 This shift marks a turn in visual language from 
narrative, from literature, burdened with associative forms — to the intuitive. In 
this sense, descriptive or illustrative forms, indirect and slow are superseded 
by those of gesture, which function as forms of inscription — direct, like 
speech — fast in their formlessness. In privileging gesture and mark my 
practice swapped the concrete shoes of representation for the fleet of foot 
presence of presentation.  
 
The physical procedures of expression, the push and pull of trial and error 
embodied in the material surface testify to work, to the slavish sense of duty 
that fuels the drive to express despite the inevitable failure to do so. Each 
painting eventually and unavoidably comes up against limit. In the end 
subjectivity defines and insists upon a threshold of belief and confidence, 
beyond which the mirage dissolves and the apparition vanishes, leaving a 
‘symptom picture’ of the desire to paint.29  
 
This is the purgatory of obligation as described by Samuel Beckett — the 
obligation to express despite the impossibility to do so. Lyotard comments 
‘The process of painting is one of devotion’.30 Devotion is often said to be 
blind. This is the paradox of a blindness that sees — of vision beyond or 
through the impenetrable darkness of the unknowable. Lyotard differentiates 
between seeing and looking. ‘I’m not saying that you are going to see’ he 
writes, ‘but, if God wills it, you are perhaps going to stop looking’.31 Looking 
seduces the viewer with the hullabaloo of colour and image. Seeing, however, 
is blind to such bedazzling spectacle. Seeing, Lyotard writes, is the ‘hoped-for 
deliverance of the gaze stretched out beyond what it sees’.32 In darkness we 
are forced to abandon ourselves to sensation alone; we feel our way — there 
is no ‘point of view’. Boundaries fail — the exterior threshold between 
darkness and ourselves corrodes to the point at which we are 
indistinguishable from the other — from the abject itself. Without physical 
topography the self is forced beyond its limit. We grope and stumble through 
discomforting inquietude. In painting, gesture is this seeing blindness, this 
!
∀#∃!
second-sight that ‘compels the eye to become the hand and the hand to 
become the eye, in order to see and above all in order not to look’.33  
 
Gesture is physical probing; a bodily movement materially inscribed that 
alludes to both uncertainty and conviction and ‘pays homage to the visible 
marvel and bears witness to the visual enigma’.34 Devotion is made concrete 
in and through gesture, in the physical votive act; its material nuance 
evidence of faith — in spite of reason— that reveals the internal structures of 
a visual experience that testifies to a kind of spectacle of nothing-ness, to 
darkness as limit. It proposes the possibility of articulation, all the while 
spelling out the opposite. The Bataillean torture of this impasse, signaled with 
the painterly gesture, and in particular the erasive or cancelling gesture, is 
what Lyotard phrases ‘the lesson of darkness’.35 
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TOWARDS ABJECTION:  
FIGURING THE SMEAR 
 
 
Figure. 17 Study II, 2011  
(Oil on steel, 12 x 16 cm) 
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It ought to do nothing to you other than dislodge you. Make your gaze 
and your words abdicate. It is not painting, images. It is not for looking 
at and commenting on. It’s painting. You won’t have to show how it’s 
made and how it’s seen. He paints so that we would be thirsty. It’s the 
whale. You can’t look at it, it’s what makes you see. You think it wants 
something from you, that it’s stringing you along, making fun of you. 
You think it wants you to follow it. That it wants you to harpoon it. But it 
wants nothing from you — it is your thirst. Lie down, wait immobile, 
suckle. It is not something, drink. Give it your gesture, without object or 
subject.36 
  
!
∀#∀!
To see is to witness — to experience — to be present. Corrosion, on the other 
hand, speaks of absence, loss and diminishment. As an unstoppable, visible 
articulation of time relentlessly unfolding, the fragmentation or disintegration 
that corrosion produces is violent. And where beauty channels serenity and 
the whole, the sublime is nothing without violence and fracture. Archival 
photographic portraits like those used in the Leviticus series (Figure.15 - p. 
115) of works provided source material for a series of improvisational 
paintings that sought to reduce the figure in portrait to a subjective, 
metaphysical encounter of something wholly other, an encounter of the 
portrait presented negatively — as missing contents. Painted during 2011, 
Study II (Figure. 17) proved to be a key work in this series and in the 
development of the studio research on the whole.  
 
It marks a drive towards absolute economy or the economy of the absolute, 
towards figuration as a process of reduction — as negation, both pictorially 
and materially. In this sense Study II constitutes something of a lesson in 
darkness. It describes a tectonic shift within my working methods. The steady 
and meticulously thought out accumulation of volume and tone with glazes 
over a grisaille compositional under-painting is superseded by process 
reduced to subtraction. It marks the turn from looking to seeing — from 
exteriority to interiority, from image in painting to the image of painting, to the 
procedures of expression as material language. The singularity of Study II, its 
material economy and the directness of expressive gesture — the paucity of 
referents and compositional structure — equates to an experiment in painting 
as sensation, whereby immediate, unmediated experience of the action of 
expression bypasses the default setting of representation or cognitive 
processing. The figure traverses the boundary between familiarity and 
estrangement.  
 
The point of departure for Study II is material rather than pictorial. Each 
painting begins with the process of laying down a uniform ground of ivory 
black and raw umber from which a subjective immaterial figurative presence is 
then dragged, cut or smeared. The matter for this ground might be considered 
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base. The body of this darkness is composed of the decomposed — ivory 
black, or impure-carbon, being a pigment produced through the charring of 
animal bones and raw umber being an earth pigment drawn from the 
sediment of iron oxide and manganese oxide. These remains are reanimated 
in and through the painter’s medium — a ‘superconductor’ of stand-oil and 
rectified turpentine. The term ‘medium’ is malleable, relating both to the 
material and the immaterial, the physical and the metaphysical. As vehicle 
‘medium’ conducts the physical properties of pigment — the painter’s medium 
actuates linguistic potential, it enables a textural syntax of traction, and 
movement. ‘Medium’ also relates to clairvoyance — a kind of second sight 
beyond the limits of the visible. Whisking up the viscous juju soup of oils, 
spirits and charred bone-dust there is something of the voodoo in the process 
of painting — a kind of spirituality of the base. The ground is not black, it is not 
idea — it is not the concept of ‘last’, nor flatness conceived, rather it is the 
base materiality of depth — the rust and bone of darkness.  
 
Under these conditions the figure is implied rather than literalized, it is the 
feeling of figuration in the absence of its form — a residual presence, 
suggested in the portrait aspect of the aluminum support and the seventeenth 
century-like darkness from which it emerges. The figure is reduced to a single 
gesture, to the nothingness of the downward smear of a medium soaked rag 
through oil paint on metal. The painting of the work is privileged above image, 
the means above the end. While the tenor of archival photographic sources 
perhaps lingers in the perceptual periphery, Study II marks the development 
of chance and intuition as working method — an intuition bound to the plastic 
reality of materials employed.   
 
Study II explores feeling, not just in terms of atmosphere — the projected 
timbre or tone of the work — but also in relation to the physical feeling of 
painting itself in terms of procedures and techniques. By this I mean how paint 
literally feels between and under the fingers, and how, subsequently, at the 
point of contact between support and painter’s hand, those material conditions 
effect gesture and the nature of mark making. Painted on aluminium, both 
Paradigm and Study II are examples of an increasing use of metal supports 
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within my practice. As gesture became central to the research so the speed of 
painting surface became more important. Where the tooth of primed canvas 
or the grain of wooden panel offers inevitable resistance that restricts gesture 
or slows the subtractive mark, unprimed metal supports provide a fast 
unyielding surface that offers kinetically charged contact between brush, rag, 
finger and support, allowing the subtractive mark to run on. Metal surfaces 
also offer significant durability to some of the more corrosive procedures 
increasingly involved in my painting. Such violent physical processes 
variously include abrasion, scraping, scoring and carving — using glass 
papers, knives and solvent soaked rags — reductive methods that in some 
sense could be considered sculptural.  
 
Over the course of the research a variety of metals have been experimented 
with, ranging from the relative warmth or softness of aluminium to the cold 
truculence of stainless steel. Used unprimed, the variety of industrially 
produced finishes available in these metals allowed for incredibly versatile 
surfaces that offered on the one hand reflective depth and on the other a 
mute, burnished flatness, depending on finish and painting technique applied. 
While early examples within the project also include the use of mild-steel, 
which provides an unstable ‘live’ surface that remains susceptible to 
oxidization or corrosion even after sizing with either shellac varnish or acrylic 
primer, the research ultimately focused less on how paint reacts and more on 
how it moves. As the project progressed it was the grain-less rigidity, the 
absolute flatness of stainless steel that proved most materially appropriate for 
the development of a particular language of abjection in relation to painting 
and the sublime. Its frictionless surface allowing for a more fluid, responsive 
working process as image develops. Here marks made remain resilient, more 
autonomous, producing a richer vocabulary from which to articulate, ‘a sense 
of being teetering on the edge of nothingness’ to use Phillip Shaw’s words.37 
 
Such a tipping point might be defined as movement — typically downward — 
from a state of equilibrium to one of collapse. Like corrosion, this entropic 
movement witness’s one state transformed to another, form to formless. The 
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smear is this tipping point, constituting a visual language of or for 
decomposition. It too is movement — tracing the capitulation of material to 
disruptive force, the operative force of Bataille’s informe — qualified by 
George Did-Huberman as a ‘certain power that forms have to deform 
themselves constantly, to pass quickly from the like to unlike’.38 The smear 
makes manifest this destabilizing pulse, this catastrophic slip that represses 
the figure, sublimating it through abstraction — the object of desire perpetually 
divorced from its expression. ‘All this’, Bataille writes ‘leads one to say that the 
summit of elevation is in practice confused with a sudden fall of unheard-of 
violence’.39 The smear constitutes this ‘sudden fall’ — it entangles previously 
disparate and autonomous compositional elements, violently dragging the 
qualified and the legible into a zone of indeterminacy. It is here the dynamics 
of the visual encounter are fundamentally altered. Here, without the traction 
afforded by representation, the eye is unable to settle — no sooner has the 
image coalesced than it collapses back into darkness. The eye is deprived of 
pictorial specificity and is instead confronted with a generality or totality that 
cannot be readily contained by literature — by the written word.  
 
The eye orientates itself towards nothing — nothing but painting— its 
procedures and performance exposed by the stark economy of means, by the 
singularity of gestural intervention, by how the paint moves. ‘The gaze’, writes 
Lyotard, ‘finds itself stripped of its separative power’.40 Narrative of image is 
superseded by surface narrative — impression (mimesis) is superseded by 
expression. The smear is a symptom of what Bataille describes as the ‘search 
for that which most ruptures elevation, and for a blinding brilliance’; a search 
that he suggests ‘has a share in the elaboration or decomposition of forms’.41 
The smear is a symptom of the desire to see — as such it has little to do with 
looking and, like all symptoms, is a felt experience. 
 
The smear of Study II sets the figure/ground relationship at tension. The 
boundaries between the two territories become porous. The smear tears open 
the closed form of the monochrome. The viewer is confronted with a bodily 
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presence, which refuses to reveal the entirety of the figure. The smear traces 
the desire for figuration in the absence of the means to deliver it — leaving in 
its wake the provisional and contingent. Its form, or rather formlessness, is 
arbitrary. The screwed up rags used vary from the soft and clean to the sharp 
edged, sticky and paint caked. The mark is made blind, under rag — beneath 
textual variation that militates against control beyond the general downward 
draw of the rag. The physical contact between the painting and myself is 
determined yet unreliable. I am unable to legislate the outcome once the 
gesture has begun. It remains uncertain despite intent and desire; its integrity 
dependent upon on a singularity of purpose, upon an autonomy derived from 
unpredictability, from the unknown. It is a leveling force. One that returns the 
viewer to what existed, as Julia Kristeva describes, ‘in the archaism of pre-
objectal relationship, in the immemorial violence with which a body becomes 
separated from another body in order to be’.42  As a painterly gesture it 
privileges lowness over elevation, the horizontal over the vertical — the 
dragging down of the pictorial, the grinding of the figure into its constituent 
parts. The smear imitates nothing — it undoes representation, leaving a 
presentation of nothingness intact between the oppositely charged poles of 
subject and object. In the smear ‘‘subject’ and ‘object’ push each other away, 
confront each other, collapse and start again — inseparable, contaminated, 
condemned, at the boundary of what is assimilable, thinkable: abject’.43  
 
For Kristeva abjection — the fluctuating non-state between object and subject, 
between body and psyche — is ‘edged with the sublime’.44 This borderline 
state, this state of becoming Kristeva likens to a ‘symptom’. In it, she writes, 
‘the abject permeates me, I become abject. Through sublimation, I keep it 
under control’. 45 She continues, ‘the sublime object dissolves in the raptures 
of a bottomless memory’.46 Kristeva’s development of Bataille’s project of 
‘linking the sacred to horrific powers of impurity’ is anchored to a 
psychoanalytical framework — to the theory of the unconscious.47 
Consequently, any such experience is dependent upon the literature 
associated with repression. Kristeva argues that  
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Not at all short of but always with and through perception and words, the 
sublime is a something added that expands us, overstrains us, and causes us 
to be both here, as dejects, and there, as others and sparkling. A divergence, 
an impossible bounding. Everything missed, joy — fascination.48 
 
This framework remains largely interpretational. Reliant on the signification of 
forms, perception under these terms is shackled to memory and the language 
of commentary — to the institution of analysis and meaning. As such ‘this 
focus on significant forms is only the prolegomena to a more essential step of 
the descent towards darkness’ — towards the essential, first hand encounter 
of the divergence of self between limit and the other side. 49 Such interpretive 
discourse remains distinct from and secondary to the direct experience of an 
abject sublime. Sublimation, Kristeva reminds us, ‘is nothing else than the 
possibility of naming the pre-nominal, the pre-objectal’.50 Thus conceived, 
sublimation provides cognitive apparatus, the means by which to control the 
self in the face of abjection via tactics of association, memory and strategies 
of repression. The complexities of such signification, meaning and logic 
qualify as discourse on abjection and its relationship to the sublime.  
 
In contrast, the gesture of the smear returns us to Bataille’s statement that ‘A 
dictionary begins when it no longer gives the meaning of words, but their 
tasks. Thus formless is not only an adjective having a given meaning, but a 
term that serves to bring things down in the world’.51 In this sense the smear 
is a phrase whose visual inflections and rhythms are tasked with the severing 
of memory; the smear is the action of abjection. Such an ‘instant’, writes 
Lyotard,  ‘belongs to no history, and the work does not progress. The gesture 
multiplies openings’.52 It is discourse of a sublime that we find at the bottom of 
the descent — a sublime corrupted with the coarse and caustic. 
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TOWARDS THE HAPTIC:  
INTUITION AND IMPOSSIBILITY 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 18 Untitled, 2012,  
(Oil on steel, 50 x 50 cm) 
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You have to hold the thing very tight because it has only one thing on 
its mind, and that is to get away from you. It always does the following: 
runs out in front of you and offers itself to your delighted eyes. Makes 
itself pretty. Appears to you, struts, parades before your eyes, and then 
vanishes. And after that, having survived, Ulysses, you’ll be able to 
write down the feelings she inspired in you. Easy to guess, “You were 
captivated but you got away.” Since you can talk about it. You’ll go 
back after it — Whereas he says to you: stop yourself moving, no 
distance, suck its ambergris directly, lie on top of it, it mustn’t stand 
before you.53 
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Study II, in some respects, happened too early in the research. The singularity 
of the work, the immediacy of gesture, the stark economy of the figure 
(specifically, in portrait) presented as missing contents, as the figure negated 
through something as base as a smear, with all the connotations of the 
viscera of the body, proved a problematic form for the research in both 
practical and conceptual terms.  
 
Practically speaking the vocabulary of Study II is determined by scale. Much 
of the early painting for the project is intimate — in marked contrast with the 
immersive, Newman-esque dimensions traditionally associated with an 
experience of the sublime in painting. Mounted several inches clear of the 
wall, Study II floats creating a certain spatial ambiguity that triggers a loss of 
confidence as the spectator experiences an isolating and ultimately subjective 
encounter of something that has an ambivalent physical presence. By drawing 
the viewer as close as possible to the surface of the painting the materiality of 
gesture, the sensation of the smear is unavoidable. On this intimate and 
discrete scale the drag of a hand-held rag composes a gestural syntax that 
obfuscates detail within a singular broad phrase.  
 
Having seen the potential of this language writ large, projected (Figure. 19) 
whilst presenting a symposium paper, I began to increase the scale of my 
painting. However, such economy of gesture, such intimacy of intuition failed 
to readily translate to a larger format. Gestural terms narrowed and became 
descriptive rather than affective. Larger formats proved unable to sustain the 
gestural directness feasible on a small scale. In simple terms, a single 
expressive mark fails to occupy compositional space in the same way on a 
larger support. Structurally speaking, as scale increases, so the language of 
gesture and mark shifts from the macro to micro, from the broad and open 
towards something more literally minded, something more consolidated — 
something that insists on more painting.  
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Figure. 19 Study II projected, RNUAL symposium paper, July 2011 
 
The challenge that works like Study II presented was how to maintain the 
intimacy and immediacy of gesture on a larger scale without being forced to 
employ a more mechanically produced language, like that of, for example 
Gerhard Richter.54 Such methods, such tools — squeegees, brooms, and 
other coopted utensils — result in a kind of ambivalent materiality, orientated 
towards process, towards object-ness, rather than the immaterial — the 
subject-ness of expression. The degree of separation between the painter’s 
hand and the working surface signals a kind of abdication to mediation, to 
mechanical procedure. Consequently, the language of the arbitrary 
overwhelms that of intuition. Directness stalls, immediacy waylaid in the 
deliberateness of the assisted mark. As Sartre comments, ‘Immediacy is the 
absence of any mediator’.55 
 
From a conceptual or theoretical perspective the near binary visual language 
of Study II proved impossible to retrieve or replicate, even on a discrete scale. 
This economy, whereby the figure is reduced to such meager means marks 
out a no-mans-land between subject and object, between the known and the 
unknowable — between the inner and outer. The figure is unable to rid itself 
entirely of the ground from which it emanates, being constantly dragged back 
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down into it like the wasp which sinks into the jam and drowns in it. At the 
same time, the ground fails to assert authority, losing traction in the back-and-
forth between states. Sartre writes, ‘To be sure, the separation between two 
discontinuous elements is an emptiness — ie, a nothing — but it is a realized 
nothing’.56 Study II offers, prematurely in relation to the development of the 
research, the possibility that such a ‘substantialized nothing’ might also be 
found in a fusion that dissolves boundaries, in a corrosion that de-classifies 
categories, in the abjection of discontinuous elements into an indeterminate 
state of interiority — inherently unstable. In this sense, the smear is a visual 
phrase that carries with it the possibility of material and metaphysical 
annihilation and the threat of an irresistible return of the figure/body to the 
darkness of the absolute, to the nothingness of primordial matter.  
 
Study II is an agonizingly concise statement that invokes a sense of being 
teetering on the edge of nothingness, located between the abstraction of the 
figure and abstraction as figure. The desire for representation and the literary 
institution that accompanies it is literally wiped away in the dragged painterly 
gesture. It silences the chatter of visible things. The memory of the figure is 
repressed — sublimated with a smear. The smear equates not just to 
negation but also to sabotage. The symbolic order, the ‘intellectual 
scaffolding’ of interpretational discourse is upended with a gesture that 
refuses to accommodate the practice of decoding visual signs and instead 
insists upon itself as sign of visual experience. The smear blinds, that seeing 
might be made conscious of the materiality of gesture, of the presence of 
painting. 
 
Study II left in its wake a series of paintings in which the pursuit of its 
particular gestural efficacy resulted in the contrivance of accident and 
imitation of intuition. Works like Loss of Other Modalities of Sensation X and 
III (Figure. 20, 21), which further explore the abstraction of the figure, reveal 
the difficulties experienced in responding formally to Study II, to a painting that 
offers a figurative statement that cannot be further distilled or reduced. 
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Increasing the support size in the Loss of Other Modalities of Sensation series 
increased the need for more painting — for a more complex presentation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 20 Loss of Other Modalities of Sensation X, 2011  
(Oil on steel 50 x 50 cm) 
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Figure. 21 Loss of Other Modalities of Sensation III, 2011  
(Oil on steel 50 x 50 cm) 
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Compositional structure could not be sustained with a single gesture. Though 
the process of making remained largely the same in these paintings, with 
figurative archeology extracted from the geology of the monochrome, the 
necessity for a broader, more expansive visual vocabulary resulted in gesture 
that is imitative. While the head remains characterized by a certain 
provisionality, by a material contingency, the vocabulary of abjection is here 
dependent upon intuition described rather than its actual activation. Loose, 
slashing brush strokes paint the appearance of the smear rather than the 
smear appearing through the painting of the work. In this respect, from the 
perspective of the painter and not necessarily that of the spectator, Loss of 
Other Modalities of Sensation X, III present painterly brush marks that 
memorialize an other passed into familiarity at the very moment of its 
appearance. ‘You were captivated but you got away’ Lyotard writes — the 
sublime is subject to the law of diminishing returns, the abject to material 
sincerity.57 If not fake as such, retaining as they do an expressive integrity in 
their physical production, the brush marks in the Loss of Other Modalities of 
Sensation paintings, nevertheless, can be seen as appropriative. They go 
after the immediacy of Study II’s formal means, but come up short — bogged 
down in the slow process of painting fastness.  
 
In a recent essay, ‘Statements of Intent’, Mark Godfrey discusses the issue of 
authenticity and gesture in relation to symptoms of expression in the painting 
of, amongst others, contemporary artists Charlene Von Heyl and Jacqueline 
Humphries. 58 Like Raphael Rubinstein, Godfrey alludes to a renewed sense 
of impossibility in and of painting as spur to a current of gestural abstraction 
discernible within recent work. The territory for this kind of painting, Godfrey 
notes, has become ever more destabilized as mid-century associations have 
fused with post-modern parodies. Gesture is once again affiliated to a 
language of the unknown — an unknown recalibrated within contemporary 
ideas of subjectivity, limit and materiality. Godfrey writes 
 
these painters, then, in their different ways, have departed from the authentic 
gesture of midcentury and the emptied postmodern gesture. Instead their 
canvases are populated by uncertain, fake, or unlocatable gestures. And 
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where we do find “real” drips or passages of firm brushwork, we find it 
impossible to read them as we once did. Meaning is thrown back onto the 
viewer as the artists’ own subjective investments in their decisions around 
paint handling become indeterminate and unknowable.59 
 
While Godfrey argues that the unknowability at the foundations of this painting 
is disentangled from the strategies of non-composition that shaped 
modernism, negation nevertheless is detectable in the language of de-
composition he reports on. Such painting turns on tactics of violation or 
corruption. Godfrey quotes Humphries who states, ‘I have to destroy the 
painting I know to make the one I don’t yet’.60 Scratch the surface of Von 
Heyl’s fastidiously delivered drips or Humphries’ vigorous ‘impromptu doodles’ 
and sincerity is revealed — a faith in an interior experience of ‘material 
surfaces seen in real space’.61 Post-pastiche (post-irony), the fake is no 
longer discernible from the real. ‘At the core of my being in the world, and my 
being as an artist’, comments Von Heyl, ‘is this sense of falseness, which 
feels paradoxically like the one truly existential sense of self left, or possible. 
And it is this paradoxical twist that gives me a new lease on pathos’.62  
 
Behind strategies of appropriated gesture is the ever-present existential crisis 
in the desire to express without the means with which to do so — or perhaps 
more appropriately from a contemporary perspective, the crisis in the desire to 
express while overwhelmed by the infinite expansion of means to do so. 
Behind the fake expressive mark is the sincere expression of the fear of 
nothingness experienced in the confrontation with the blank canvas, in facing 
the ‘vertiginous uncertainty of just starting off’.63  
 
This just starting off returns us to Lyotard’s conception of the Now of the 
sublime — that point of tension and transition between the all-devouring dark 
of nothingness and something other, something like the figure of gesture. 
Perhaps channeling Beckett, Lyotard associates this anxiety with waiting. He 
situates it in the traumatic possibility of nothing happening. The feeling at such 
a point is contradictory. Loaded as it is with both dread and giddy anticipation 
it equates to something like the eternal torture experienced by Beckett’s 
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characters Estragon and Vladimir in his play Waiting for Godot. Wandering 
the postmodern limbo of worn out essentialism and the absurdity of 
articulating the un-presentable, the painter declares with the first mark made 
‘We’re saved!’ only for the torment of paralysis to be immediately reinstated, 
as the very same gesture subsequently insists ‘Nothing to be done’. As 
Lyotard comments, misery accompanies not just the starting off, but ‘every 
point of questioning’, every ‘and what now?’ — or, in respect to Study II, every 
point that asks ‘is this it?’ or ‘is this enough?’ 64 
 
As such painterly gesture relates to what Lyotard describes as a ‘Letting go of 
all grasping intelligence and of its power, disarming it, recognizing that this 
occurrence of painting was not necessary and is scarcely foreseeable’.65 
Such a letting go is a surrendering to intuition, to (visual) knowledge gained 
not by reason and perception but instead by instinct, by belief — by feeling. 
Sartre comments that ‘Intuition has often been defined as the immediate 
presence of the known to the knower’.66 This immediate knowledge, in 
relation to painting, is visual language that manifests the presence of the 
immediate. Consequently it is the unknown to which the knower (painter) 
orientates — an intuition guided towards forms of the unconscious by 
accident, chance and material conditions. In this sense, gesture is the engine 
of intuition. 
  
Despite the apparent impossibility of adequate expressive means to present 
the inexpressible the event of gesture happens — it just starts off. The surface 
is marked, and in that first instance the mark is abstract. It presents the 
possibility of something other than silence. The mark presents the potential of 
gestural language at the point words fail. In the Loss of Other Modalities of 
Sensation X and III just starting off is an action compromised — vertiginous 
uncertainty coming not from the emptiness of the point of departure, but 
instead from the confrontation with the fullness of what has passed before, 
with the material immediacy achieved previously in Study II. In this sense the 
difficulty of just starting off in the Loss of Other Modalities of Sensation works 
was the conflict between the premeditated and the unexpected, the known 
and the unknown. The challenge was, as it were, to paint over Study II.  
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Where Study II was begun with a gesture that proposed the figure, Loss of 
Other Modalities of Sensation X, III offers figuration that proposes gesture. 
Reflecting on this differential studio research subsequently developed into two 
distinct lines of enquiry — on the one hand an exploration of the abstraction of 
the figure and on the other an investigation of figure as abstraction.  
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OTHER CATASTROPHES 
 
TOWARDS THE HAPTIC:  
THE FIGURE UNDER ABSTRACTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 22 Untitled II, 2012  
(Oil on steel, 50 x 50 cm)  
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Sight finds itself barricaded in, it paints its distress. You come too late, 
after the party. The event of colours is over; the lights are going out 
over the great abandoned tables. You drag yourself across the floor-
tiles, counting their doleful symmetries. You pick up what has fallen 
from the banquet of the flesh. You remember that a beggar can be the 
messenger of the gods.1 
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Struggling with issues of scale in relation to the physical production of gesture 
I began to look harder at the figure in portrait as compositional structure. In 
particular I looked at the portrait as expressive generality rather than as 
illustrative specificity — as a universal condition rather than depiction or 
description. In this respect Untitled II (Figure. 22) presents a more formally 
developed figure — there is a sense of silhouetted volume and mass in the 
three-quarter profile — but the form is one that still refuses to allow features to 
settle into cohesion, instead maintaining the figure as interior matter, held 
between states, as the subjective consequence of erasure, of the failed 
attempt. Such is the severity of this reduction that the residue of form left 
behind is no longer portrait, but instead merely head. This generic term is 
better suited to the summation of the figure rather than the description of 
physiological particulars for posterity. Untitled II preserves nothing for 
posterity; the future is rewarded not with the nostalgia of memory derived from 
the transparency of legible imagery but instead with opacity that returns the 
viewer to the original unstable experience. Posterity is gifted the immediate — 
the future is gifted the present.  
 
The term head suggests the figure as a contingent experience detached from 
or ambivalent to original source material. As head Untitled II is mere type, the 
non-descript form that nevertheless depicts — that describes limit of self and 
expression. In this sense Untitled II functions as a kind of tronie. This generic 
Dutch term (meaning face) is largely associated with a mode of seventeenth 
century figurative painting, and in particular the self-portraiture of Rembrandt 
Van Rijn. Generally bust length, single figures or heads, such tronie paintings 
were less to do with portraiture in terms of religious tropes, status and identity 
and instead more to do with the portrayal of extreme emotional states. 
Removed from specific narrative or allegorical context, tronies employed the 
figure in isolation — in the abstract. Consequently these figurative blanks 
served the painter as means of expanding their (representational) expressive 
vocabulary. In this sense the tronie serves as mode of study. The tronie 
privileges the subject of painting.  
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The same might also be said of Francis Bacon’s tronies — the Head series. 
Like much of the painter’s output their factness comes from provisionality, 
both in terms of image and procedure. Nothing is resolved in Bacon’s Head 
paintings; they remain in a contingent state — like Rembrandt’s tronie self-
portraits they remain studies of or for. Like Bacon’s portraits, the head 
paintings ‘are the interrogation on the limits of the self’.2 They ask the 
question, ‘Up to what degree of distortion does an individual still remain 
himself!? Where lies the border beyond which a self ceases to be a self?’ 3 
In Bacon’s tronies, like Head II, painterly action corrupts, corrodes and 
reduces the figure to this limit. It is a threshold of absolute indeterminacy 
determined by Bacon’s understanding of Rembrandt’s painting. He comments 
 
If you think of the great Rembrandt self-portrait in Aix-en-Provence, for 
instance, and you analyze it, you will see that there are hardly any sockets to 
the eyes, that it is almost completely anti-illustrational. I think that the mystery 
of fact is conveyed by an image being made out of non-rational marks. And 
you can’t will this non-rationality of a mark. That is the reason that accident 
always has to enter into the activity, because the moment you know what to 
do, you’re making just another form of illustration. But what can happen 
sometimes, as it happened in this Rembrandt self-portrait, is that there is a 
coagulation of non-representational marks which have led to making up this 
very great image. Well, of course, only part of this is accidental. Behind all 
that is Rembrandt’s sensibility, which was able to hold onto one irrational 
mark rather than onto another. And abstract expressionism has all been done 
in Rembrandt’s marks.
4
 
 
Like Head II, Untitled II functions as a figurative blank whose erasive gestural 
language elicits a subjective response. Such an approach seeks to reduce the 
figure to a generalized but, nevertheless, more direct figural presence. Where 
the figurative resides within illustration, the figural is to be found in the opacity 
of isolation.  
 
The distinction between these territories is one highlighted by Gilles Deleuze 
in his dissection of Bacon’s painting. As Deleuze would have it, the figurative 
amounts to not only the interrelation between the figure and ‘an object that it 
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is supposed to illustrate’, but also, ‘the relationship of an image to other 
images in a composite whole which assigns a specific object to each of 
them’.5 From within such relationships narrative inevitably seeps and with it 
illustration. However, as Deleuze writes ‘Painting has neither a model to 
represent nor a story to narrate’.6 Through techniques of ‘isolation’, 
‘extraction’, if not abjection, whereby the figure is deprived of the possibility of 
these relationships through, for example, the ambivalence of darkness, the 
figure is reduced to a ‘what takes place’ — to a simple matter of ‘fact’, or the 
fact of matter — the material insistence of gesture. 7 Extracting the figural from 
the figure exposes a latent sense of the spiritual, a sense of the sacred 
exposed in the abjection of the figure — the figural reveals the ghost of the 
holy. 
 
Deleuze comments that ‘Thus isolated, the Figure becomes an Image, an 
Icon’.8 For Deleuze Image, derived from the Figure abstracted, ceases to be 
merely a framing device for sign and symbol — it ceases to be something that 
the viewer looks into; rather it becomes an experiential vehicle. Image ceases 
to correlate to imagery, to illustration; rather it invokes a sense of the 
imaginary — the un-heard phrase, the form of the unknowable.  
 
This is a telling recalibration of terms. Image, divested of illustrative function, 
assumes the spirit of revelation associated with or derived from the 
contemplation of an Icon. Long since emptied of conventional religious 
iconography, the Icon nevertheless retains transcendent potential — the Icon 
maintains an insistence on ‘communion’ between the interested parties, 
between work, figure, spectator and materials. While no longer holy, such a 
communion remains resolutely spiritual. The figural thus becomes a kind of 
votive offering that initiates, or provides the Image for self-revelation, for a 
corporeal encounter with limit. The figure in isolation — in abstraction — 
becomes icon for lack, for the absence of clearly prescribed iconography, for 
the emptiness left in the wake of the emancipation of the image from religion, 
for the impossibility of expression in the darkness of that void.  
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Deleuze’s notion of the ‘figural’ has a certain proximity to Bataille’s conception 
of the formless. Both terms stand as operative agents of abstraction, in 
opposition to ‘intelligible relations’ and the literature/narrative they insist upon. 
Like formlessness the figural functions through and in abjection — it turns on 
privation, on silence, on the isolation of the figure. Both terms seek to de-
classify, to bring things down in the world. Where formless seeks to liberate 
the word from meaning, the figural seeks to ‘break with representation, to 
disrupt narration, to escape illustration, to liberate the Figure: to stick to the 
fact’, or as Bataille might have it, stick to the task — the affective or 
experiential function of the figure in painting.9 
 
Standing before Bacon’s painting Head II the material conditions of the 
painting qualifies this notion of the figure rendered figurally. Presented in 
isolation the figure itself becomes an abstraction. Isolation in Bacon’s Head 
series is taken to the extreme limit, reducing the figure to the contingency of a 
head barely discernible from the ‘thicknesses and densities’ that surround it. 10 
Without contextual scaffold on which to hang the butchered remains of the 
figure in Head II representational content is stripped out of the portrait, leaving 
the material experience of a kind of indistinct nothingness that returns us to 
Sartre’s downward facing mode of being. Place in Head II cannot be 
determined pictorially, it cannot be entirely processed in compositional terms, 
rather place comes from the immediacy of the space of painting, from the 
material directness that emanates from painterly gesture. Place is found in the 
collaboration between the work and the spectator. There is a certain in-your-
faceness to Head II, inasmuch as pictorial depth is undone by an unresolved 
figure/ground relationship that in the end offers a disorientating flatness, 
despite the texture and turmoil of the material surface. Both elements 
conspire in a single plane and, as such, are ‘grasped in close view, a tactile or 
“haptic” view’.11  
 
The haptic view blinds the eye. The subjective ‘I’, the self, is instated in its 
place. The haptic view corrodes looking, substituting optical function with a 
kind of second sight, which ‘discovers in itself a specific function of touch that 
is uniquely its own’.12 Deleuze remarks that ‘One might say that painters paint 
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with their eyes, but only insofar as they touch with their eyes’.13 Applying 
Lyotard’s perspective, Head II is seen and not looked at — Head II is felt. He 
writes,  
 
The painting is not something to be read, as contemporary semiologists 
would have it. Rather, as Klee put it, it has to be grazed, it makes visible, 
giving itself up to the eye like the exemplary thing that it is, like naturing 
nature (to borrow Klee’s words again), since it makes visible seeing itself.
14
 
 
Like touch the haptic view is direct, it is received by the eye as a conduit for 
immediacy upon the nervous system. Its visual language articulates Carl 
Einstein’s notion of ‘unmediated experience’ of the ‘immediate human 
being’.15 The materiality of the haptic view amounts to sensorial ‘fact’ and, as 
such, equates to knowledge — knowledge cut free from objectivity, from ‘its 
culturally determined bondage to meaning’.16 In de-limiting the eye and with it 
the tyranny of cognition, the haptic view initiates an affective discourse 
independent of that of translation and interpretation, in opposition to the 
‘house of language’.17 
 
Loss of Other Modalities of Sensation XIV (Figure. 23) is a finger painting. As 
such it marks a significant development in the studio research towards the 
haptic view, towards the confusion of eye and hand. Deleuze comments that 
this state of sensorial bewilderment comes about at the point where neither 
hand nor eye can exert their dominance, where neither is ‘subordinated’ — at 
the point at which sight discovers in itself a specific function of touch. Such a 
state, Deleuze argues, results from the unity of catastrophe and the diagram. 
Both terms might justifiably be substituted with that of gesture. Deleuze 
associates these terms with processes of corruption evident within Bacon’s 
painting, with the painterly means by which the figurative is reduced or 
distilled to the figural. Triggered by the diagram, the movement between these 
states is downward — from the visual (predetermined optical space) to the 
visceral, from the cerebral to the sensational. Deleuze writes, ‘A Sahara, a 
rhinoceros skin: such is the suddenly outstretched diagram. It is as if, in the 
midst of the figurative and probabilistic givens, a catastrophe overcame the  
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Figure. 23 Loss of Other Modalities of Sensation XIV — part suite, 2012  
(Oil on stainless steel, 20 x 25 cm) 
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canvas’.18 The scrubbed out line, the smeared over form, the wiped out mass, 
the thrown paint — this ‘operative set of traits’ remove painting from a 
predetermined ‘optical organization’. Beyond this threshold we discover the 
haptic view, where ‘one can no longer see anything, as if in a catastrophe, a 
chaos’.19 This state of chaos, where opticality is blinded and the nervous 
system takes over, nevertheless exposes the potential for order, for visual 
‘rhythm as matter and material’.20 Such blindness is brought about by the 
action of painting; by the (violent) gesture of the hand liberated from the brush 
as arbiter of the nostalgia of forms and ‘guided by other forces’, or forces of 
the other. 21  
 
My own painting process established conditions for such catastrophe, for 
gesture that opens the form. While brush, rag and palette knife continued to 
contribute to this process, the production of the work is here predominantly 
generated through marks made with hands directly on the painted surface. To 
be more specific the broad gestural syntax that accounts for the head — for 
the raked-over remains of a figure in isolation — is largely the result of 
painting in latex surgical gloves. Under latex, oil paint moves in a completely 
different way than it does under brush, rag or palette knife. Latex has 
unpredictable bite. Especially so in respect to painting on metal. With little or 
no friction, as fingers move across the painted support, the marks made run 
on like quicksilver before the latex catches, a shift in pressure or a crease in 
the rubber halting the mark and tearing paint abruptly off the surface. In Loss 
of Other Modalities of Sensation XIV the heel of the latex covered hand is the 
incident from which emerges the sensorial image, it is the incident that has 
‘introduced or distributed formless forces throughout the painting, which have 
a necessary relation with the deformed parts, or which are made use of as, 
precisely, “places”’.22 This disruptive gesture or diagram scrambles visual 
data, leaving behind corrupted code that intermittently reveals glimpses of 
resemblances. In Loss of Other Modalities of Sensation XIV soft smear is 
replaced by the violence of a tear. This tear offers a more expansive 
compositional structure, a richer diagram you might say — one that can be 
worked into, allowing this material language to be produced on a larger scale. 
!
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PAINTING PAINTING:  
TOWARDS THE UNSYMBOLIZED IMAGINARY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 24 Untitled III, 2013  
(Oil on stainless steel, 30 x 40 cm) 
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The unconscious is very kind to alert the conscious by means of signs. 
In the least bit of daydreaming, the other vision begins to paint. 
Untranslatable, the dream throws into the soul a suspicion as to its 
health. It is not in possession of itself, a ghost is haunting it. It learns in 
this way that the other, the clandestine passenger whose language and 
manners it does not know, knows how to say and show what it can’t 
[!] Thus, the thought of painting: its always absent presence haunts 
the life of the worthy gaze, and it wakes up only if the gaze dozes off. It 
worries the whole of the visible by making it suffer the intrusion of 
unknown visual idioms. One paints in order to honour the fleeting 
angel.23 
  
!
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In pursuing figural painting my aim was to explore the threshold between 
autonomous mark and load-bearing gesture — between producing effect, 
chasing chance and accident, and painting affect. Simply put, the work 
needed to bring the smear closer to the figure as an open form, closer to 
representation. Not in the sense of illustration, but rather representation in 
terms of painting as presentation. In this sense the work needed to 
extrapolate the single gesture into a richer, deeper vocabulary using an 
appropriate contextual scaffold.  
 
This I found in the painting of painting. Where initially archival photography 
had offered some sort of oblique visual or pictorial foundation to early 
paintings like Paradigm and Study II, as gesture in relation to the abstraction 
of the figure assumed greater prominence research moved towards painting 
as source material. By drawing on the history of the medium, and in particular 
Rembrandt’s self portraits, the intention was to situate subject matter, the 
matter of subjectivity, more clearly within the business of painting itself. In this 
respect the material encounter functions like a Mobius band, whereby start 
and finish mark the same point — the experience of gesture returning the 
spectator to the matter of painting and vice versa. Subsequently gestural 
language, the vocabulary of mark making, is positioned within a discourse of 
practice. Image, as such, is stripped of the obligation to illustrate and narrate 
through a plastic language of disruption and abjection that invokes the 
imaginary. The unconscious is brought into proximity through the 
provisionality of gesture, through the contingency of the ‘tear, integral to 
language, where the work of expression occurs. Such violence belongs to the 
depth of language’.24  
 
The use of paintings as direct source material has its own particular heritage 
and reflects an approach to picture making far more complex than mere 
citation or homage.  As Willem de Kooning comments  
 
If I am influenced by another painter from another time, that’s like the smile of 
the Cheshire Cat in Alice, the smile left over when the cat is gone. In other 
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words I could be influenced by Rubens, but I would certainly not paint like 
Rubens.25 
 
This is research embodied in the physical action of painting. The relationship 
between source and work reflects an open-ended process of learning and 
passing on — a kind of processing of knowledge through materiality, through 
visual experience — a physical working through which equates to thinking in 
paint. Richard Kendall describes Leon Kossoff’s frequent direct use of Nicolas 
Poussin’s paintings, among others, as a mean of penetrating a little into their 
identity and finding structures of his own to account for their success. For 
Kendall this type of symbiotic relationship between a work and its direct 
antecedents attests to the creative co-existence of the studio and the 
museum.26 The resulting work is a distinct act of creation, self-sufficient and 
autonomous; uniquely the product neither of Poussin or Kossoff, but rather, of 
a kind of retrospective conversation between the two. The language that 
sustains this dialogue is not mimetic or interpretive, it has little to do with the 
stagnation of simulation, rather it is a language of process, corporeal and 
determinedly unresolved. The study is destined to remain necessarily 
incomplete — the known is cast adrift on the formlessness of the unknown. 
 
Francis Bacon’s preoccupation with paintings from the canon of art history is 
well charted. His work reveals periodic obsessions with the painting of 
numerous artists including Velasquez, Rembrandt, Ingres, Van Gogh and 
Picasso. By drawing on old master works Bacon was able to extricate himself 
from the burden of image — in using reproductions of paintings the ‘problem’s 
already been solved’, he says. However, he goes on to point out that ‘The 
problem that you’re setting up, of course, is another problem’. 27 This problem, 
that of ‘making appearance out of something which is not illustration’, is a 
‘particular theory’ which haunts Bacon’s use of, for example, Velasquez’s 
portrait of Pope Innocent X, 1650 — a painting he would return to over again, 
not, he claimed, for the latent religiosity of the painting, but for a sense of the 
spiritual derived from a confrontation with the human form beyond the 
confines of the figurative — from painting as a process of devotion to that 
which Bacon described as ‘impossible to achieve’.28 Such devotion, such 
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blind faith in the possibility of painting as a distinct, sensational language, 
such study — a term that persists in the titles of Bacon’s paintings — 
maintains the material discourse of the medium.  
 
In these paintings study, as such, is bound to Bacon’s strategies of disruption 
and distortion. His devotion to the painting of Velasquez manifests a kind of 
Bataillean form of study where defilement, desecration and iconoclasm are 
the prevailing tactics. As we have seen, the first of his studies after 
Velasquez’s Pope Innocent X (1650) also ends the Head series of 1948/49. In 
Head VI, 1949 (Figure. 25) the process of study, the thinking in paint, is 
brutally exposed. The compositional structure appears uncertain, with the 
papal figure coalescing, within the diagrammatic box-like re-framing device 
that would become a familiar component of Bacon’s pictorial manner, from 
raw abbreviation that leaves a bust length portrait little more than an 
apparition emanating from violently sketched in darkness. This darkness 
striates the head of the figure and the suggestion of the throne behind. It is an 
image that appears as though a relic of work destroyed — the leftover carrion 
of a portrait that has been scraped and scrubbed back to the raw tooth of the 
unprimed canvas. For Bacon study is a process of translation, and as such it 
is the movement between the high and low, between the coherence of image 
and the other of irrational form. In this downward movement we once again 
determine the formless in action. Dawn Ades points to the proximity of Bacon 
to Bataille suggesting that in Head VI perhaps the  
 
idea was to test one of the greatest portraits ever painted, of a man set 
highest above his fellow men (the archetypal father, verging on the divine) in 
the grip of a feeling so intense that the only expression of it brought him close 
to the beasts. It must be emphasized that it is not the intention here to 
suggest that Bacon was in any sense illustrating Bataille, but rather that their 
concerns, preoccupations and attitudes run parallel.
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Figure. 25 Francis Bacon, Head VI, 1949  
(Oil on canvas, 20 x 30 cm) 
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While Ades locates these shared preoccupations in Bacon’s imagery, in his 
fascination with the mouth and the animal, it is also possible to locate them 
within Bacon’s materiality, within the way he physically applies the paint — in 
the slashing verticality of black that obliterates much of the face in Head VI. 
 
Bacon himself was evidently conflicted by the paintings he produced that cited 
old master works, commenting that he regretted in particular the studies he 
produced on Velasquez’s Pope Innocent X, ‘because I think that this thing 
was an absolute thing that was done and nothing more can be done about 
it’.30 Elsewhere, however, he commented that drawing on masterworks ‘breed 
other images for me. And of course one’s always hoping to renew them’.31 
Once again language allows for confusion — there is slippage in terms, the 
‘absolute thing’ giving rise to contradiction. As Carl Einstein points out in 
Documents ‘the absolute is precisely that supreme truth which remains 
indemonstrable [!] it is identical with the void and with that which has no 
object’.32 There is no workable corollary between thingness and the absolute, 
which by its nature exceeds the known and the recognizable. Rather, Bacon’s 
turn of phrase suggests he viewed the Velasquez painting as a closed, perfect 
form — nothing more can be done about it, he says. The absolute has little to 
do with such perfection of form and composition. ‘Object-related vision’, writes 
Carl Einstein, ‘in which the object overwhelms pictorial form, is passive’.33 The 
absolute is anything but passive.  
 
Bacon’s material language, the language of catastrophe, the syntax of 
smudge, smear and eviscerating brush mark cleaves open closed, idealized 
form and reduces the Velasquez painting to an abject state — a contingent 
state that renews the possibility of the absolute in the gestural expression of 
limit and representation’s impossibility. Bacon returns the Velasquez work to 
the abstract, to the idea of a painting. To study is to look at, to scrutinize — to 
see. However, for Bacon, study, in pursuit of what Einstein termed ‘pure visual 
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function’, relies upon a certain groping material intuition that reduces 
composition to sensation — to ‘a perfectly concrete individual experience’.34  
 
Such concrete individual experience offers a perspective on Bacon’s 
comment that he’s always hoping to ‘renew’ the master works upon which he 
draws. By painting from painting we can speculate that Bacon sought to re-
instate the self in works over run by the symbolic and buried under the weight 
of historical and cultural narrative, and in so doing return them to the realm of 
the unpresentable via the material language of abstraction. In this sense 
Bacon’s vivisecting brush opens up the closed and the familiar, putting such 
painting out of reach and invoking the unknown. As discussed, Mark Godfrey 
has marked the renewed currency of the unknown within contemporary 
painterly practice. He writes  
 
Such invocations of unknowability could be caricatured as so many New Age 
bromides, but we would be wrong to characterize them in this way. For a 
start, the unknowable has a new premium in a culture that prides itself on 
being able to know everything via instant access (constitutional or not) to 
massive troves of information. 
35 
 
This currency, employed with a greater or lesser degree of sincerity, 
orientates, within certain contemporary practices, towards the painting of 
painting and the language of gesture. Godfrey’s survey is focused on abstract 
painters. It is worth noting that the figure remains absent from his discussion 
of painting that has established ‘resistant positions between authenticity and 
appropriation’.36  
 
Philip Gurrey, however, is a contemporary painter who has channeled 
concerns with the language of gesture in relation to the unknown through the 
figure in portrait. Like Bacon, Gurrey is interested in painting painting — in the 
subject of the impossibility of viable expressive means. He approaches the 
canon of masterworks as vehicle for material improvisations that take form 
beyond the threshold of legibility to what Samuel Beckett describes as ‘Total 
object, complete with missing parts’.37  
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Figure. 26 Phillip Gurrey, Margaretha de Geer, 2007, (Oil on board, 55 x 50 cm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 27 Girl, 2007, (Oil on board, 31 x 31 cm) courtesy of the artist 
!
∀#∃!
In early works like Margaretha de Geer, 2007 (Figure. 26) and Girl, 2007 
(Figure. 27) Gurrey cites the techniques and visual tropes of seventeenth 
century northern European painting — a period which in Gurrey’s view 
witnessed a secularization of painting. He comments 
 
I investigated Van Dyck, Rembrandt and Rubens, by taking parts of society 
portraits and re-working them into a more contemporary image. I was 
commenting on how we live now and the birth of modern culture. 17th-century 
Holland saw the rise of money, and the death of royalty and the church. To 
use images from that time was important.
38  
 
Like Bacon, Gurrey turns to the painting ‘establishment’ — to the 
overwhelming canon, over burdened with literature, consumed by historical 
narrative — to subvert the written word and cleave open iconography and 
cliché through a sense of materiality that returns painting to the Now. As with 
Bacon’s Velasquez paintings, masterworks provide Gurrey with the scaffold 
for study, for material research — for thinking in paint. Known images and 
academic techniques are deployed as departure points for what Gurrey 
describes as ‘investigation in paint’.39 Like Bacon, Gurrey approaches the 
figure as a vehicle for abstraction. Both artists are interested in the body 
under forces of abjection.  
 
Where Bacon cites images from radiography and dentistry, Gurrey’s early 
painting draws upon the war photography of Percy Hennell documenting 
trauma surgery. As Gurrey’s work has developed, so the materiality of visual 
language has risen to the surface. Where in early works like Eye, 2007 
(Figure. 28) Gurrey investigates the figure as indeterminate proposition 
through representational images of the abstraction of surgical scarring, in later 
works like After Goya, 2010 (Figure. 29) he does so through downward facing 
painterly gesture — through the figure instead scarred by the material process 
of painting. It is the palette knife that surgically incises alizarin crimson across 
the portrait, it is the dripping turpentine and the dragged rag that anesthetizes 
the known and instates the unpresentable. In this sense, the figural 
supersedes the figurative — material immediacy supersedes narrative.  
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Figure. 28 Eye, 2007, (oil on board, 31 x 31 cm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 29 After Goya, 2010, (oil on canvas, 100 x 100 cm) 
 
Courtesy of the artist   
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Territories disintegrate. The sacred is made profane as seventeenth century 
techniques of glazing and grisaille are corrupted by the impasto vocabulary of 
the abstract expressionist, by the mid-twentieth century drip, drag, slash and 
smear. Gurrey’s points of departure become harder to determine, collapsing 
into the event horizon of painting’s concrete presence, its brutal fact-ness. 
‘For me’, comments Gurrey, ‘a lot of the meaning of the work is intrinsic to the 
paint, it’s not a reference to something’.40 As such Gurrey’s After Goya 
studies mark a development in his work from painting paintings — image and 
motif, to painting painting — process and presence. In these works references 
are buried under a language of visceral gesture that articulates the formless 
figure.  
 
It is this particular sense of study that shaped a series of my own paintings 
based on the self-portraits of Rembrandt. Formally speaking the prevailing 
use of strong chiaroscuro in seventeenth century painting and in particular 
Rembrandt’s self-portraits facilitates the development of a figural approach to 
the figure. There is a singular quality to Rembrandt’s self-portraits. An 
enveloping darkness absorbs and consumes form, while at the same time 
alluding to it. In this sense the figure is itself the catastrophe, the gesture that 
splits the whole, the apparition of limit that defiles the infinite. Rembrandt 
presents the figure isolated within the dimmest of light against indeterminate 
space, against a painted blankness that refuses geographical or architectural 
grounding. Such Beckett-like blankness ensures the void is thus an ever-
present threat. As Joanne Shaw remarks Rembrandt’s use of chiaroscuro 
subsequently served to inform Beckett’s conception of a darkness both 
psychological and theatrical, both sacred and profane, or rather profanely 
sacred. She points out that Beckett transcribed R. H Wilenski’s An 
Introduction to Dutch Art, which included texts on Rembrandt’s use of 
darkness, light and the abject state found in the ‘dim void’ between.41 Shaw 
notes that Beckett evidently copied passages that describe Rembrandt’s 
painted non-space as ‘limitless recession and ‘eternal mystery’ and his 
portraits as ‘records of emotive fragments in relation to boundless and 
mysterious space and time’. As Shaw comments  
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If we look at his portraits or self-portraits with light directed onto the faces 
(and sometimes the hands), and the rest of their bodies only faintly seen in 
the darkness, we observe a particular emotion that is introspective and yet 
reminiscent of something other than the merely self-conscious. 
42
 
 
The human fragments of Rembrandt’s painting, Shaw argues, enabled 
Beckett to develop a theater of interiority — a theater of inner experience. 
 
This notion of the fragmentation of the human, of the figure corroded, is 
central to my material study of Rembrandt’s portrait painting. In Untitled III, 
2012 (Figure. 24 - p. 159) the formal precept of the oscillation between light 
and dark, between figure and ground affords a kind of essential compositional 
stability, while seventeenth century dress, the ‘architecture’ of breastplates, 
armor, studded collars and ruffs gives structure that frames the suggestion of 
human form, and facilitates the exploration of the boundary between 
abstraction and representation, between chaos and order. Such compositional 
elements serve to anchor a visual language that fractures and fragments the 
figure. The tension between light and dark is activated by gesture that refuses 
to allow either state to settle. Limitless recession vibrates against the fore, the 
ground against the figure, releasing a kind of ‘visual noise’. In this static 
charge of indeterminacy Shaw locates ‘Beckettian infinity’ and in it something 
of the sublime. It is a sublime experienced abjectly — in the gloaming — in 
the ‘hiatus between the light of life and the ceaseless blackness of the self’s 
death’.43 
 
The painterly process of Untitled III equates to what Shaw describes as a 
worsening of sight, which nevertheless prompts seeing. The erasive smear 
that drags the facial features in Untitled III into indeterminacy results in ‘a 
negative seeing in an negative light — a reverse-direction creation which does 
not result in annihilation but, at the boundaries of possibility, a refusal to 
disappear’. This ‘failure of ceasing to be’, writes Shaw, ‘is shown to have its 
own sublimity’.44 
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Figure. 30 Untitled IV, V, 2013, (Oil on stainless steel, 20 x 20 cm) 
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The Rembrandt studies are determined by the decisions that arise in the 
process of the making; they allow mark and gesture to lead the way. In 
Untitled IV, V 2013 (Figure. 30) for example, compositional tension comes not 
from content, from image but from how paint is physically put down, or more 
accurately how paint is removed. There is no intermediary state between the 
original point of departure and the work. There are no preparatory stages in 
the process that prescribe how much of the source material will endure. The 
study is in the painting of the work. It is the push and pull of material 
translation that accounts for the progression of image, or the image of 
painterly progression. Paintings within this series were necessarily completed 
in one or two sessions at most. As the black ground begins to dry, its physical 
properties degrade from a conductive state of wetness to a more resistant, 
tar-like condition as medium and paint cloy on the stainless steel surface. 
 
As this body of painting progressed I began to work in series (Figure. 32). By 
repeatedly subjecting the same image to these corrosive gestural techniques 
the emphasis shifts from image to mark and process. Returning time and 
again to one image insists on a visual experience dictated not by pictorial 
content, but by plastic language and the sense of impossibility that it inevitably 
expresses. Presented in series, painting remains an unresolved, unlimited, 
open-ended set of variations that become a kind of contradictory proposition 
of negation in painting encountered as an accumulated experience. This idea 
was further informed by a research trip to view Francisco Goya’s cycle of 
Black Painting’s at the Prado Museum in Madrid in the summer of 2011. 
Neither commissioned nor sold, between 1819 and 1823, Goya painted this 
collection of fourteen idiosyncratic works directly onto the walls of the Quinto 
Del Sardo (The House of the Deaf Man).  
 
While there is perhaps much that could be made from the content of these 
works in relation to painting, darkness and the gothic sublime, from the point 
of view of my studio research the value of these paintings came from the 
experience of them not as disparate images to be analytically unpicked for 
meaning, reference and narrative, but instead from their presence or their  
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Figure. 31 Loss of Other Modalities of Sensation XV – part suite, 2011  
(Oil on stainless steel 3 x 20 x 30 cm)  
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present-ness as an encounter with painting as cohesive body, with painting as 
something close to environment. While presented in the ultimately artificial 
context of the Prado, nevertheless, this cycle of oblique paintings, which stray 
from representation and illustration into near total material abstraction, exert 
considerable force as a whole. Surrounded by painting that lingers on the 
threshold of legibility, that exhibits opaqueness both materially and 
conceptually, the viewer is cut adrift from past and future tense and left only 
with dizzying immediacy. Standing alone, at first opening in front of Goya’s 
Black Paintings the viewer is conceivably confronted by the same sublime 
Now experienced in front of, say, the fourteen paintings that make up Barnett 
Newman’s Stations of the Cross, exhibited at the Solomon R. Guggenheim 
Museum in 1966 — or later the same year, in front of Ad Reinhardt’s cycle of 
Black Paintings exhibited at the Jewish Museum, New York in 1966. In 
relation to the Station paintings Newman comments   
 
Why fourteen? Why not one painting? The Passion is not a protest but a 
declaration. I had to explore its emotional complexity. That is, each painting is 
total and complete by itself, yet only the fourteen together make clear the 
wholeness of the single event.45 
 
The Stations of the Cross cycle is a not an evocation of religious spirituality, of 
Christian dogma, rather the sum of the parts, the single event that destabilizes 
the self, is a ‘statement’ of the spirit of painting. Each station Newman 
remarks, is ‘an expression of how I worked. I was a pilgrim as I painted’.46  
 
Newman’s cycle of paintings dedicated to the cry of Lema are a response to 
what the painter described as the ‘plastic challenge’ of the ‘question that has 
no answer’.47 In 2010 Philip Gurrey undertook the same impossible challenge, 
also producing a cycle of paintings for the Stations of the Cross.  Unlike 
Newman’s works, however, Gurrey’s were commissioned by the church — 
namely St. Andrews, London, where they were exhibited alongside 
conventional Christian iconography. In this respect the specificity of context 
heightens the tension between spirituality and the spirit of paint.  
  
!
∀#∃!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 32 Philip Gurrey, VII Jesus falls for a second time, 2010  
(Oil on board 31 x 30 cm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 33 Philip Gurrey, XII Jesus dies upon the cross, 2010  
(Oil on board, 31 x 30 cm) courtesy of the artist  
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Uniformly modest in scale (fifteen paintings, all 31 x 30 cm, oil on board), 
Gurrey’s Stations cycle shifts from legible figuration, in works like VII Jesus 
Falls For a Second Time (Figure. 32), to figural abstraction, in works like XII 
Jesus Dies Upon the Cross (Figure. 33), where the cry of Lema is reduced to 
a subtractive material gesture — to the articulate silence of dripping turpentine 
and wiped off paint. The figure, once the barometer against which the sublime 
could be measured, is reduced to the abject stain — to the blood on Bacon’s 
pavement.  
 
As the installation view (Figure. 34) of the St. Andrews exhibition illustrates, 
Gurrey’s Station Cycle marks the distinction between a pre and postmodern 
conception of the sacred. In Gurrey’s painting we see the decomposition and 
decay of traditional iconography long associated with experiences of the 
sublime, leaving behind instead a painted surface that testifies to nothing 
more than the passion of painting and the inevitability of failure found therein. 
As Bataille remarks  
 
Christianity has made the sacred substantial, but the nature of the 
sacred, in which today we recognize the burning existence of religion, 
is perhaps the most ungraspable thing that has been produced 
between men; the sacred is only a privileged moment of communal 
unity, a moment of the convulsive communication of what is ordinarily 
stifled.48 
 
Gurrey’s surface attests to just such convulsive communication. While 
narrative haunts the work, persisting in the titling, it is to the impossibility of 
adequate language that Gurrey’s paintings orientate, to the presence of 
painting in the absence of God. The privileged moment of communal unity, 
here located between work and spectator, is paradoxically an isolating 
experience of self. 
  
Gurrey ends his cycle with XV The Ressurection (Figure. 35), a work that 
sees the white monochrome rise from the dead. However, Gurrey’s 
monochrome is not the clean white witness as modernism marched towards  
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Fig. 34 Philip, Stations of the Cross, Installation View, 2010 
 St. Andrew’s Church, London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Figure. 35 XV The Resurrection, 2010 (Oil on board, 31 x 30 cm) 
 
Courtesy of the artist 
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minimalism, it is not the white of Robert Rauschenberg or Malevich, rather 
Gurrey’s is the off-white of the scraped back surface, it is the dirty white left 
behind by the process of erasure or the decay-yellow white of the Turin 
Shroud, stained with the traces of the figure. The iconographic language of 
religious narrative as been entirely consumed within the figural gesture, within 
a kind a negation that, in the end, reinstates possibility in the snow-blindness 
brought about in sullied white — a negation that resurrects the ‘blank canvas’ 
and with it obligation.  
 
As with Newman, the painterly language of Gurrey’s Stations of the Cross is 
expressive of the limit of expression. Beneath the material gesture we find 
nothing more than the desire to reveal the unknown — nothing more than a 
Bataillean sense of torment. Gurrey’s process relies upon the imp of the 
perverse. In a work like Jesus Falls For A Second Time the disruptive gestural 
impulse, the arbitrary, catastrophic mark destabilizes representational 
technique. Gurrey likens this intuitive, improvisational process to that of jazz, 
commenting that ‘Abstract painters like John Hoyland work in this manner. 
Always working in response to the previous mark they have just made. It’s 
almost like a call and response’.49 For Gurrey, as for Newman, the Stations of 
the Cross works are a material language for experience once located within 
religion. 
Though Newman stated that the conception of the Stations cycle coalesced 
from nowhere other than the doing of the work, in a sense, he too is painting 
from painting. The image of the Passion is a given — its iconography seared 
onto the retina of western visual culture. As such Newman was free to 
articulate the ‘plastic challenge’ of a material language for the inexpressible. 
In the same way, returning time and again to Rembrandt’s self-portraits, in a 
painting like Juju, 2013 (Figure. 36) for example, liberates gesture from 
illustration allowing it to move towards painting as a statement of obligation 
and failure. The unfinished or barely started quality of the work bears fragile 
testament to the impossibility of presentation/representation, to the 
implausibility of adequate means. The subtractive mark, the tear in the 
surface is a kind of hole within the whole, a void within unity (Figure. 37).  
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Figure. 36 Juju, 2013,  
(Oil on stainless steel, 50 x 50 cm) 
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Figure. 37 Juju—detail  
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Invariably structure in the work is born of the frustration of articulation, of my 
limits as a painter. It proceeds from backward steps in the painting, from 
fingers scribbling through coherent form, from the erasing scythe of the 
palette knife — from the cancelling out. The violent tracings of dragged paint 
form phrases of a cursive script of sorts that testifies to process — to a kind of 
post-war confrontation between the artist, his tools and his medium. Passages 
of smeared paint appear stable and affirmative before they melt away into 
negative space — into ‘limitless recession’ we might say. Though a work like 
Ju-Ju perhaps overstates its case, being too deliberate, too realized, too 
legible — closer to the scream than silence, too much like painting as 
opposed to non-painting — it nevertheless served to expand a negative 
vocabulary in my painting. Such visual language equates to a form of 
sublimation of the unconscious taboo of the figure in postmodern painting. Via 
negative gesture, via de-formation it is re-appropriated as a culturally 
acceptable form — as a kind of abjection of the figure, as its formlessness, 
whose un-verifiability insists that the viewer ‘does not leave the reality of the 
painting and that the artist’s vision is not interrupted by comparative 
observation. The viewer isolates himself and forgets’.50 This isolation, this loss 
of self amounts to something close to sublime experience.  
 
Such visual language shifts painting towards what Carl Einstein termed 
‘antipictorial experience’.51 Referencing Analytical Cubism he writes, ‘Instead 
of presenting the result of an observation, the painter presents the result of a 
visual process that is not interrupted by objects. He is not content with an 
abbreviated rendering that would eliminate the refracted parts’.52 The 
discourse shifts from sign, motif and cultural criteria — Einstein’s ‘immortlized 
dead turkeys’ — towards painting as presence, an experience that is cued 
from the vague recollection of the figure, but is no longer dependent on it. It 
transcends knowledge and its motifs at the same time that it offers their 
apparition. ‘The condition of such simultaneity’, writes Einstein,  
 
is a quickness immeasurable in time that resembles the rapid, synthetic force 
of dreams. Such quickness is possible only because one is not distracted by 
the motif, and because the objective tendency dwells at the periphery, yet 
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does remain present, for the pictorial forms are directed towards the 
subjugation of nature.
53
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FIGURING ABSTRACTION:  
THE SMEAR AS PORTRAIT OF THE SELF 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 38 Symptom IV, 2013  
(oil on stainless steel, 40  x 40 cm) 
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These paintings would need a text that would honour the shortfall of 
sentences. That would bring out the mutism of words. In which one 
would detect the death-rattle that language covers, as Quignard says. 
[!] Even a poem, even the most naked poem, would still be too 
prepared, would give much to be understood. It would make us believe 
in the shimmer of meaning. We’d need a prose that would, sounding 
hollow, be the equal of these chromatic vanities. White, Black, neutral 
groan here so low in the dazzling parade of pigments that the 
complaint of not being able to see is scarcely heard. We’d need a 
prose full of words in which one would discern one’s disappointment at 
not being able to say anything, a little exaltation that closed lips let 
pass.54 
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Juju (Figure. 36, 37) says too much, is too verbose. As a visual poem it is too 
prepared, too equipped. Its gestural language is too descriptive, offering 
optical specificity at the expense of haptic generality. In short there is too 
much to look at in the painting and not enough to see. The figure emerges not 
from the action of painting, from essential material expression, but from the 
painting of action, ie, the expectation of gestural effect. The resultant image 
appears somehow too close — the figure is presented in mannered proximity 
without the ‘distances of the Sahara’, as Bacon would put it.55 There is 
disconnection between the visual whole and the language that undoes it; the 
‘condition of simultaneity’ is subsequently blocked. ‘Quickness’, the 
immediacy of visual experience acting directly upon the nervous system is 
stalled as gesture overwhelms the figure. The threshold that brings 
representation and abstraction to tension gives out as smears, smudges and 
the erasive gouges of the palette knife consume composition. Commenting on 
Bacon’s navigation of this threshold Deleuze writes 
 
The diagram must not eat away at the entire painting, it must remain 
operative and controlled. The violent methods must not be given free reign, 
and the necessary catastrophe must not submerge the whole. The diagram is 
a possibility of fact — it is not the fact itself. Not all the figurative givens have 
to disappear; and above all, a new figuration, that of the Figure, should 
emerge from the diagram and make the sensation clear and precise.
56  
 
In the painting of Juju the phrases of material rhythm, the movement of the 
paint within the compositional whole achieved a certain autonomy that 
prompted the question, what if violent methods are given free reign? What if 
the diagram is permitted to eat away, to corrode the entire painting? Under 
such conditions can gesture itself assume the capacity of the figure; can its 
ambiguity bring about the necessary tension between the chaos of the 
unknown and the order of the familiar?  
 
Deleuze insists that the diagram unchecked leaves painting in an 
‘irremediably confused state’. Its efficacy requires ‘contour’ — a mechanism 
that confines or contains the gestural rupture to ‘certain moments of the act of 
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painting’. 57 The question of whether the figure is intrinsic to this procedure of 
confinement, whether it is essential to this mechanism of containment, shaped 
the development of studio research as the autonomy of gesture became more 
pronounced within the Rembrandt study series. Consequently, the project 
evolved towards a gestural language that presented the arbitrary, conditioned 
— not by the figure but by the ‘localization’, to use Deleuze’s term, of the 
ground, by the vibration caused in the oscillation between limitless recession 
and immediate presence of mark. In this sense research shifted from 
abstracting the figure towards figuring the abstract. 
 
Symptom IV (Figure. 38) is an early piece from this period of studio research. 
It is a work on a tentative scale, but as such returns the viewer to an intimate 
experience of surface and the material language therein. The physical 
process of working remains relatively unchanged. As previously, the prologue 
to the painting is the laying down of the dark ground over the steel plate. This 
mechanical, somewhat un-thinking procedure is a kind of material 
contemplation that sets specific psychological conditions for painting proper, 
when conscious thinking gives way to thinking in paint. The contemporary 
painter Jacqueline Humphries, in conversation with fellow artist Cecily Brown, 
likens this precursory phase to Olympic swimmers wetting-down before they 
swim. ‘It’s like they have to become one with the pool’, she writes, ‘I realized I 
have to be prepared to be dirty to be able to do anything worthwhile in the 
studio’.58 These initial stages, defined by the smell of mediums and minerals, 
the viscosity of pigment, the feel of the steel support, invests the eventual 
action of painting with a sense of materiality that is innately or essentially 
(self) reflective. Humphries remarks, ‘The very substance of paint is a sort of 
abstract, formless thing that’s very other, but physical and biological too. It’s 
very base’.59 Paint, then, being both physical and biological, is of the body. In 
and of itself it is a matter of flesh — limber, slimy, secreted — ‘an informed 
smearing of shit’ is Cecily Brown’s irreverent description of painting.60 At the 
same time, paint alludes to the body beyond its base limit. It is at once 
corporeal and at the same time immaterial. Paint is a sort of abstract only in 
its relation to the body, to the figure. The relationship is symbiotic, if not 
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parasitic. ‘The body is the Figure’, Deleuze writes, ‘not the structure.61 This 
statement might also read, ‘The paint is the Figure, not the structure’.  
 
In this sense gesture might be seen as a kind of anatomy. The figure is flayed 
to the bare bones with the violence of mark and mistake.. The once disparate 
vocabularies of abstraction and representation begin to run together. Talking 
to Cecily Brown about her work Humphries comments that 
 
Your paintings are truly figurative but approach concerns that are more the 
domain of abstraction: certain ways of using paint, making forms, the way the 
image disperses and re-congeals, the respiratory quality of your forms and 
how they seem to expand and contract, the way movement occurs.
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Again we see paint itself become corporeal, it assumes bodily presence — its 
materiality invest forms with this respiratory quality. If not quite a ‘living thing’ 
as such, painting breathes, it lets go the little exaltation that closed lips let 
pass, the exaltation that articulates one’s disappointment at not being able to 
say anything. Bringing abstract concerns to bear upon the figure amounts to a 
kind of sublimation. Gesture and mark serve as the means of repression. In 
Humphries’ paintings there is a sense of the figure cancelled or redacted 
behind fiercely free expressive language. Such a vocabulary is constrained 
within ambivalent contours of taped off lines — lines that contain Humphries’ 
expressive bodily expulsions. As Mark Godfrey comments ‘the history of 
Western painting has centered on the representation of skin’. In the absence 
of its image it is the fleshiness of paint that acts as lure for the viewer. 
 
In Kat, 2009 (Fig. 39) Humphries presents a monochrome whose aggressive 
gestural language is barely contained at all, but for the brief serrating zig-zag 
of taped edge that runs down the mid right hand side of the painting. A latent 
desire for the figure, perhaps intrinsic to all painting, is consumed by the 
catastrophe that here runs amok. The physical gestures of the painting seem 
like the remains of a figure scribbled out — the smears of rag and brush wipe 
through a mass of darkness that obliquely implies human form in portrait.  
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   Figure. 39 Jacqueline Humphries, Kat, 2009, (Oil on linen, 228 x 24 cm)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Figure. 40 Jacqueline Humphries, Untitled, 2011 (Oil on linen, 228 x 243 cm) 
 
Courtesy of the artist and Green Naftali, New York  
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The smear sublimates it, leaving fore and ground to vibrate against each 
other. In this sense Kat is the privation of the figure. As such, however, it is a 
double negative. In its absence the figure is felt all the more keenly. The 
figural is propped up with the remains of the figure — the human fragments 
left behind in Rembrandt’s shadows, shadows that Humphries disrupts in Kat.  
 
It might be said that Humphries approaches abstraction with concerns more in 
the domain of figuration. She comments that ‘I like to think you make a 
painting against the background of all other pictures, so the figures are there, 
offstage’.63 Despite her best efforts, against such contingency the figure 
endures in the handmade mark, in the traces of physical expression and in 
the base-ness of paint as body. Humphries’ paintings insist upon a physical 
experience that is disorientating and contradictory. They ‘challenge us to look 
carefully and slowly’ at an immediate experience.64 The scale of her work is 
generally that of the body, of arms-reach dimensions. However, she refuses 
to allow the viewer to anchor themselves within this material field. Godfrey 
notes that Humphries’ work ends ‘in a place where the painting will not cohere 
and creates the experience of the unknown at every instance of looking at 
it’.65  
 
In more recent painting, like Untitled, 2011 (Figure. 40) Humphries begins with 
a painted frame — a finite contour against which to stage an infinite 
expansion of malerisch language. Invoking the spirit of Barnett Newman, 
Humphries comments that ‘This frame is a way of saying, ‘this, here, now’.66 
Rather than emptiness there is fullness, rather than silence there is visual 
language, there is the event of gesture. The frame mitigates the threat of the 
void of arbitrary abstraction. Humphries remarks, ‘My goal is always to paint a 
picture, not just an abstraction’.67 A certain proximity to Newman is further 
evinced in Humphries’ painting. A work like Untitled, 2008 (Figure. 42) takes 
Newman’s iconic zip and turns it up to eleven. Here Humphries’ now is 
manifest in an impossibly complex visual matrix created from painting over, 
through and around masking tape zips to the point at which opticality fails and 
the haptic view takes over. In places the tape is left on the painted surface as 
testament to intuition, to the feeling orientated process that is painting.  
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Fig. 41 Jacqueline Humphries, Untitled, 2008,  
(Oil on linen, 228 x 243 cm)  
 
Courtesy of the artist and Green Naftali, New York 
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The deployment of the zip is more than citation; it is more than a knowing 
postmodern nudge and wink in the direction of sensibilities past. Humphries 
evidently genuinely shares the concerns of Barnett Newman. She remarks 
 
It’s a notion I have about what abstraction can do, which I attempt to answer 
differently with each body of work; that maybe you can augment the “real” 
effect without the intermediary of represented “things”. For example, there are 
ways of expressing fullness and emptiness other than with objects. And what 
really compels me is the very palpable risk of failure, as if edging up to an 
abyss.
68  
 
On some level Newman and Humphries are painting the same thing. In her 
ambition to augment the “real” effect there are echoes of Newman’s sense of 
struggle ‘to bring out from the nonreal, from the chaos of ecstasy something 
that evokes a memory of the emotion of an experienced moment of total 
reality’.69 Now is as now as it was then, when Newman painted Onement I in 
1948.  
 
In earlier stages of studio research the initial ‘architecture’ of the work was 
established through the image of a Rembrandt self-portrait, in Symptom IV 
(Figure. 38) there is no such given upon which to rely. Structure or 
compositional integrity emerges from the body — from paint itself — from the 
free marks that come from an intuitive working through of the materials with 
fingers, palms, brushes and rags. Without image to fall back on such thinking 
is necessarily impulsive. The incentive to begin amounts to a leap of faith — 
one that reminds us that painting is an act of devotion. The first mark made, 
while deliberately intended is impossible to predict. The immediacy of gesture, 
its directness is the result of a tension between intentionality and 
happenstance. The downward smear of Symptom IV is a gestural form 
derived from intention translated to accident or intuition in the operation, in the 
act of painting. It activates the surface of the work, revealing the material 
qualities of both pigment and mark; it opens the possibility of form extracted 
from, but intrinsically still part of, a ground that refuses to submit. These free 
marks, the catastrophe that corrupts the whole, are brought under control 
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through the painterly response that determines compositional structure from 
negative syntax. Such a material response equates to Deleuze’s notion of the 
contour in Bacon’s painting — the critical faculty brought to bear on the event 
of the diagram, on the hysteria of the accident. In this sense painting becomes 
a process of containment through effacing, cancelling and redacting, tactics 
that traverse the territory between form and formlessness. Here the figure 
reaches its limit, disintegrating into gesture and into Rembrandt’s shadows, 
into the shadows of the body — as Deleuze remarks, ‘the shadow is the body 
that has escaped from itself through some localized point in the contour’.70  
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LOST IN TRANSLATION:  
FORMS OF DISCOURSE 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 42 Symptom VIII, 2014  
(oil on stainless steel, 100 x 100 cm) 
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Figure. 42a Symptom VIII — detail 2014  
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The work is this paradox: as a visible object, it bears witness to an 
unknown substance, diaphanous, big with powers in innumerable 
colours, spatialities and temporalities. Slow lightning. The work is in the 
obligation of that and obliges the eye to turn into a mouth to mouth onto 
that. The work is the cry it gives when the painter’s hand, putting it into 
our throat, transmogrifies it in passing into visible colour and 
surveyable expanse, into lasting time. 71  
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In Symptom VIII, 2014 (Figure. 42, 42a) this evolving language of intuition is 
applied to a larger scale. Where previously I had sought a kind of miserly, 
impoverished economy of form through subtractive gesture, the larger surface 
facilitated a more expansive vocabulary of negative forms with which to 
articulate material working through. The painting process is one that begins 
with the singular irruptive gesture on a pristine surface — with a definitive 
statement that descends through extrapolation to misadventure. The integrity 
of the initial mark, which cannot sustain the compositional whole, is subjected 
to sabotage — a process of over painting, running through, cutting out and 
cancelling that continues despite numerous moments of cohesion and 
coagulation. The painter’s impulse to coax form and image to its limit pushes 
the painting back into chaos, returning the work to its original unstable point of 
departure. The process begins again, structured upon the salvaged remains 
from the proceeding pass. All the while the paint cures, resulting in a slower 
surface, a more fleshy body, which produces material contrast in gestural 
phrases — from the quicksilver to the labored, from the hard edged to the 
smeared and smudged. The tension between foreground presence and 
limitless recession suggests temporal instability — a state of transition or 
translation that reveals form in a state of becoming or decomposing. At such a 
threshold resemblance suddenly becomes a possibility, but one that ultimately 
refuses to be realized. The end point of the process, while far from arbitrary, 
nevertheless exhibits a certain ambivalence that leaves the viewer with work 
to do. From a distance the contrast of form against darkness in Symptom VIII 
might imply kinship with, for example, seventeenth century still life painting, 
but closer inspection reveals the nothing of gesture in place of object. The 
known collapses into what Bataille termed the ‘night’ of ‘non-knowledge’ — 
the abject state of blindness in which the sublime is seen.72 
 
Bataille’s writing has been used as a prism through which to view the gestural 
painting of contemporary artists like Charlene von Heyl. Discussing her work 
the writer Kirsty Bell describes a painting process characterized by a ‘constant 
doubling-back, wiping over and destroying of what was there before’.73 Bell 
locates chance at the heart of von Heyl’s methods — a modus operandi 
referred to by the artist in terms of sabotage. Von Heyl’s painting, Bell 
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suggests, relies upon chance as a ‘productive interference that prevents 
static, straightforward progression from idea to representation’.74 Bell applies 
Bataille’s existential description of chance to von Heyl’s production. She 
quotes Bataille, who states ‘Chance represents a way of going beyond when 
life reaches the outer limits of the possible and gives up. Refusing to pull 
back, never looking behind, our uninhibited boldness discovers that solutions 
develop where cautious logic is baffled’.75 
 
Bafflement — the surrender of cognition to raw experience or sensation — is, 
in Von Heyl’s work, the result of painting that is somewhat less malerisch, less 
materially expressive than Humphries, but that, nevertheless, offers the 
prospect of a non-verbal language that communicates a ‘whole hearted belief’ 
in painting’s ability to ‘suggest movement, to conjure depth from two 
dimensions, to articulate mood, to picture flesh’.76 The materiality of paint 
itself that is center-stage in early works like Misshit, 2001 (Figure. 43) is 
gradually superseded by a more glyphic vocabulary that comes to the fore in 
later works. Such a vocabulary is presented in a more propositional, strategic 
manner than in the painting of Humphries. However, quotation and citation 
are employed sincerely in the service of articulating ‘something that remains 
inexplicable in any other language’.77 In a work like Woman, 2005 (Figure. 44) 
von Heyl applies a steady hand to chaos. She states that  
 
What I’m trying to do is to create an image that has the iconic value of a sign 
but remains ambiguous in its meaning. Something that feels like a 
representation but isn’t. Something that looks as if it has a content or a 
narrative but hasn’t. Something that is kind of hovering in front of the painting 
instead of just being it.
78
 
 
While the vocabulary of Woman might bring to mind historical antecedents — 
Newman’s taped zips, the arbitrary line of Duchamp’s Three Standard 
Stoppages (1913) or Pollock’s drips and splashes — von Heyl’s strategy aims 
at authenticity rather than pastiche. Her looping, glitching and erasing visual 
tactics produce ‘weird shifts where you don’t expect them, and at their best  
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Figure. 43 Charlene von Heyl, Misshit, 2001  
(Oil on canvas, 85 x 100”) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 44 Charlene von Heyl, Woman, 2005  
(Charcoal, oil and acrylic 82 x 78”) 
 
Courtesy of the artist and Petzel, New York  
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they will have an auratic presence despite themselves. It’s not about 
mystifying anything; it’s about lengthening the time of pleasure. Or torture’.79  
 
As with Humphries, Newman and a mid-century perspective would appear to 
be on von Heyl’s mind — auratic presence here turns on the sensation of time 
passing, on an immediacy of Now that stretches into the infinite. Von Heyl’s 
painting aggressively goes after such a state, for her it’s Now or Else — the 
title of a painting from 2009 (Figure. 45). It is a work that demands seeing as a 
triggering and as an experiencing. Her emphasis is on something that feels 
like representation, not that looks like it. The response to her painting is 
physical. She describes this reaction as the ‘cringe factor’ — an awkward 
bodily reflex, triggered by a kind of retching eye — an eye in painful spasm 
confronted with an uncomfortable visual experience of the unknowable. Von 
Heyl points out that cringe is produced by ‘procedure and material and 
imagery, not jokes or literal irony’. Bell aligns this kind of bodily response to a 
kind of sensuality — with desire that remains unsatisfied. Once again she 
summons Bataille, quoting his description of sensuality as a shift ‘in which 
suddenly there is this glimpse of a demented ‘goo’ that, although normally 
escaping us, suddenly seems attainable. The ‘goo’ still gets away’.80 
 
Now or Else refuses to comfort the eye. Variances in visual rhythm jar against 
one another. In these later works gestures are distinct and isolated. Hard 
edges produce a language of abrupt contrast. The needle skips, ‘manipulating 
the speed of perception’ as von Heyl remarks.81 Breadth and depth become 
conflated. A singular material surface dissolves or corrodes the distinction 
between figure and ground. 
 
Where Humphries figures the gesture of painting, von Heyl can be said to 
paint gesture. As such the real in von Heyl’s painting turns on a certain 
fakeness — a fakeness sincerely employed. Both approaches signal a belief 
in the language of painting as discourse made plastic. Von Heyl quotes Walter 
Benjamin definition of image as ‘dialectics at a standstill’.82 The provisionality 
intrinsic to the painting of both artists declares that the discourse is 
necessarily impossible to resolve. Even if it is at a degree of critical remove,  
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Figure. 45 Charlene von Heyl, Now or Else, 2009 
(Acrylic oil linen, 82 x 78”) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 46 Charlene von Heyl, Igitur, 2008  
(Acrylic on linen 82 x 74”) courtesy of the artist and Petzel gallery, New York  
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impossibility fuels such practices, both in terms of the failure of the word in 
relation to painting — both painters comment on the limit of written discourse 
in relation to painting — and in terms of painting itself. Igitur is a painting by 
von Heyl from 2008 (Figure. 46). Of the work, von Heyl remarks 
 
“Igitur” is a poem by Stéphane Mallarmé. He continued to change it for years 
and left it unfinished. The poem is about the impossibility of making art — and 
about art as suicide. At the time I was reading Maurice Blanchot, who was 
obsessed with Mallarmé, and I’m obsessed with people who are obsessed 
with Mallarmé because they always make for a cool access to pathos. I have 
tried to get there through Mallarmé himself, but I just can’t enter that mind 
space. 
 
Pathos coolly delivered is a fair summation of von Heyl’s language of gesture. 
Existential crisis is presented forcefully but stripped of the hysterics of 
Mallarmé’s mind space. Von Heyl’s Igitur expresses the trauma of confronting 
chaos but does so with an unshaking, deliberate hand. As Lyotard writes, 
‘Now the role of the painter comes into full view: to hold up the formidable 
disorder of the figural to the luminous organization of the scriptural’.83 Von 
Heyl’s intuitive language produces paintings that refuse to resolve 
themselves. They remain defiantly open. Igitur is the limit of expression — a 
gaping mouth held at tension. In this sense von Heyl too paints the scream. 
But it is a silent scream, a muffled scream from a mouth gummed up with 
Bataille’s demented goo. 
 
Like Igitur, Symptom X, 2014 (Figure. 47) aims at auratic presence squeezed 
from the gap between the phony and the real, between the gesture of 
abstraction and abstraction itself — between the disorder of the figural and 
the security of the scriptural. While the initial point of departure in the process 
remained a singular movement, a perfectly isolated material gesture hacked 
from the ground, as the painting developed gesture shifted closer towards a 
sense of representation, towards something that feels reminiscent — 
nostalgia abstracted. In this respect Symptom X allows the inferred 
seventeenth century still life forms to stay for longer within the composition.  
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Figure. 47 Symptom X, 2014  
(Oil on stainless steel, 100 x 100 cm) 
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Figure. 48 Symptom X — detail 
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The painting, however, cannot be trusted. The forms remain inconclusive, in a 
state of transition or translation between the legible and the non-demonstable. 
As von Heyl comments ‘when you get close, you realize that the surface is not 
keeping that promise; it’s almost like a betrayal’.84 Symptom X (Figure. 48 —
detail) reveals itself to be an empty vessel, full to the brim with an abject 
material language that articulates the fleeting possibility of inner experience. 
The smear is slipping; it presents bodily evidence of downward movement. It 
represents the misadventure of the figure. The smear is a portrait of the self; it 
is a portrait of impossibility and faith — to use Newman’s words, ‘It is an 
expression of how I worked. I was a pilgrim as I painted’.85 
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GHOSTS IN THE MACHINE:  
PAINTING ABSENCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 49 Negotiation II, 2013  
(Monoprint, oil on newsprint, 14 x 11 cm) 
! !
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Hands prepare the fire, they flounder in paste and pigment, distribute 
all but blindly the drops, the clusters, the spots, the fields. And then it’s 
the marvel of the flashing bang, when the great MAN press prints in 
one go on the thick paper the unforeseen monotype. I paint time, time 
without dimension, instantaneous and simultaneous. I push the button, 
the machine begins to smoke its poisonous steam, it presses the paper 
to the tune of six or eight hundred tons per square inch, expels from its 
belly the unknown print, new-born of colours, miraculous total bouquet, 
ready-made rocket, that the paper retains and keeps in its swaddles, I 
didn’t do anything, says the alarmed man faced with the child. What the 
MAN press can do, the man indeed cannot.86 
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Reflecting upon Sam Francis’ works on paper, Lyotard writes ‘The monotype 
fixes the few small articles fallen from a throw of the dice’ — an expression he 
draws from Stéphane Mallarmé’s radical poetic work, Un Coup de Dés Jamais 
N'Abolira Le Hasard (A Throw of the Dice will Never Abolish Chance).87 In 
Discourse, Figure Lyotard cites this work along with Igitur in relation to a more 
phenomenological calibration of language, to a more sensorial capacity within 
the word. Mallarmé, writes Lyotard, ‘radically deprives articulated language of 
its prosaic function of communication, revealing in it a power that exceeds it: 
the power to be “seen,” and not only read-heard; the power to figure, and not 
only to signify’.88 In this sense language is conceived of as an open form 
whose obligation is neither to represent nor to re-create, but instead to initiate. 
Such forms are negative; they are located in the space between letters and 
words, in the silence, in the void of language 
 
Through the transgression of the usual spacings between textual elements, 
through an arrangement of words that takes into consideration, beneath the 
constraints imposed by the structure of language [langue], spatial values 
borrowed from our visual and gestural experience, whether perceptual or 
imaginary.
89    
 
Lyotard writes that ‘When speech becomes object, it is not to reproduce 
something visible, but to make visible an invisible, lost “thing”, taking on the 
form of the imaginary of which it speaks’.90 Poles are reversed, from the 
language of signs to the sign of language — an other discourse, plastic and 
expressive. The spatial values borrowed from visual experience turn on 
arbitrariness, on the unforeseen distances and proximities, the rhythms of 
form and formlessness that emanate from the inconclusive or unresolved 
nature of gesture — from the throw of a dice.  
 
The monoprint is just such a gamble. In symbiosis with my painting during this 
research I have developed an ongoing cycle of works on paper using the 
monoprint process, of which Negotiation II (Figure. 49) is an example. As the 
most basic method of transferring a painting to paper monoprinting offered 
possibilities both in terms of research themes and practice.  
!
∀#∃!
 
The monoprint might be described as the epitome of abjection in painting. The 
printing press subjects it to a brute force that degrades material and gesture, 
leaving intention nothing but a stain — an oily slick across paper. In this 
respect the monoprint process was approached as an evolution of studio 
research into painting as an abject material language.  
 
The monochromatic ground on an unprimed steel plate is broken up using 
solvents, oil mediums like honey-gel, rags, bushes and fingers to a tipping 
point where image is implied but not literalized. The painting is then subjected 
to the arbitrary and violent process of translation that takes place in the press, 
corroding painting’s present-ness, leaving only vestiges or the fragmented 
artifact of an experience now absent — the ghost of a painting recorded 
unfaithfully on paper, a support with intrinsic association with the literary, with 
drawing and narrative. In the press, painting falls into a gap between the word 
and visual language, between text and texture. Such a gap elicits the silence 
experienced before articulation; the gap is the anxious pause before speech, 
where articulation remains viable but its form indeterminate and improbable. It 
is an awkward silence, one that asks ‘How many combinations were possible, 
remain pending!’ 91 We are returned to Beckett’s notion of a literature of the 
un-word. The spaces between phrases, the voids within language equate to 
thought made form. Lyotard quotes Paul Valéry who writes of Mallarmé’s 
experimental typography, “It seemed to me that I was looking at the form and 
pattern [la figure] of a thought, placed for the first time in finite space [!] With 
my own eye I could see silences that had assumed bodily shapes”.92  
 
What the press leaves behind is more akin to a sketch, a preliminary; 
Negotiation VIII, 2013 (Figure. 50) is the idea of a painting, boundless, 
terrifying, threatening, inconceivable — as Raphael Rubenstein might have it, 
impossible. Negotiation VIII is a ‘symptom-picture’; it is the trace of the desire 
to paint fossilized or cauterized under the press. It presents the material  
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Figure. 50 Negotiation VIII, 2012,  
(Oil on newsprint, 14 x 11 cm) 
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evidence of painting. However, the proof turns out to be circumstantial. While 
the experience remains analog, in the flesh as it were, with all the grain of 
paper variance and the noise of pigment/ink inconsistency, there is an 
uncertain temporality to the work. Movement appears arrested but not yet 
complete; the corruptive force of gesture remains operative — the resultant 
image hums, vibrating between past, present and future tense as it continues 
to decompose within the eye.  
 
Like rag, brush, blade or finger the press is a painting tool. Its mechanical 
ambivalence, its industrial frigidity belies potential for expressive material and 
gestural articulation. In a statement to accompany his 1963/64 18 Cantos 
suite of lithographic prints Barnett Newman described printing as an 
‘instrument’ to be played. For Newman lithography was not a ‘poor man’s 
substitute’, it was not distinct from painting; rather printing methods served the 
material expansion of the abstract language common to his creative out put in 
general. He comments that ‘I have always worked the stone the same way 
that I paint and draw — using the area — complete’.93 As an instrument the 
press is affective and expressive — it is a sensorial device. Of lithography 
Newman writes, ‘It is like a piano or an orchestra; and as with an instrument, it 
interprets’.94 In this sense the press is an intuitive apparatus. The process of 
interpretation reveals a tension between control and chaos — the forms spat 
out ultimately unpredictable. The weight of paper, the density of the ground, 
the pressure of the press itself all contribute to a variable and felt process, a 
material working through that translates the known, or the visible into the 
apparition of the invisible, into an expression of the unknowable. The press 
degrades the work, forcing it beyond expectation, beyond its limit. In this way 
the press returns the work to darkness. The instant of collision, the gesture of 
compression, the flashing bang that crushes these variables into an 
unforeseen totality blinds, leaving us to rely on other senses or the sense of 
the other.  
 
Newman equates such visual forms with a kind of listening. As cantos his 
prints assume the character of poetic or lyrical language — ‘each one different 
in form, mood, colour, beat, scale, and key’.95  In this sense my own print  
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Figure. 51 Negotiation X, 2013  
(Oil on 300gm Somerset paper, 14 X 11 cm) 
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works develop from one another, each form suggesting an alternative 
threshold for the next. Each constitutes a distinct phrase, but when taken 
together as a cycle there is the cogency of what Newman describes as 
‘symphonic mass’ — each individual expression ‘adds its song to the full 
chorus’.96  
 
Works like Negotiation X, 2014 (Figure. 51) come from a ‘grappling with the 
instrument’, from a material negotiation that leaves the figure/ground 
relationship in flux — the violence of the press corrupting the two into one 
another, into the artifact of a singular imprint.97 Like Bacon’s splatter of thrown 
paint or Newman’s coarsely painted taped off zip, the flash-bang of the press 
is the catastrophe that invokes the disorder of the figural against the 
intelligible, against the figurative. In a literal sense the monoprint process 
turns painting inside out — the resultant ‘ruined’ image being the reverse of 
the original. Rolling the press across the painting, chance and chaos are 
crushed back into the work at the very moment it feels there is nothing more 
to be done. At the point the painting nears clarity, control is surrendered to the 
inconsistencies of the machine and the self of the painter is lost. Lyotard 
describes it poetically as the ‘backward stroke of the wing’ that jolts the 
‘storerooms of the visible’.98 As such the action of the press is a gesture of 
sabotage — a term Charlene von Heyl used for the title of a 2008 artist’s book 
of her print works. John Kelsey describes von Heyl’s works on paper as ‘travel 
posters for unpicturable, exploded destinations; they are pages of chaos’.99 
The notion of exploded destinations is an apt summation of how the press as 
gesture, in a work like Negotiation X, serves to force open form and insist 
upon surface. That surface is at tension between speed and stillness, 
between material manifestation and the immaterial, between the physical 
presence of ink, oils, paper and mark, and the absence of painting.  
 
Von Heyls’ works on paper are an amalgam of printing techniques. Screen-
printing is layered on top of woodcuts on top of drawing on top of digital prints. 
References and visual sources are gradually buried under a suffocating 
accumulation of procedure and process. Presented in her book Sabotage 
(2008) von Heyl’s print works offer the proposition of visual form experienced 
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materially in the place of the written word. Kelsey comments that ‘Rejecting 
both written language and illustration, Sabotage is a sort of image-text that 
gets straight to one of the book format’s most abstract possibilities; the 
material production of a sort of counterspace that exists beyond meaning’.100 
The excess of her vocabulary ultimately delivers a visual language that 
equates to a silence that speaks volumes. Von Heyl comments that  
 
The challenge was to use the form of the book and the idea of a text that 
never surfaces but is there as form, and to use that as a tool to insist on 
presence [!] I am interested in a kind of iconic statement that, in the moment 
where you actually try to read it, refuses exactly that and insists on having 
nothing to say.101   
 
Like Newman’s prints works, von Heyl’s develop out of one another, moving 
backwards and forwards towards a coherent whole. Both artists presented 
such works in a way that emphasized the common vocabulary and purpose of 
the individual images. While Newman presented his 18 Cantos as a physical 
portfolio, complete with introductory statement, von Heyl creates a sense of 
symphonic mass through the format of a book. In so doing both bring the 
horizontality intrinsic to the written word to the perception of visual form. Both 
appear interested in the space of text being ceded to place, to immediacy — 
to the now-ness of painting. Expanded from their painting vocabularies this 
language consumes the literary in favor of literal experience. Gesture erases 
the word. Narrative is obliterated, scribbled out, over written with an all-
consuming ground, with abstract form. Without recognizable text, without the 
sanctuary of the word the reader is forced to become spectator — witness to 
catastrophe, to the articulation of impossibility.  
 
Movement V, 2014 (Figure. 52) presents the possibility of this impossibility. 
The smear and the press conspire to leave a corrupted state, neither painting, 
drawing nor writing. Such catastrophe is transitional — it is motion. Deleuze 
comments that ‘In the unity of the catastrophe and the diagram, man 
discovers rhythm as matter and material’.102 In this sense the monoprint 
alludes to the destabilizing material rhythm of the un-presentable. However, 
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while the violent methods of the monoprint are given free rein catastrophe 
does not devour the work entirely, it is confined within the white margins that 
are an inevitability when printing on paper. This formal intrusion ‘magnetized 
the challenge’ of printing for Newman. He writes, ‘I would create a totality only 
to find it change after it was printed — into another totality’. The struggle as he 
saw it was to ‘give the imprint its necessary scale so that it could have its 
fullest expression’ — in other words, so that each print declared presence.103 
Scale in Newman’s lexicon has little to do with size. In an effort to achieve this 
he subsequently gave each canto unique margins based on intuition. 
However, from the point of view of my own studio research the machine-
driven shift between totalities has proved not so unwanted. Such framing 
equates to Bacon’s contour — the visual means by which the catastrophe of 
the roll of dice is given compositional value. It serves to contain the 
ambivalent, invisible forces of abjection, which bring nothing and something to 
tension in physical discourse. These margins establish the key in which 
rhythm as matter and material is heard. Whilst proportionally uniform, contour 
remains variable. Sometimes clean, sometimes bleeding, the margins of the 
print actuate another totality. The gestural phrase that suggests limitlessness 
becomes, instead, a material statement on the limit of language.    
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Figure. 52 Movement V, 2013,  
(Oil on 300gm Somerset paper 11 x 14 cm) 
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CONCLUSION 
 
MEMORIES OF THE HUNT:  
SPECULATION AND REFLECTION 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 53 The Whiteness of the Whale, 2015  
(Oil on stainless steel, 100 x 100 cm) 
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Figure. 53a The Whiteness of the Whale — detail 
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For all these reasons, then, any way you look at it, you must needs conclude 
that the great Leviathan is that one creature in the world which must remain 
unpainted to the last. True, one portrait may hit the mark much nearer than 
another, but none can hit it with any considerable degree of exactness. So 
there is no earthly way of finding out precisely what the whale really looks 
like. And the only mode in which you can derive even a tolerable idea of his 
living contour, is by going a whaling yourself; but by so doing, you run no 
small risk of being eternally stove and sunk by him. Wherefore, it seems to 
me you had best not be too fastidious in your curiosity touching the 
Leviathan. 
   Henry Melville, Moby Dick or, The Whale1 
 
Consigning the soaring heaven-bound sublime of the nineteenth century to 
the velvet, inky depths of a remorseless abyssal vortex that eventually 
consumes the Pequod and her crew, Melville’s invocation of the inexpressible 
turns on crisis, catastrophe and impossibility — terms which provided the 
compass points for this research. In relation to practice it was the catastrophe 
of a studio fire that brought about a fundamental revaluation of my approach 
to painting and provoked concerns with presence in painting and painting as a 
downward facing material language. Impossibility gave foundation to the 
resulting theoretical reflection. Contemporary consensus establishes that, like 
the white whale, the sublime cannot be captured; it cannot be harpooned and 
stuck fast with a unified and coherent aesthetic logic. As evidenced in the 
persistent requests made by the supervisory team for this research to clarify, 
qualify and contain the terms employed, the frailties of conventional language 
cannot adequately service the inexpressible or its discourse. The sublime 
bleeds out. With no respect for boundaries or for territory, it infects. No longer 
held upright with a spine of Romantic divinity it mutates, becoming a kind of 
inner experience in the broadest sense, approached in countless ways, by 
countless writers — a relatively narrow selection deployed here to determine 
a specific relationship between the sublime and abjection.  
 
Like Ahab’s doomed quest, the pursuit of the sublime in painting is destined to 
fail — the great Leviathan is that one creature in the world, which must remain 
!
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unpainted to the last. The reconciliation between subject and object, between 
experience and language remains necessarily out of reach — there is no 
earthly way of finding out precisely what the whale really looks like. However, 
this research marks a distinction between being destined to fail and failure as 
destination. Here we have found the ghosts of Bataille and Beckett, Bacon 
and, more surprisingly, Barnett Newman. Such a destination finds failure as 
limit, as a kind of materially hard-won non-knowledge — a loaded and 
contrary nothing studiously derived from the intuition and catastrophe inherent 
in thinking in paint. Such failure is far from empty. Despite being unable to 
derive even a tolerable idea of the living contour of the unpresentable, such 
limit experience, nevertheless, opens form. Form is corroded back by the 
subtractive gesture to an in-between state, to a state of formlessness that 
testifies to the possibility of the bearing witness to that which is not visible — 
the boat rocks, then pitches, revealing a fleeting glimpse of the shadow of the 
Leviathan passing silently beneath in crushing fathoms of darkness. This 
subjectivity equates to a blindness that forces the spectator to run the no 
small risk of being eternally stove and sunk by the direct experience of 
painting.  
 
From the outset the project acknowledged the contradictions inherent in 
sublime discourse. It was consciously embarked upon under what Philip Shaw 
has called ‘the absurdity of spanning the gulf between the theoretical and the 
practical’ in relation to the sublime.2 Confronted with the failure of the word 
and a perceived impasse within aesthetic logic, within a straining historical 
literature policed by external authorities — within the discourse on the sublime 
— studio practice set out to explore gesture and abjection as a material 
expansion of language to provide direct terms for an experiential account of 
the concept — to provide terms for the discourse of the sublime. The 
navigation of this distinction, a distinction that marks a distance between 
verbal and visual language in relation to inner experience, accounts for the 
central problematic of the project. Failure is our destination. The material 
expansion of language through painterly gesture is ultimately recorded and 
weighed with the written word and in proximity to the rhetoric it seeks to find 
distance from. Research that relies upon a written text to qualify an 
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investigation into texture, into the limits of the word in relation to alterity and 
the pursuit of painting as an autonomous language, has been approached 
consciously as a flawed proposition, with a view that from this tension terms 
can be reconsidered, artists re-read and discourse re-invigorated.  
 
Such tension informed the structure of the thesis, whose shape and colour 
reflects the distinct vocabularies of theory and practice. They have been 
approached as separate yet symbiotic, provoking a deliberate and necessary 
shift in tenor between chapters that discuss theoretical and historical context 
and those that endeavor to articulate the process of painting. Where the 
former leans towards the established chatter on the sublime, the latter seeks 
to evaluate studio research through commentary as ‘essay-poem’, to borrow 
Harman Parret’s description of Lyotard’s reflections on the painting of Sam 
Francis.3 These reflections on material discourse are speculative rather than 
conclusive. The heuristic is privileged over the empirical. Seeing (as an 
experiential blindness that reveals non-knowledge) is privileged above the 
sureties of looking, of knowing. The pursuit of the absolute resolutely refuses 
to reward with absolutes. It ‘appears to you, struts, parades before your eyes, 
and then vanishes,’ writes Lyotard on Francis’ painting Ahab (1962). ‘And 
after that, having survived, Ulysses, you’ll be able to write the memories of the 
hunt’.4 In respect to research conclusions, then, some memories of the hunt 
are more concrete than others.  
 
Discourse of the Sublime: Reflections on Practice 
 
At the foundations of this research lies the figure/ground relationship. In 
approaching it in relation to the abject, the figure, severed from narrative, is 
cut adrift on the provisional and the contingent. Figural forces, the (gestural) 
forces of disruption and sabotage, corrupt the polarities of the relationship, 
leaving behind a decaying non-state of subjectivity — a kind of absence that 
alludes to presence. Under the weight of such subjectivity there is perpetual 
motion of sorts, a constant but erratic back and forth between traces of the 
familiar and the unknown. The figure/ground relationship is delimited. No 
longer contained it spills out from the surface of the painting, engulfing the 
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spectator. In this moment, this privileged instant, this now, boundaries 
between the work and the self become indistinct. Experience threatens to 
overwhelm and the sublime is glimpsed, albeit obliquely, through the murky 
depths of paint smeared. 
 
While there had been, during the early stages of the project, an expectation 
that it would be processes of material degradation that would steer studio 
research — the literal processes of surface corrosion and decomposition — in 
the end it was the materiality of gesture that provided the compass 
approaching the abject. Exploring a negative gestural language — an intuitive 
vocabulary of the unresolved and the erased — enabled the development of a 
visual language that articulates the territory between representation and 
abstraction. This territory is inherently unstable; states are permanently in 
transition, or rather translation. Language shifts from illustration to sensation, 
from object to subject — from closed to open form.  
 
Crucially, the decision to pursue open form, or formlessness, through the 
materiality of gesture, and not the gesture of materials, reoriented studio 
research towards language and its limit, towards a discourse located not 
within the object, within the brutality of the informe surface, but instead within 
the violence of the informe gesture, within expression and subsequently 
notions of impossibility. In this context painting became a process of sabotage 
and subtraction — a process of impoverishment as Samuel Beckett might 
have it. The figure is translated from a mode of representation into that of 
presentation by figural force — by the palm of a hand that smears one form 
into another, by the drag of rag that blurs the distinct and the discrete — by 
the physical, painterly gestures that push a work forward by pulling away what 
was previously and temporarily achieved.  
 
Such strategies provoked a shift within my painting practice from the 
abstraction of the figure to the figure of abstraction — to the bodily trace of 
obligation and limitation, to mark as artifact of the working through — a term 
employed by Lyotard in relation to ‘rhythms of inventive failure [!] 
Durcharbeiten without end, leaving little monuments to process’.5 At the heart 
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of this working through is a painterly vocabulary driven by intuitive, 
speculative endeavor. It is gesture that leaves little monuments to the search 
for a material phrase for the un-representable. As this vocabulary of sabotage 
and subtraction became the central focus of studio research, so the figure, 
with all its narrative residue, was forced out of my painting in favor of the 
plastic push and pull through which we witness the corrosion of the distinction 
between figure and ground. Charlene Von Heyl’s words return to mind — ‘I 
want to get abstraction to the point where it screams that it is something: a 
representation and a thing’.6 At such a point we abandon ourselves to the in-
between, to the abject.  
 
Thinking in paint equates to event — to the ‘it happens’ in Lyotard’s 
discussion on the sublime. As such material working through can be seen as 
ontologically driven discourse. It orientates towards sensation, not reason. 
Lyotard writes, ‘This question is called forth by feeling: it is possible for 
nothing to happen’.7 Smeared paint is nothing happening. Gesture translates 
it from threat to promise, from generality to specificity — to an absolute 
nothing. Subsequently we have seen event defined by a negative vocabulary 
of gesture. Painting over, through and out has characterized the Now of this 
research. Gesture folds back upon itself destabilizing the familiar. The eye is 
at once attracted and repelled; the unified self disintegrates. Compositional 
improvisation and pictorial catastrophe has offered syntax to phrase the 
unknown. A viable taxonomy, however, remains painfully beyond reach and 
we are left with only feeling — the feeling that something may be coming, 
looming towards the surface from bottomless depths of the black 
monochrome. In this anxiety we embrace, willingly or otherwise, a kind of 
inner experience. 
 
The smear is not a sign for the sublime, it is not a legible motif, it does not 
stand in for the vertiginous mountain range or the religious icon, rather it is a 
symptom — a symptom of, as Beckett remarks, ‘Two old maladies that should 
no doubt be considered separately: the malady of wanting to know what to do 
and the malady of wanting to be able to do it’.8 The smear is symptomatic of 
haptic vision, of seeing as feeling. Its disruptive movement, which sets the 
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figure/ground relationship at tension and invokes a destabilizing subjectivity, 
insists on a collaborative response from the spectator. Commenting on Carl 
Einstein’s conception of visual language in relation to George Braque, Didi-
Huberman writes 
 
Einstein speaks to us here of a vision which is not a faculty, but exigency, 
work: it rejects the visible (that is to say the already visible) and demands the 
oscillation of the visual; it rejects the action of the voyeur and demands that of 
the seer. This is the ultimate mode of comprehending the symptom-image: 
what is a symptom, in effect, if not the unexpected, unfamiliar sign, often 
intense and always disruptive, which visually declares something which is not 
yet visible, something we do not yet know? If the image is a symptom — in 
the critical rather than the clinical sense of the term —, if the image is 
discontent in representation, it is in that it indicates a future of representation, 
a future that we know not yet how to read, nor even describe.’ 
9
 
In the symptom-image the relationship between work and spectator is no 
longer passive. Like the symptom, the negative painterly gesture is active, it is 
open, operative, mobile — it demands. In this respect the symptom-image is a 
form of discourse, or a contribution to (non) knowledge. The smear, 
discontent in representation, insists that the spectator go a whaling 
themselves.  
 
Discourse on the Sublime: Speculations on Theory 
 
Thinking in paint directly facilitated new critical thinking. Pursuing the abject in 
painting, via gestural language, offered material expansion of terms in relation 
to a discourse of alterity. It enabled me to reconsider the narrative of the 
sublime, subsequently revealing an abject underbelly to a history I discovered 
to be defined by the cycle of collective trauma. More importantly, the figural 
evolution of studio research provoked critical reflections that revealed the 
potential for closer parallels between the existential, anti-hierarchical drive of 
European dissident surrealist artists and writers and transcendence as 
articulated by American mid-century abstract expressionist painters. Such 
possibility enabled speculation on a commonality in language between artists 
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with diverse and apparently opposing material vocabularies. Though unlikely 
bedfellows, we have consequently seen, through the cloudy and cracked 
prism of an abject sublime, unexpected proximity between Francis Bacon and 
Barnett Newman. 
 
While the diffracted view through such a prism might ultimately remain 
unreliable, speculation on a relationship between Newman and Bataille offers 
the possibility of a new perspective on the painter — one that relocates him to 
the Other side of the Atlantic as a dissident surrealist. Though concrete 
evidence for Bataille’s influence on the painter might at this point remain 
largely circumstantial, clues found in the pages of the sublime issue of The 
Tiger’s Eye, in Newman’s Broken Obelisk sculptures and, in more general 
terms, the painter’s own writing suggest, if not a direct relationship, then 
certainly more than a passing wave. While the perimeters of this project 
constrained this particular area of investigation, moving forward there would 
seem good grounds for an expansion of research into the question of 
proximity between Newman and Bataille. 
 
We have seen that the modern and postmodern sublime is grasped against 
the grain leaving us with a downward facing sense of the concept, one that 
privileges spirit as corporeal experience. ‘Level by nature to this earth’s 
horizon are the glances of man’s eyes;’ comments Ahab, “not shot from the 
crown of his head’.10 Cut adrift from divine nature or the imperious vertical 
iconography of the gothic cathedral, the sacred has become fugitive. The 
‘sacred place’ is transitional; a state of becoming found in the opacity of now; 
it is movement — sensation. It is this bodily sense of the sacred that I have 
traced from studio practice to Bataillean notions of interiority and the 
inexpressible prevalent in the twentieth-century and subsequently detectable 
in the practices of the contemporary painters here discussed.  
 
In so doing conditions have been established to revaluate the sublime in 
abject terms. We have seen that the recent re-emergence of concerns with 
the overwhelming and the inexpressible within cultural production follows a 
cyclical history whereby the sublime is reanimated in the wake of collective 
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trauma. From the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 to the terror and turbulence 
experienced globally post 9/11; a history of anxiety has provoked a gradual 
shift towards strategies of negation in relation to the inexpressible. Such a 
shift plunges the sublime into Beckett’s existential darkness, where we find 
the figure in fragment. The optimism that once anchored transcendence to the 
divine gives way, under the excessive tumult of the contemporary period, to a 
pessimism that instead binds our sense of the Other to silence, to the 
impossibility of articulation. At its limit, language is driven toward the visual. 
Here we find a vocabulary characterized by erasure, sabotage and the 
provisional. The sublime is reanimated in painting by the expression of 
painterly endeavor — by an expansion of non-representational gestural form, 
a kind of non-composition, as Mark Godfrey would have it, which deploys 
formlessness as a phrase of presentation.11 This vocabulary — the disruptive 
phrasing of the drip, the exaggerated, eviscerating brushstroke, the sprayed 
and spattered impasto blockage, the scraped back and the smeared — 
continues to be offered as future representation, in spite of, or perhaps 
because of, past affiliations. As Godfrey suggests issues of authenticity 
become largely moot; gesture becomes ‘unlocatable’.12 Whatever 
associations or motivations are found therein, this vocabulary, this syntax of 
abandon and renewal, is employed sincerely in the service of the unknowable 
and painting as direct experience.  
 
Painting as material discourse expands to fill the schisms, fissures and 
contradictions, which for contemporary commentators like Elkins and Forsey 
prohibit a viable coherent theory of the sublime. As we have seen the critical 
desire for a unified theory for such a shape shifting, porous concept ultimately 
cannot be satisfied. However, the language of painting — gesture, colour, 
mark and matter — offers an alternative discursive model, one better suited to 
notions of the inexpressible. Lyotard, for whom, to a degree, the terms 
painting and the sublime are interchangeable, describes the need for the 
distinction of discursive models when he writes 
 
It appears to me that producing a theoretical discourse on painting —
theoretical in the sense that this word has today, that is, a meta-language 
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whose model is inevitably linguistic (or more strictly language-like) — would 
be to reconstitute in the region of discourse a set-up that pictorial practice 
(here the interpretive domain that it is a question of understanding) is 
precisely in the process of liquidating or liquefying.
13
 
 
Intrinsically orientated towards subject, the language of painting offers the 
possibility of just such a liquidation through non-cognitive discourse governed 
by feeling — by the affect-phrase, which remains unarticulated despite the 
presence of gesture. Lyotard continues 
 
Rather than attempting to understand, what we have to do would be to 
transform the energy at stake in what we call painting, not in a theoretical set-
up, but in a type of liquefaction, in a kind of aleatory production, in the sense 
intended by John Cage; rather than attempting to resolve the question of 
painting in the sense of arresting its meaning, we would have to dissolve the 
question, in the sense of undoing the stases, including theory as a ‘stasis’. 
14
 
 
In this respect we can view painting as corrosive agent. The event of gesture, 
the Now of the smear, dissolves the question; it dissolves the stasis of theory. 
Aleatory production — the contingent, provisional and abject energy of 
painting — corrodes the contradictions and blockages inherent to the concept 
of the sublime and offers direct terms for the continued expansion of its 
discourse.  
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